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The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) was heralded as an “emancipation
proclamation” for people with disabilities, one that would achieve their equality
primarily through its reasonable accommodation requirements.  Nevertheless, both
legal commentators and Supreme Court Justices assert that the ADA’s employment
mandates distinguish the ADA from earlier antidiscrimination measures, most nota-
bly Title VII, because providing accommodations results in something more than
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equality for the disabled.  The Article challenges this prevalent belief by arguing that
ADA-mandated accommodations are consistent with other antidiscrimination meas-
ures in that each remedies exclusion from employment opportunity by questioning the
inherency of established workplace norms, and by engendering cost when altering those
norms.  It then places the ADA within historical context by illustrating how now-
outdated social conventions about other workers with perceived atypical biological
identities, particularly women and African Americans, persist in keeping workers with
disabilities from equal labor market participation.  Finally, the Article demonstrates
how ADA accommodation expenses are an appropriate and reasonable remedy and
explains why, for both economic and prudential reasons, disability-related accom-
modations must operate as antidiscrimination provisions (rather than as tax-and-
spend subsidies) in order to alter social attitudes towards the disabled.  The Article
concludes with some thoughts on what extra-judicial factors could facilitate the ADA’s
transformative agenda.
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Legislation is powerless to eradicate racial instincts or to abolish distinctions based
upon physical differences . . . .
1
[W]oman’s physical structure and the performance of maternal functions place
her at a disadvantage . . . . [S]he is not an equal competitor with her brother.2
INTRODUCTION
Modeled after existing civil rights statutes, and passed with great
flourish, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)3 was heralded as
an “emancipation proclamation” for people with disabilities.4  At the
heart of the statute, and intended as the most expedient method of
bringing about social and economic equality for the disabled, are the
ADA’s employment provisions.5  In pertinent part, Title I compels
employers to provide reasonable accommodations to “qualified” em-
ployees with disabilities.6  By placing this obligation upon employers,
1
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896).
2
Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 421-22 (1908).
3
Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (1990) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§
12101-12213 (2000)).
4
Two legislators are credited with this description. See 136 CONG. REC. S9689
(daily ed. July 13, 1990) (statement of Sen. Harkin) (“The ADA is, indeed, the 20th
century emancipation proclamation for all persons with disabilities.”); 135 CONG. REC.
S10789 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1989) (statement of Sen. Kennedy) (“In a sense, this legisla-
tion is an emancipation proclamation for the disabled, and America will be better.”).
For an overview of the ADA, including the genesis of many of its provisions, see Robert
L. Burgdorf Jr., The Americans with Disabilities Act:  Analysis and Implications of a Second-
Generation Civil Rights Statute, 26 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 413 (1991).  For a detailed
account of the politics underlying the ADA’s passage, see JOSEPH P. SHAPIRO, NO PITY:
PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES FORGING A NEW CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 105-41 (1993).
5
The influence of disability rights advocates in “selling” the ADA to Congress on
autonomy grounds, as well as the way in which the Supreme Court might be amenable
to this conception, are set forth in Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Americans with Disabilities
Act as Welfare Reform, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 921, 985-1026 (2003).
6
To be considered qualified, individuals must be capable of performing the es-
sential job functions of the positions they seek, either with or without the provision of
reasonable accommodations.  42 U.S.C. § 12111(8).  Although this mandate is funda-
mental to disability-based employment discrimination, neither the ADA nor interpret-
ing courts have provided much guidance on how to determine the reasonableness of
accommodations.  I set forth an initial, hopefully useful, economic framework in Mi-
chael Ashley Stein, The Law and Economics of Disability Accommodations, 53 DUKE L.J. 79
(2003).
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Congress intended to remedy the historical exclusion of disabled
workers from the labor market, which it documented during hearings
on the ADA.7  Consequently, when a nearly unanimous Congress
passed the statute, it was in large part to “guarantee” workers with dis-
abilities “a level playing field.”8
Nevertheless, legal scholars analyzing Title I’s employment ac-
commodation mandates with approbation, opprobrium, or agnostic
indifference assert that those directives distinguish the ADA from
other antidiscrimination measures, most notably Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII).9  Central to this perception, which has
become “canonical,”10 is the belief that both economic reality and
conceptual theory divide Title I and Title VII into two distinct varieties
of regulation.  “[R]eal anti-discrimination law[s],”11 they aver, remedy
the exclusion of similarly situated members of protected categories
from workplace opportunity, and so achieve equality for certain his-
torically marginalized groups.12  In contrast, by affirmatively requiring
7
See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(2) (“[H]istorically, society has tended to isolate
and segregate individuals with disabilities, and, despite some improvements, such
forms of discrimination against individuals with disabilities continue to be a serious
and pervasive social problem.”).
8 136 CONG. REC. H2427 (daily ed. May 17, 1990) (statement of Rep. Hoyer).
This metaphor is frequently used when describing ADA remedies.  See, e.g., 136 CONG.
REC. H2444 (daily ed. May 17, 1990) (statement of Rep. Matsui) (expressing hope that
the ADA “will make the playing field a little more even for those with disabilities to
compete in the workplace”); Bonnie Poitras Tucker, The ADA’s Revolving Door:  Inherent
Flaws in the Civil Rights Paradigm, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 335, 341 (2001) (arguing that the
ADA’s “entire focus” is “on equalizing the playing field for people with disabilities”).
9
See Pub. L. No. 88-352, 778 Stat. 241 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000(e)-
2000(e)(17) (2000)) (barring employment discrimination on the basis of race, color,
religion, sex, and national origin).
10
To be consistent with previous scholarship, I have borrowed this term from
Christine Jolls, Antidiscrimination and Accommodation, 115 HARV. L. REV. 643, 643-44
(2001).  At the same time, I express trepidation in doing so given that the word con-
notes not only a dominant approach, but also one whose validity is recognized.  The
latter definition is inaccurate because the prevailing view of disability accommoda-
tion—which this Article shows to be theoretically incorrect, ahistorical, and counter-
factual—has arisen without adequate vetting, and thus should not be given such credi-
bility.
11
Erickson v. Bd. of Governors, 207 F.3d 945, 951 (7th Cir. 2000).  Curiously,
Judge Easterbrook’s endorsement refers to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34
(1988)), which he subsequently distinguishes from the ADA.  Erickson, 207 F.3d at 951-
52.
12
The contingent notion of what comprises equality within the employment expe-
rience of disabled workers is addressed in Parts II and III of this Article.  Arriving at a
broader, more ecumenical definition of equality is at the heart of much jurisprudential
scholarship, notably that of John Rawls and Ronald Dworkin.  That enterprise is be-
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employers to provide reasonable accommodations to existing or po-
tential workers with disabilities, the ADA does more than simply level
an uneven playing field.  Compelling employers to accommodate dis-
abled workers, these scholars agree, pushes both the workplace equi-
librium and its financial calculus beyond equality, and thus differenti-
ates the ADA from its predecessors.  The conception of disability-
related accommodations being distinct from Title VII antidiscrimina-
tion prohibitions is so pervasive that it has influenced the Supreme
Court’s ADA jurisprudence.13
An important article by Christine Jolls questions this entrenched
view by noting that antidiscrimination and accommodation measures
are not wholly separate and immiscible.14  Instead, as Jolls points out,
an overlap exists between the two regulatory devices, at least so far as
the way in which remedies for disparate impact discrimination can
parallel the provision of accommodations.15  I agree with Jolls that
confluence exists, but carry her point much further:  ADA-mandated
accommodations resemble antidiscrimination remedies not simply
due to their comparable results, but because fundamentally they are
antidiscrimination remedies.  Moreover, because this Article goes be-
yond iconoclasm and on toward reformation, I argue that ADA-
mandated accommodations are an essential normative device for ef-
fectuating equality on behalf of people with disabilities.16
This Article challenges the prevailing interpretation of the ADA
by arguing that the statute is consistent with other antidiscrimination
regulations in remedying historical inequities.  It supports this asser-
yond the scope of this Article.
13
See infra Part II.C.3.  Elsewhere, I have very briefly explored how the Court also
views disability accommodations as a threat to the governing occupational hierarchy by
eroding employers’ control of the workplace.  Michael Ashley Stein, Disability, Employ-
ment Policy, and the Supreme Court, 55 STAN. L. REV. 607, 632-33 (2002).
14
See generally Jolls, supra note 10.
15
Id. at 651-56.
16
Jolls’s assertions can be read to include ADA-mandated accommodations, al-
though she does not provide any disability-related examples.  Id. at 645.  Conversely,
Samuel Bagenstos has recently asserted the moral equivalence (but not the economic
confluence) of disability accommodations remedying intentional (disparate treat-
ment) exclusion, but did not address inadvertent (disparate impact) exclusion.  See
Samuel R. Bagenstos, “Rational Discrimination,” Accommodation, and the Politics of (Disabil-
ity) Civil Rights, 89 VA. L. REV. 825, 834 (2003) (“[M]y definition of ‘antidiscrimination’
leaves out an important aspect of what we usually call antidiscrimination law—the pro-
hibition on practices that have a disparate impact on members of protected
classes . . . .”).  This Article addresses the lacunae left by their valuable work in arguing
for the historical, economic, and prudential confluence of ADA-mandated accommo-
dations with Title VII remedies.
584 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 153: 579
tion by demonstrating that society views physically atypical workers,
including women, African Americans, and people with disabilities,
along a continuum, adjusting most slowly to those differences with
which it is least familiar.17  During this acclimatization period, various
biases and misperceptions are slowly stripped away.  For example, as-
sertions once regularly made about women and African Americans,
respectively, are now considered unacceptable.  Parallel biases and
misperceptions persist, however, in unnecessarily excluding people
with disabilities from the workplace because they are held out as true
and rational beliefs.  Instead of viewing disabled workers separately
from other biologically atypical employees, I argue throughout this
Article on behalf of the position enunciated in the disability rights
aphorism:  “same struggle, different difference.”18  This Article also il-
lustrates how disability-related accommodation costs remedy historical
exclusion of the disabled from mainstream society in an appropriate
and reasonable manner.  Finally, I argue that ADA accommodations,
for economic and prudential reasons, need to operate as antidis-
crimination provisions, rather than as tax-and-spend subsidies, to
achieve their goal of transforming societal attitudes towards workers
with disabilities.19
Part I begins by setting forth an ecumenical definition of em-
ployment discrimination.  Next, it presents the economically flavored
canonical paradigm which differentiates “simple discrimination,”
meaning workplace exclusion remedied by regulations that result in
equality, from redistribution, which is seen as an affirmative duty go-
ing beyond the norm of equality because it transfers resources from
employers to employees.  Part I then describes Christine Jolls’s ques-
tioning of the supposed absolute dichotomy between antidiscrimina-
tion regulations and non-ADA accommodation mandates.  It con-
cludes by describing how academic commentators have applied the
17
Although a full exploration is beyond the scope of this Article, I will briefly note
my belief that gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgendered people are the next group of
socially marginalized individuals with perceived biological atypicality in line for
empowerment.  Infra Part II.C.1.
18
For a depiction of this apophthegm in practice, see Smithsonian Inst., Nat. Mu-
seum of Am. History, Disability Rights Movement T-Shirts, at http://americanhistory.si.
edu/disabilityrights/exhibit_t_shirts_full2.html (2000) (last accessed Nov. 2, 2004).
19
My position is not an unqualified one.  As I have stated elsewhere, there are
some workers with disabilities for whom accommodations are neither legally required
nor practically achievable.  See Stein, supra note 6, at 144-77 (diagramming disability
accommodations along a continuum of costs, the most expensive of which are neither
ADA-required nor socially beneficial).  For a more detailed explanation, see infra Part
III.
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canonical paradigm to ADA accommodations, with the result that the
statute is viewed as something other than a “pure” antidiscrimination
provision.
Working within the received framework, Part II challenges where
the canonical paradigm draws a line between simple discrimination
and redistribution as it relates to ADA accommodations.  It begins by
illustrating a flawed methodological assumption underlying the analy-
sis:  the notion that accommodation costs are (internally) engendered
due to the inherent lesser capability of the disabled, rather than (ex-
ternally) caused by socially contingent conditions.  Part II then dem-
onstrates how similar estimations were once rolled out in opposition
to equality arguments made on behalf of women and African Ameri-
cans; further, that achieving equality through civil rights provisions
always engenders cost because those laws change an entrenched and
needlessly exclusionary status quo.  Moreover, it argues that the ADA
is the most recent measure to empower individuals that mainstream
society views as biologically atypical.  While those conventions are now
considered outdated as relating to employees on the basis of their sex
or race, Part II shows how the unique civil rights chronology of the
disabled, in combination with enduring misperceptions about the
group, persists in influencing the Supreme Court’s assessment of
workers with disabilities.
Part III argues that ADA-mandated accommodations are funda-
mental antidiscrimination measures that effectuate no more than
equality.  In support of this assertion, Part III maintains that disability-
related accommodations are an appropriate antidiscrimination rem-
edy because, like Title VII and other more traditional regulations, the
ADA remedies the avoidable exclusion from workplace opportunity of a
targeted group.  It further asserts that the ADA is a reasonable antidis-
crimination remedy in that the costs it imposes are circumscribed, and
because it requires that those expenses be incurred in a manner propor-
tionate to the resources of employers.  Finally, Part III provides eco-
nomic and prudential justifications for why the ADA is more properly
conceived of as antidiscrimination legislation than as a tax-and-spend
subsidy for disability-related accommodations. The Article concludes
with some thoughts on what factors exogenous to the ADA could help
the statute’s future implementation.
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I.  THE CANONICAL PARADIGM OF
DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION
Prohibited discrimination arises from the unequal treatment of
otherwise equal individuals who are also members of protected
classes.  Prevailing analyses of employment discrimination law are
economic in nature, dividing labor market regulations between those
designed to prevent simple discrimination and those calculated to re-
distribute resources.  One commentator has pointed out that overlap
exists between the two approaches in the sense that remedies brought
under antidiscrimination protections sometimes bring about the same
economic effect as remedies attempted under (non-ADA) accommo-
dation measures.20  Nonetheless, nearly all legal scholars characterize
the ADA as a redistributive measure and distinguish it in kind from
traditional antidiscrimination legislation.
A.  Defining Employment Discrimination
Employment discrimination may be defined as the different
treatment of otherwise equal individuals on the basis of certain pro-
tected group-based characteristics, such as race or sex.21  As described
below, the issue of whether workers with perceived atypical identity
characteristics are otherwise equal begs the very question raised.22
Consequently, whether the biological differences of particular indi-
viduals (“only women are capable of giving birth”) translate into func-
tional limitations that are immutable (“women who give birth are in-
herently less capable of working immediately thereafter”) or contrived
limitations (“allocating physical recovery time for women who have
given birth is different from allocating physical recovery time for
other workers, such as those who have contracted the flu”), or socially
20
Jolls, supra note 10, at 651-56.
21
For a discussion of why group membership, as opposed to individual circum-
stance, is necessary to justify antidiscrimination protection for people with disabilities,
see Samuel R. Bagenstos, Subordination, Stigma, and “Disability,” 86 VA. L. REV. 397, 422-
68 (2000) (arguing that ADA coverage ought to be limited to those individuals whose
disability-related stigma subjects them to systematic disadvantage); Mark Kelman, Does
Disability Status Matter?, in AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES:  EXPLORING IMPLICATIONS OF
THE LAW FOR INDIVIDUALS AND INSTITUTIONS 91, 97-99 (Leslie Pickering Francis &
Anita Silvers eds., 2000) [hereinafter EXPLORING IMPLICATIONS] (proposing that
norms are best enforced as group, rather than individual, protections because the
larger societal benefits stemming from the prevention of market discrimination relate
to the incorporation of those groups into the social and economic mainstream).
22
See infra Part II.A.1 (discussing the origin of disabled employees’ accommoda-
tion costs).
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contingent limitations (“women, whether child-bearing or adopting,
need to stay at home to nurture their children; men who are parents
can rely on their female partners or pay for child care assistance”) is
key to whether one views exclusion from workplace opportunity as
licit or discriminatory.
Within the context of employment discrimination law, differential
treatment, the practice of excluding members of a protected group
from full workplace opportunity, can arise through a wide range of
employer behavior.  Its genesis can issue from overt animus (“I don’t
like Asians”), be responsive to the biased perspectives or “tastes” of
third parties (“my clients and/or customers don’t like Asians”), origi-
nate in unproven assumptions of social convention (“Asians are too
diffident”), rely on empirically incorrect proxies in the absence of ac-
curate information (“Asians lack communication skills”), or use em-
ployment practices later shown to be irrelevant or unwarranted (“Eng-
lish-speaking telephone operators must be native English speakers”).
Although divining an employer’s “true” motivation is pertinent to
traditional doctrinal analysis, it is not relevant to application of the
canonical paradigm.  This is because, from an economic perspective,
the issue of what motivates employers is immaterial to the inquiry of
whether ADA-mandated accommodations implicitly redistribute
wealth from employers to disabled employees.  Whether the denial of
a reasonable accommodation was precipitated by animus, inadver-
tence, or some other noneconomic reason is likewise not material to
this calculus.23
B.  The Canonical Paradigm:  Dividing “Simple Discrimination”
 from Redistribution
The clearest proponent of the canonical paradigm of employment
discrimination is Mark Kelman.24  Kelman distinguishes between the
23
Infra Parts I.B-I.D.
24
See MARK KELMAN, STRATEGY OR PRINCIPLE?:  THE CHOICE BETWEEN REGU-
LATION AND TAXATION 8-9 (1999) [hereinafter KELMAN, STRATEGY OR PRINCIPLE]
(“[I]t is surely the case that insofar as the ADA demands that private actors provide
beneficial, non-market-rational treatment to certain customers (or workers), it could
be said to function as a broad-gauged redistributive social program, designed to funnel
social resources to a class of deserving beneficiaries.” (footnote omitted)); MARK
KELMAN & GILLIAN LESTER, JUMPING THE QUEUE:  AN INQUIRY INTO THE LEGAL
TREATMENT OF STUDENTS WITH LEARNING DISABILITIES 195-98 (1997) (differentiating
between rights to be free from discrimination and redistributive policies); Kelman, supra
note 21, at 96 (“It is also possible to see the demand for accommodation as the de-
mand for resource redistribution.”); Mark Kelman, Market Discrimination and Groups, 53
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societal norms that exist against “simple discrimination” and those
norms that mandate the provision of “accommodation.”25  Simple dis-
crimination occurs when an employer treats an individual differently
from other employees or job applicants, despite the fact that she is
equal with respect to all “relevant” characteristics.26  According to
Kelman, a ‘relevant’ characteristic is one that does not affect the em-
ployer’s economic function, meaning that the employer experiences
no additional costs from employing her (i.e., that her net marginal
product is the same as that of other employees).27  Therefore, plain-
tiffs asserting the right to be free from simple discrimination are ask-
ing only that employers treat them as equal to those who are “equiva-
lent sources of money.”28  In Kelman’s scheme, it is important to note,
freedom from simple discrimination exists as a right rather than as a
“colorable claim” because its application does not involve the expen-
diture of limited social and economic resources.29
STAN. L. REV. 833, 880 (2001) [hereinafter Kelman, Market Discrimination] (“What is
most striking . . . about these transparently redistributive antidiscrimination programs
is that they redistribute resources, not money, to increase levels of social inclusion”).  It
bears noting that, insofar as the ADA is concerned, Kelman is agnostic on whether ac-
commodations ought to be funded through regulation or subsidies.  The thrust of his
argument is that we ought to recognize the ADA as being redistributive in nature.
25
See KELMAN & LESTER, supra note 24, at 195-226 (discussing these differences in
policy toward students with learning disabilities); Kelman, supra note 21, at 92 (stating
that the ADA provides two remedies, including “protection against ‘simple discrimina-
tion’” and “reasonable accommodation”); Kelman, Market Discrimination, supra note 24,
at 834 (same).
26
See Kelman, Market Discrimination, supra note 24, at 840 (stating that the ADA
“prohibits ‘simple discrimination’ (differential treatment despite equality along ‘rele-
vant’ dimensions)”); see also Kelman, supra note 21, at 93 (“Insofar as the employer or
owner cares about the person’s status or traits that are irrelevant to such person’s eco-
nomic function, he or she is breaching the duty to avoid simple discrimination.”).
Whether a characteristic is relevant is crucial to distinguishing between simple dis-
crimination and redistribution.  Because Kelman does not view disability-related exclu-
sion arising from pure capitalistic rationality as relevant, he characterizes counter-
balancing accommodations as redistribution; in contrast, because I perceive accom-
modations as correcting avoidable exclusion, I interpret their denial as simple dis-
crimination.  Infra Part III.A.1.
27
See Kelman, Market Discrimination, supra note 24, at 841 (“A worker’s net mar-
ginal product is equal to the value of the increase in goods or services the firm will
produce if the employee is added to the firm, net of the added costs that firm will in-
cur if she were employed by that firm.”); see also KELMAN & LESTER, supra note 24, at
199-208 (maintaining that employers are chiefly concerned with individual net produc-
tivity rather than with aggregate gross production values); Mark Kelman, Concepts of
Discrimination in “General Ability” Job Testing, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1157, 1198-1204 (1991)
[hereinafter Kelman, Job Testing] (same).
28
Kelman, Market Discrimination, supra note 24, at 835.
29
Id. at 834.
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In contrast to an individual seeking relief from simple discrimina-
tion, an employee who requests an accommodation “concedes” that
both “business rational[ity]” and lower net productivity (due to ac-
commodation expense) “differentiates” her from a non-requesting
employee.30  In asking her employer to disregard additional input
costs, Kelman avers, the employee has made a “straightforward de-
mand for resource redistribution.”31  In economic terms, an entity that
is required to provide an accommodation has been subjected to “an
implicit ‘regulatory tax’” whose proceeds provide in-kind (as opposed
to in-cash) benefits to accommodation recipients.32  Kelman argues
further that the simple discrimination model imposes an unlimited
cost-qualified duty, while the accommodation model requires claim-
ants to compete against all other demands for available social re-
sources.33  Finally, Kelman distinguishes the two norms on the ground
that the non-accommodator bases her decision on retaining real social
resources (i.e., acting in an economically rational manner) rather
than on personal preferences (meaning, idiosyncratic or illegitimate
motivations).34
At this point it is important to note that, from a jurisprudential
perspective, Kelman’s paradigm of simple discrimination contrasted
with redistribution parallels the philosophical schema dividing formal
(or corrective) justice from distributive (or material) justice.  The first
group of terms refers to the notion of treating similarly situated indi-
30
Id. at 843.  Accordingly, the employee “does not claim to merit the treatment
she asks for because she has the same relevant traits as the person who has received
better treatment.”  Id.  But see Ron Amundson, Disability, Handicap, and the Environment,
23 J. SOC. PHIL. 105, 113 (1992) (“Someone whose disadvantage occurs as a result of a
social decision has a more obvious claim for social remediation.”).
31
Kelman, Market Discrimination, supra note 24, at 880.  At the same time, it should
be noted that Kelman has consistently pointed out that employers frequently believe
they are dealing with disabled employees whose traits make them less net-productive,
when in fact those workers would be equally net-productive but for the noninclusive
organizational decisions made by those same employers.  See, e.g., id. at 846-48, 877-78
n.71 (asserting that employers’ argument that it is costly to hire disabled employees is
untenable and disabled employees “will be just as net productive, prospectively, as
those [with whom] they compete”).
32
Id. at 880.
33
See id. at 852 (“[T]hose seeking protection from simple discrimination possess
‘rights’ claims while those seeking accommodations are making ‘distributive’ claims.”).
This is because “[a]ccommodation claims are best conceived of as zero-sum, distribu-
tive claims to a finite pot of redistributed social resources, competing not only with the
demands of others who seek accommodation . . . but with all claimants on state re-
sources.”  Id.
34
See id. at 853-54 (“The nonaccommodating defendant (and taxpayer) attempts
to retain (or save) real social resources . . . .”).
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viduals in a similar manner.35  The second category is drawn from the
field of social justice, and advocates treating all individuals equally,
whether or not they are in fact equal.36  This model (although not well
articulated) underlies the canonical academic examination of the
ADA, as well as that of the Supreme Court.37  I concur with Kelman’s
paradigm for examining employment discrimination law to the extent
that it parses simple discrimination from redistribution, but not in the
manner in which it has been applied to the ADA.  Consequently, I
question the point at which the line between formal and distributive
justice is drawn with respect to disability-related accommodations, ar-
gue that the nexus ought to be shifted, and justify those assertions.38
35
See, e.g., JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM (1861), reprinted in ESSAYS ON
ETHICS, RELIGION AND SOCIETY 205, 243 (F.E.L. Priestley & J.M. Robson eds., 1969)
(“[I]t is, by universal admission, inconsistent with justice to be partial; to show favour or
preference to one person over another, in matters to which favour and preference do
not properly apply.”); HENRY SIDGWICK, THE METHODS OF ETHICS 267 (7th ed.
1981)(1907) (“[T]he only sense in which justice requires a law to be equal is that its
execution must affect equally all the individuals belonging to any of the classes speci-
fied in the law.”).  For perhaps the earliest exposition of the theory that like things
should be treated alike, see ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 118 § 1131a-b (Martin
Ostwald trans., 1962).
36
See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 54 (rev. ed. 1999) (1971) (defining
distributive justice generally as the theory that “[a]ll social values—liberty and oppor-
tunity, income and wealth, and the bases of self-respect—are to be distributed equally
unless an unequal distribution of any or all of these values is to everyone’s advantage”);
AMARTYA SEN, INEQUALITY REEXAMINED 73-87, 129-52 (1992) (advancing Rawls’s con-
ception of distributive justice by exploring the dynamic interplay of equality and diver-
sity).  A few commentators have applied Rawlsian theory to people with disabilities.
See, e.g., Carlos A. Ball, Autonomy, Justice, and Disability, 47 UCLA L. REV. 599, 635-51
(2000) (arguing that redistribution of material goods sufficient to make disabled peo-
ple functional, and hence autonomous, is a moral obligation on society); Norman Da-
niels, Justice and Health Care, in HEALTH CARE ETHICS:  AN INTRODUCTION 317-20
(Donald VanDeVeer & Tom Regan eds., 1987) (maintaining that society ought to re-
distribute resources in the form of health care to those disabled people whose receipt
would enable their function); Ronald Dworkin, What is Equality?  Part 2:  Equality of Re-
sources, 10 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 283, 292-304 (1981) (suggesting that people with disabili-
ties should receive wealth redistribution as part of a behind-the-veil insurance schema).
In contrast to this position, Mark S. Stein asserts that Rawls’s theory would mandate
distribution of social resources either to the poor or to the “severely disabled,” both of
which would be incorrect from a utilitarian perspective.  Mark S. Stein, Rawls on Redis-
tribution to the Disabled, 6 GEO. MASON U. L. REV. 997, 1003-12 (1998).  This is an odd
gloss as, empirically, the population of those two groups largely overlap.  U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, CENSUS SUMMARY FILE 4 (1999), available at http://factfinder.census.gov
(Poverty Status in 1999 by Disability Status by Age for the Population).
37
Infra Parts I.D, II.C.3.
38
Infra Parts II-III.
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C.  The Canonical Paradigm Generally Questioned:
When “Simple Discrimination” and (Non-ADA)
Accommodation Converge
Christine Jolls questions received wisdom by noting that antidis-
crimination and accommodation regulations occasionally overlap to
the extent that some remedies for disparate impact discrimination
are actually accommodation requirements.39  These “cases of equiva-
lence,” she argues, are economically indistinguishable from certain
aspects of antidiscrimination law in the outcomes that they mandate.40
Thus, assertions about the fundamental distinctiveness of antidis-
crimination and accommodation mandates are unpersuasive.41
Jolls offers five practical examples in support of her thesis of over-
lap between disparate impact and accommodation and demonstrates
how eviscerating disparate impact in each necessitates the provision of
an accommodation-type remedy.42  Respectively, these are facially neu-
39
See Jolls, supra note 10, at 645, 684-97 (recognizing similarities and areas of over-
lap between accommodation requirements and antidiscrimination statutes).
40
Sharon Rabin-Margalioth, Anti-Discrimination, Accommodation and Universal Man-
dates—Aren’t They All the Same?, 24 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 111, 137 (2003).  Rabin-
Margalioth advances Jolls’s arguments in another direction by averring that, from an
economic perspective, universal mandates (i.e., provisions that affect all workers re-
gardless of identity characteristics) form a third equivalence category.  Id. at 137-38.  I
am in agreement with her general conclusion, but note that the lines she draws in
reaching her deduction are sometimes overly bright.  Thus, while laws affecting over-
time pay, such as the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 207-219 (2002), are clearly
among the category of universal mandates, some might also catalog Title VII’s dispa-
rate treatment component as a universal mandate in that it is, in theory, ecumenical in
its reach (hence, the reason why reverse discrimination suits can be brought by white
males).  At the same time, disparate treatment can be found in traditional antidis-
crimination legislation, such as the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 621-634 (2002), which by definition only applies to individuals over the age of forty.
There have been several clever responses to these ambiguities.  See LAWRENCE M.
FRIEDMAN, YOUR TIME WILL COME:  THE LAW OF AGE DISCRIMINATION AND MAN-
DATORY RETIREMENT 15 (1984) (musing that with time, everyone has an opportunity to
come under the ADEA’s aegis); John J. Donohue III, Comment, Understanding the Rea-
sons for and Impact of Legislatively Mandated Benefits for Selected Workers, 53 STAN. L. REV.
897, 898 n.1 (2001) (describing the ADEA as an “exception to the general rule of uni-
form applicability of a federal antidiscrimination law.”); see also Christine Jolls, Accom-
modation Mandates, 53 STAN. L. REV. 223, 226 (2000) (observing that because certain
individuals, notably those in classically protected categories, are more likely to assert
Title VII claims, the statute can be properly conceived of as antidiscriminatory).
41
A similar argument was previously made in the context of pregnancy-based dis-
crimination by Reva B. Siegel, Note, Employment Equality Under the Pregnancy Discrimina-
tion Act of 1978, 94 YALE L.J. 929, 940-46 (1985), and by Linda Hamilton Krieger, Fore-
word—Backlash Against the ADA:  Interdisciplinary Perspectives and Implications for Social
Justice Strategies, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 3-4 (2000).
42
What follows is drawn from Jolls, supra note 10, at 652-66.
592 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 153: 579
tral:  (1) no-beard rules43 that disparately impact those African Ameri-
can males whose skin conditions preclude regular shaving;44 (2) job
selection criteria that tend to exclude women (notably, height and
weight requirements)45 and racial groups (chiefly, standardized ability
tests);46 (3) English-only rules that adversely affect individuals with al-
ternative national origins;47 (4) refusals of non-Family and Medical
Leave Act (FMLA)48 pregnancy leave time requests disparately impact-
ing women who bear children;49 and (5) actions effectuating policies
on the grounds of business necessity that tend to exclude members of
protected groups.50
43
No pun is intended here, nor in my discussion of other grooming rules, such as
hair length, insofar as they affect women rather than men.
44
Usually due to pseudofolliculitis.  See STEDMAN’S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1470
(27th ed. 2000) (defining the condition).  The case discussed in text is Bradley v. Piz-
zaco of Neb., Inc., 7 F.3d 795, 799 (8th Cir. 1993), which reversed a finding of business
justification for a no-beard policy at a Domino’s Pizza franchise.  Jolls, supra note 10, at
633 n.47.
45
See, e.g., Lanning v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 181 F.3d 478, 482 (3d Cir.
1999) (addressing a provision requiring transit police candidates to run a mile and a
half in under twelve minutes).  See generally David E. Hollar, Comment, Physical Ability
Tests and Title VII, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 777, 791-93 (2000) (describing the Third Circuit’s
application of a minimum qualifications standard to the physical ability test at issue in
Lanning).
46
See, e.g., Banks v. City of Albany, 953 F. Supp. 28, 36 (N.D.N.Y. 1997) (recogniz-
ing a prima facie case for Title VII discrimination where African American plaintiffs
challenged fire department hiring practice rooted in personal and familial relation-
ships).  See generally Kelman, Job Testing, supra note 27, at 1159 (arguing that the use of
general ability tests in employment decisions is “[not only] suspect if one reads the an-
tidiscrimination norm expansively, but also that their use is inconsistent with the sort
of meritocratic principles that mainstream conservatives, who typically support job test-
ing, voice in interpreting that norm”).  The impact of standardized education-related
tests upon race is addressed in R. Richard Banks, Meritocratic Values and Racial Outcomes:
Defending Class-Based College Admissions, 79 N.C. L. REV. 1029, 1070 (2001) (concluding
that considering socioeconomic status, rather than just raw numbers, in the college
admissions process serves to promote meritocratic goals and racial diversity).
47
See, e.g., EEOC v. Synchro-Start Prods., Inc., 29 F. Supp. 2d 911, 911-12 (N.D. Ill.
1999) (involving alleged disparate impact of a rule that forbade the speaking of any
language other than English at the worksite).  See generally S. Craig Moore, English-Only
Rules in the Workplace, 15 LAB. L. 295 (1999).
48
Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-3, 107 Stat. 6 (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654).  For the reason that commentators view this stat-
ute as an accommodation mandate rather than as a pure antidiscrimination provision,
see supra Part I.B.
49
See generally Samuel Issacharoff & Elyse Rosenblum, Women and the Workplace:  Ac-
commodating the Demands of Pregnancy, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2154 (1994).
50
See, e.g., Lanning, 181 F.3d at 481 (vacating the judgment of the district court
and holding that “a discriminatory cutoff score must . . . be shown to measure the
minimum qualifications necessary for successful performance of the job in question in
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Three themes common to the aforementioned examples bear not-
ing.  First, in each case, a court questioned whether a given business
policy was in fact necessary to the business.  Second, all of the employ-
ers were required to bear additional costs when policies causing dispa-
rate impact were abnegated.  Third, those employers were compelled
to hire or retain workers they had previously viewed as less capable.
Jolls’s article, while giving trenchant treatment to most forms of em-
ployment discrimination, does not engage the area of disability-
related discrimination and, more particularly, ADA accommodation
claims.51  The absence is due as much to the empirical lack of disabil-
ity-related cases proceeding under disparate impact theory, as it is be-
cause her article is illustrative rather than normative.52  Building upon,
but also going much further than Jolls, I argue below that ADA ac-
commodations are an appropriate, reasonable, and properly allocated
antidiscrimination remedy.53
D.  The Canonical Paradigm Applied to the ADA:
Accommodations Are Redistribution
In applying the simple discrimination versus redistribution model
of employment discrimination to the ADA, a wide spectrum of legal
theorists conclude that disability-related accommodations differ in
kind from more traditional antidiscrimination regulations.  This is be-
cause ADA accommodations, which balance out inherent biological
limitations, involve additional expenses relative to other civil rights
requirements, which costlessly equalize externally driven restrictions.
As a result, a received wisdom has developed among academics that
providing accommodations raises the disabled above an equal posi-
tion. 54
order to survive a disparate impact challenge”).
51
In an interesting gloss that does speak to the ADA, Verkerke engages Jolls’s the-
sis that simple antidiscrimination measures and accommodation provisions overlap.
While acknowledging that some overlap exists, he nonetheless avers that it is not sig-
nificant enough to abandon the traditional distinction between these two classes of
antidiscrimination measures.  J.H. Verkerke, Disaggregating Antidiscrimination and Ac-
commodation, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1385, 1395-1401 (2003).
52
This observation is also made by Bagenstos, supra note 16, at 828.
53
Infra Parts III.A-III.C.
54
See Stephen F. Befort & Holly Lindquist Thomas, The ADA in Turmoil:  Judicial
Dissonance, the Supreme Court’s Response, and the Future of Disability Discrimination Law, 78
OR. L. REV. 27, 75 (1999) (describing the ADA’s accommodation requirement as a
“form of affirmative action for disabled individuals”); Robert L. Burgdorf, Jr., “Substan-
tially Limited” Protection from Disability Discrimination:  The Special Treatment Model and
Misconstructions of the Definition of Disability, 42 VILL. L. REV. 409, 414 (1997) (arguing
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that there has been a “special treatment” approach in the interpretation and enforce-
ment of laws prohibiting discrimination based on disability); Deborah A. Calloway,
Dealing with Diversity:  Changing Theories of Discrimination, 10 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL
COMMENT. 481, 491 (1995) (averring that the ADA goes beyond providing only equal
treatment); John J. Donohue III, Employment Discrimination Law in Perspective:  Three
Concepts of Equality, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2583, 2585 (1994) (explaining that the goal of
employment discrimination law is to set a protected person’s wages equal to their value
even in a biased market); Lisa Eichhorn, Hostile Environment Actions, Title VII, and the
ADA:  The Limits of the Copy-and-Paste Function, 77 WASH. L. REV. 575, 605 (2002) (con-
tending that the ADA departs from the formal equality model of other antidiscrimina-
tion statutes); Sharona Hoffman, Corrective Justice and Title I of the ADA, 52 AM. U. L.
REV. 1213, 1235-40 (2003) (arguing that the ADA deviates from the traditional civil
rights model of protecting “discrete and insular” minorities); Patricia Illingworth &
Wendy E. Parmet, Positively Disabled:  The Relationship Between the Definition of Disability
and Rights Under the ADA, in EXPLORING IMPLICATIONS, supra note 21, at 3, 8 (discuss-
ing the difference between the ADA and Title VII); Samuel Issacharoff & Justin Nel-
son, Discrimination with a Difference:  Can Employment Discrimination Law Accommodate the
Americans with Disabilities Act?, 79 N.C. L. REV. 307, 314-15 (2001) (distinguishing be-
tween ADA suits and other antidiscrimination litigation); George Rutherglen, Discrimi-
nation and Its Discontents, 81 VA. L. REV. 117, 145 (1995) (same); Verkerke, supra note
51, at 1387 (same); Pamela S. Karlan & George Rutherglen, Disabilities, Discrimination,
and Reasonable Accommodation, 46 DUKE L.J. 1, 3 (1996) (arguing that disabled individu-
als have greater protection than “women, blacks, or older workers”); Krieger, supra
note 41, at 3-4 (positing the fundamental difference between Title VII and the ADA is
the difference between “formal equality” and “accommodation of difference”); S.
Elizabeth Wilborn Malloy, Something Borrowed, Something Blue:  Why Disability Claims Are
Different, 33 CONN. L. REV. 603, 608-09 (2001) (explaining the heightened duty to peo-
ple with disabilities); Miranda Oshige McGowan, Reconsidering the Americans with Dis-
abilities Act, 35 GA. L. REV. 27, 35 (2000) (“[T]he ADA appears to make a revolutionary
break with the old ways of thinking about discrimination while charting a new course
of affirmative obligations to ensure real equality.”); Stewart J. Schwab & Steven L. Will-
born, Reasonable Accommodation of Workplace Disabilities, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1197,
1202 (2003) (“[T]he ADA expands on prior conceptions of discrimination.”); Michelle
A. Travis, Leveling the Playing Field or Stacking the Deck?  The “Unfair Advantage” Critique of
Perceived Disability Claims, 78 N.C. L. REV. 901, 951 (2000) (“[T]he ADA . . . arguably
goes beyond the concept of corrective justice to include a component of ‘distributive
justice’ as well.”); Amy L. Wax, Disability, Reciprocity, and “Real Efficiency”:  A Unified Ap-
proach, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1421, 1426 (2003) (“In effect, the ADA operates as a
mechanism for the broad range of taxpayers to impose ‘negative externalities’ on em-
ployers . . . .”); Carolyn L. Weaver, Incentives Versus Controls in Federal Disability Policy, in
DISABILITY AND WORK:  INCENTIVES, RIGHTS, AND OPPORTUNITIES 3, 5 (Carolyn L.
Weaver ed., 1991) [hereinafter DISABILITY AND WORK] (arguing that the “imposition
upon employers of a duty to ‘accommodate’” is the central flaw of the ADA); Christo-
pher J. Willis, Comment, Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act:  Disabling the Disabled,
25 CUMB. L. REV. 715, 730 (1994) (“[T]he ADA operates as a tool which redistributes
wealth from consumers and the labor force as a whole to the disabled persons who
choose to invoke it.”); John M. Vande Walle, Comment, In the Eye of the Beholder:  Issues
of Distributive and Corrective Justice in the ADA’s Employment Protection for Persons Regarded as
Disabled, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 897, 923-25 (1998) (same).
The strongest position that can be taken from these numerous commentators is
summarized by economist Sherwin Rosen:
Fundamentally the ADA is not an antidiscrimination law.  By forcing employ-
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To date, the commentator who has most thoroughly applied Kel-
man’s simple discrimination versus redistribution paradigm to the
ADA has been Samuel Issacharoff, both on his own,55 and most clearly,
in an article written with a co-author, Justin Nelson.56  Issacharoff was
not the first scholar to conclude that Title I is distinct from Title VII,57
nor do all other commentators precisely follow that analysis.58  How-
ever, his work may be taken as emblematic of the canonical view.59
ers to pay for work site and other job accommodations that might allow work-
ers with impairing conditions defined by the law to compete on equal terms, it
would require firms to treat unequal people equally, thus discriminating in fa-
vor of the disabled.
Sherwin Rosen, Disability Accommodation and the Labor Market, in DISABILITY AND WORK,
supra, at 18, 21.
55
See Samuel Issacharoff, Bearing the Costs, 53 STAN. L. REV. 519, 537 (2000) (re-
viewing MARK KELMAN, STRATEGY OR PRINCIPLE:  THE CHOICE BETWEEN REGULATION
AND TAXATION (1999)) (“By dismantling the moral cover of antidiscrimination claims,
Kelman draws out the redistributive element of statutes like the ADA and then subjects
them properly to the difficult choice between regulation and taxation.”).  Issacharoff
and Rosenblum provide a parallel and consistent argument by asserting that the Preg-
nancy Discrimination Act (PDA) cannot be understood as a leveling device for women
of fertile age since they necessarily impose higher costs as a group on employers.  See
Issacharoff & Rosenblum, supra note 49, at 2157 (“[P]articular accommodations neces-
sary to allow women to continue their career paths through the period of anticipated
fertility means that there will be specific additional costs to employers attendant to fe-
male employees.”).  The same may be said for the position that Issacharoff stakes out
on the ADEA and less productive (due to increased salary cost) workers.  See Samuel
Isaacharoff & Erica Worth Harris, Is Age Discrimination Really Age Discrimination?:  The
ADEA’s Unnatural Solution, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 780, 798-99 (1997) (noting that unlike
claims involving race and sex discrimination, an employer defending against a claim of
age discrimination will usually have a legitimate cost-based explanation for the em-
ployment action).
56
Issacharoff & Nelson, supra note 54, at 315-16.
57
See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS:  THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION LAWS 480-94 (1992) (arguing against the ADA joining the family of anti-
discrimination laws, all of which he opposes).
58
Jill Hasday, for instance, buys into the prevailing paradigm, but from a distinct
perspective.  Hasday argues that one way in which the ADA abludes from Title VII is
that it requires disabled claimants to mitigate their disabilities (and hence identities)
as a precondition of receiving statutory protection, whereas group members protected
by Title VII are under no such directive.  See Jill Elaine Hasday, Mitigation and the Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act, 103 MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2004) (enumerating “an im-
portant difference” between the ADA and Title VII).  Two quick observations are war-
ranted.  First, because the duty to mitigate was imposed by the Supreme Court in
Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 475 (1999), in the absence of any legisla-
tive justification the obligation may be more indicative of the Justices’ idiosyncratic
conception of the ADA rather than that of Congress.  See infra text accompanying note
74 (describing the “medical model” of disability).  Second, although Hasday is meas-
ured in arguing for (“only”) a reasonable mitigation standard, I am nevertheless con-
cerned by the implications on disabled individuals’ dignity, i.e., that requiring people
to mitigate their disabilities could repress the expression of an essential element of
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As an initial matter, Issacharoff and Nelson recognize that a uni-
form goal of employment discrimination law is to alter how employers
select, retain, promote, and compensate their employees.60  Title VII,
for instance, displays a “smooth interrelation” between antidiscrimina-
tion principles and redistributive measures that result from its under-
lying philosophy of treating similarly situated people similarly.61  By
contrast, the ADA’s accommodation mandate begins with a unique
“claim that differently situated people should be treated differently,”
in that the ADA requires employers to engage disabled workers who,
as result of accommodations, are more costly to employ than their
nondisabled peers.62
They explain, moreover, that Title VII was based on the premise
that groups (in their example, African Americans) preferred higher
paying, safer jobs, but discriminatory barriers had excluded them
from obtaining those jobs.63  When Title VII’s antidiscrimination
command removed those barriers, equality was achieved.64  By con-
trast, ADA accommodation cases are totally devoid of a subjugation
principle analogous to that contained in discrimination “simpliciter”;
they argue further that the ADA is exceptional in that it “does not at-
tempt, even as formal matter,” to ground itself in an antisubjugation
command but is instead driven purely by the goal of shifting resources
to the disabled.65  Finally, while traditional antidiscrimination provi-
sions seek to proportionately remedy past prejudice, the ADA “es-
chews this formal equality command” by justifying the provision of ac-
their personal identity, and moreover that these individuals may no longer have ADA
protection post-mitigation.  For a somewhat parallel argument in the context of
gay/lesbian identity, see Kenji Yoshino, Covering, 111 YALE L.J. 769 (2002).
59
It is also especially apposite, since he overtly builds upon and cites to Kelman’s
work.  See, e.g., Issacharoff, supra note 55, at 536-37 (agreeing with Kelman’s conclu-
sion that the ADA is redistribution rather than antidiscrimination).  Obviously, the
same cannot be said for commentators whose work precedes Kelman’s.  Nevertheless,
because those scholars employ the same type of economic analysis that Kelman later
clarified and elaborated on in his work, for convenience of proxy I attribute the oeuvre
to Kelman.
60
See Issacharoff & Nelson, supra note 54, at 309 (stating that employment antidis-
crimination laws are implicitly “deeply redistributive” and “seek to alter the outcomes”
in the labor market where there is a “belief that . . . market preferences are in some
deep sense wrong”).
61
Id. at 314-15.
62
Id. at 315-16.
63
Id. at 313.
64
Id. at 313-14.
65
Id. at 311-14, 357.
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commodation through a determination of whether a given individual
has a disability that limits a major life activity.66
Two ideas pervade the majority of ADA employment discrimina-
tion scholarship:  one is that disabled workers are accommodated be-
cause they are inherently less capable than nondisabled employees,
and a second is that by thereby engendering relatively higher net-cost,
providing accommodations to disabled workers brings about a dy-
namic that goes beyond equality.  Taken together, these precepts dis-
sociate the characteristic of disability from the mainstream in a starkly
different way than do the characteristics of sex or race.  Consequently,
canonical scholars maintain that ADA accommodations are redistribu-
tive in nature, and are therefore not a true antidiscrimination remedy.
II.  CHALLENGING WHERE THE CANONICAL PARADIGM
DIVIDES “SIMPLE DISCRIMINATION”
FROM REDISTRIBUTION
In classifying the ADA as a redistributive device, the canonical
model of employment discrimination creates a false distinction be-
tween simple antidiscrimination provisions and redistributive meas-
ures.  Erroneous assumptions and arguments similar to those once
applied to other protected groups, but now discarded, support this
distinction.  In addition, as a whole, canonical scholarship fails to ac-
knowledge the place of disabled people as the latest group of empow-
ered, biologically atypical workers.
A.  Underlying Misconceptions About Accommodation Costs
A central flaw undermines the nexus where canonical scholarship
divides simple discrimination from redistribution when assessing ADA
accommodations.  This is the baseline assumption that accommoda-
tion costs are internally engendered by the disabled person’s inherent
lower capability, rather than externally caused by social conditions.
1.  The Origin of Accommodation Costs
As an initial matter, it is empirically uncertain to what extent ac-
commodated workers with disabilities are less net-productive than
non-accommodated workers because their accommodation represents
66
Id. at 317.
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an additional input cost.67  This is a subject which I have addressed at
length elsewhere.68  Moreover, to engage the strongest argument put
forth by the received wisdom, this Article addresses instances where
accommodating disabled workers is in fact costlier than hiring unac-
commodated workers. 69
In assessing the ADA, the canonical perspective assumes that ac-
commodation costs are endogenously engendered by the disabled
person’s biological inability, rather than exogenously caused by social
conditions.  Adherence to this precept is logically necessary to con-
clude that deviations from existing labor market practices, in this case
the ADA-compelled accommodations, push the market’s balance be-
yond an equilibrium.  Thus the canonical paradigm uses as its initial
baseline a status quo that has already excluded disabled participation
in the workplace, as opposed to one which evaluates whether exclu-
sion of disabled workers is necessary.  Because these workplace ine-
qualities are integrated into the canonical framework, any deviations
from the status quo are perceived as bringing about more than equal-
ity.70
67
In certain—some would even argue most—circumstances, this will be true.
Human variation allows for a number of different and plausible scenarios.  The point,
though, is that here only one conception of disabled workers is engaged.  Thus, the
canonical commentators do not include the possibility that accommodated employees
with disabilities can be hyper-productive, such that even with the cost of accommoda-
tion, their net profit margin is equal to or greater than that of the average non-
accommodated worker.  At the same time, these authors also do not assume that dis-
abled workers are per se less productive beyond the cost of accommodations.  This
makes for an evenhanded, if somewhat unsatisfying, analysis.  See, e.g., Michael Ashley
Stein, Labor Markets, Rationality, and Workers with Disabilities, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB.
L. 314, 316-28 (2000) (criticizing the assumption that accommodations have higher
costs than benefits, and presenting alternative measures of productivity).
68
See Stein, supra note 6, at 103-09 (presenting and critiquing the accommodation
cost studies in depth); Stein, supra note 67, at 317-25 (same); Michael Ashley Stein,
Empirical Implications of Title I, 85 IOWA L. REV. 1671, 1674-77 (2000) [hereinafter Stein,
Empirical Implications] (same).
69
The point applies equally to other contexts of antidiscrimination, where an em-
pirically sustainable category is not utilized because the observable fact is itself the by-
product of a discriminatory practice.  See generally FREDERICK SCHAUER, PROFILES,
PROBABILITIES, AND STEREOTYPES (2003) (arguing for the prevalence and benefit of
classifications); Michael Ashley Stein, Generalizing Disability, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1373
(2004) (noting that disability ought also to be considered within the group of unused
classifications).
70
My argument parallels the one which Owen Fiss made against rational discrimi-
nation in the racial context, namely, that the biological differences that rationalize the
discrimination are a by-product of previous irrational discrimination.  See Owen M.
Fiss, A Theory of Fair Employment Laws, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 235, 260 (1971) (“[F]ailure to
respond to efficiency-based uses of race may have the effect of ‘honoring’ or ‘legitimat-
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In contrast to the canonical perspective of inherent limitations re-
stricting disabled participation, scholars from the disability studies
movement71 argue for a “social” or “minority” model of disability.72
According to this framework, the physical environment and the atti-
tudes it reflects play a controlling (if not central) role in creating what
society terms “disability.”  Thus, factors exogenous to a person’s own
impairments determine how much she can function in society.73  This
theory is in stark contrast to the “medical model” of disability which,
informing the canonical perspective, views a disabled person’s limita-
tions as naturally (and thus, properly) excluding her from the main-
stream.74
ing’ racial discrimination that cannot be so justified and that ultimately makes a re-
striction on blacks conducive to short-run efficiency.”).  For an alternative application
of some of Fiss’s arguments to intentional disability-based discrimination, see Samuel
R. Bagenstos, The Supreme Court, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and Rational Discrimi-
nation, 55 ALA. L. REV. 923, 947 (2004) (arguing that an acceptance of the view that
disability discrimination is rational requires acceptance of the rationality of racial dis-
crimination as well).
71
Disability studies is an academic discipline analogous to that of critical race or
feminist theory, with dedicated university departments.  Gary L. Albrecht et al., Intro-
duction:  The Formation of Disability Studies, in HANDBOOK OF DISABILITY STUDIES 2-5
(Gary L. Albrecht et al. eds., 2001) [hereinafter HANDBOOK].  For discussion of how
the discipline has moved from the margin to the mainstream, see SIMI LINTON,
CLAIMING DISABILITY:  KNOWLEDGE AND IDENTITY 3 (1998); Catherine J. Kudlick, Dis-
ability History:  Why We Need Another “Other,” 108 AM. HIST. REV. 763, 770 (2003).
72
As explained by one of the originators of the theory, the minority rights model
is based on three major postulates:  (1) the primary problems faced by dis-
abled persons stem from social attitudes rather than from functional limita-
tions; (2) all facets of the man-made environment are shaped or molded by
public policy; and (3) in a democratic society, public policies represent pre-
vailing public attitudes and values.
Harlan Hahn, Feminist Perspectives, Disability, Sexuality, and Law:  New Issues and Agendas,
4 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 97, 105 (1994) (footnotes omitted); see also id. at
101 (“[D]isability is attributed primarily to a disabling environment instead of bodily de-
fects or deficiencies.”).
73
See, e.g., CLAIRE H. LIACHOWITZ, DISABILITY AS A SOCIAL CONSTRUCT:  LEGISLATIVE
ROOTS 1-16 (1988) (tracing the legal classification of disability as an outgrowth of the
public’s opinion that physical disability confers social inferiority); SUSAN WENDELL,
THE REJECTED BODY:  FEMINIST PHILOSOPHICAL REFLECTIONS ON DISABILITY 35 (1996)
(noting the difficulty in marking “the distinction between the biological reality of a
disability and the social construction of a disability”); Ron Amundson, Disability, Handi-
cap, and the Environment, 23 J. SOC. PHIL. 105, 110 (1992) (stating that “a handicap re-
sults from the interaction between a disability and an environment”); Richard K.
Scotch, Making Change:  The ADA as an Instrument of Social Reform, in EXPLORING
IMPLICATIONS, supra note 21, at 275, 275 (“[The] social model of disability . . . concep-
tualizes disability as a social construction that is the result of interaction between
physical or mental impairment and the social environment.”).
74
See Kenny Fries, Introduction, in STARING BACK:  THE DISABILITY EXPERIENCE
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One of the earliest contributions to the development of the social
model of disability, before there even was a disability studies move-
ment, was made by Jacobus tenBroek.75  TenBroek argued that dis-
abled people’s own physical limitations had far less to do with their
ability to participate in society than did “a variety of considerations re-
lated to public attitudes,” many of which were “quite erroneous and
misconceived.”76  TenBroek’s theory, expressed in the context of tort
law standards,77 has been utilized by scholars from other disciplines, es-
pecially by feminist scholars who challenge where the line has been
drawn between equality and more-than-equality when applied to groups
of biologically atypical individuals.78
FROM THE INSIDE OUT 6-7 (Kenny Fries ed., 1997) (noting that “this view of disabil-
ity . . . puts the blame squarely on the individual”); LIACHOWITZ, supra note 73, at 11
(averring that the “medical/pathological paradigm” of disability stigmatizes the dis-
abled by conditioning their inclusion only “on the terms of the ablebodied majority”
(emphasis omitted)).
75
Among his many accomplishments, tenBroek was a professor of political science
at the University of California, Berkeley, and also founded the National Federation of
the Blind, an organization over which he presided for twenty-three years.  FRED PELKA,
THE ABC-CLIO COMPANION TO THE DISABILITY RIGHTS MOVEMENT 303 (1999).
76
Jacobus tenBroek, The Right to Live in the World:  The Disabled in the Law of Torts,
54 CAL. L. REV. 841, 842 (1966).
77
In the article, tenBroek demonstrated how people with disabilities were histori-
cally held to higher duties of care with respect to the law of torts.  Underlying this di-
vergence was the theory that the operative “reasonable and objective” standard could
not be uniformly applied to biologically impaired people, for they were inherently less
able to engage in social functions.  As a consequence, until the passage of “white cane
laws,” a blind person who had used neither a cane nor a dog while receiving an injury
in the public domain was precluded from recovery on the ground of contributory neg-
ligence.  This was because, as a matter of law, visually impaired people were required
to exercise a higher standard of care than others.  Id. at 877-82.
78 See, e.g., MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE:  INCLUSION, EX-
CLUSION, AND AMERICAN LAW 101-10 (1990) (assessing whether biological differences
require different legal treatment); MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, HIDING FROM HUMANITY:
DISGUST, SHAME, AND THE LAW 306 (2004) (noting that “a handicap does not exist
simply ‘by nature’ . . . . [I]t only becomes a handicap when society treats it in certain
ways”).  Feminist scholars have long argued that because of analogous environmental
considerations, accommodations are a necessary component of sex-based antidiscrimi-
nation remedies.  See, e.g., Leslie Bender, Sex Discrimination or Gender Inequality?, 57
FORDHAM L. REV. 941, 949-53 (1989) (rejecting the current “male gendered” work-
place culture); Herma Hill Kay, Equality and Difference:  The Case of Pregnancy, 1
BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 1, 28 (1985) (“The social value of accommodating reproduc-
tion and employment opportunities so that women remain free to engage in both ac-
tivities on an equal basis with men justifies the additional cost.”); Deborah L. Rhode,
Perspectives on Professional Women, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1163, 1185-93, 1202-07 (1988) (ex-
amining constraints on women in the workplace and comparing the options of assimi-
lation or alteration of the workplace culture); Cathy Shuck, Comment, That’s It, I Quit:
Returning to First Principles in Constructive Discharge Doctrine, 23 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB.
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An eloquent application of the social model of disability to the
ADA, and one which rebuts the canonical view of disability-related ac-
commodations as redistributive, is by philosopher and disability rights
commentator Anita Silvers.79  Silvers argues that being biologically
anomalous is only viewed as abnormal because a dominant group has
imposed conditions that are most favorable to its own circumstances,
rather than because of “any biological mandate or evolutionary tri-
umph.”80  According to her, the social model of disability traces the
source of disabled peoples’ relative disadvantage to the existence of a
hostile environment that is “artificial and remediable” as opposed to
“natural and immutable.”81  Silvers provides an example of disability as
a social construct in explaining that from the viewpoint of a person
mobilized in a wheelchair, disability is experienced by lack of access to
workplaces, educational programs, medical services, and other areas
otherwise open to the public.82  Since the ADA seeks to remove the
subordination of individuals with disabilities, Silvers argues that it is a
product of formal and equalizing justice, rather than of redistributive
or material justice.83  In her view, the ADA is based on notions of for-
L. 401, 403-05 (2002) (examining the doctrine of constructive discharge in sexual har-
assment cases).  Accordingly, Harlan Hahn has noted that the minority rights model
“seeks to promote both equal rights and a positive sense of personal and political identity
parallel to the second wave of the women’s movement.”  Hahn, Feminist Perspectives, supra
note 72, at 98; see also Richard K. Scotch & Kay Schriner, Disability as Human Variation:
Implications for Policy, 549 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 148, 154-57 (1997)
(proposing that the discrimination-focused minority model be supplanted by a model
describing disabilities as manifestations of human variation).  TenBroek’s work is,
naturally enough, also frequently cited by those writing in the disability field.  See, e.g.,
Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Americans with Disabilities Act as Risk Regulation, 101 COLUM.
L. REV. 1479, 1483-89 (2001) (exploring the politics of risk valuation and regulation in
the ADA); Jonathan C. Drimmer, Cripples, Overcomers, and Civil Rights:  Tracing the Evo-
lution of Federal Legislation and Social Policy for People With Disabilities, 40 UCLA L. REV.
1341, 1344-48 (1993) (criticizing the ADA as codifying the medical-social pathology
model of disability, by granting only limited rights of workplace access to the disabled);
Mark C. Weber, Disability and The Law of Welfare:  A Post-Integrationist Examination, 2000
U. ILL. L. REV. 889, 889, 956 (2000) (examining the law of welfare as it affects disabled
persons and arguing for its reform).
79
Anita Silvers, Formal Justice, in DISABILITY, DIFFERENCE, DISCRIMINATION:
PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE IN BIOETHICS AND PUBLIC POLICY 13 (Anita Silvers et al. eds.,
1998) (advocating full social access and participation of people with disabilities).
80
Id. at 73.  Thus “[i]f the majority of people, instead of just a few, wheeled rather
than walked, graceful spiral ramps instead of jarringly angular staircases would connect
lower to upper floors of buildings.”  Id. at 74.
81
Id. at 75.
82
Id. at 74.
83
See id. at 119-26 (analyzing the theory behind the ADA and its impact on dis-
abled persons).
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mal justice due to its acknowledgment that equal access to goods and
opportunity is not a special benefit.84  Rather, the statute sanctions in-
tervention into existing social constructs by questioning an environ-
ment that artificially disadvantages people with disabilities.85  Conse-
quently, Silvers concludes that it is erroneous to characterize the
provision of a reasonable accommodation “as advantaging the indi-
vidual for whom it is made.”86
I generally agree with, and build on, the disability studies perspec-
tive in arguing that the ADA is an appropriate antidiscrimination de-
vice because it remedies avoidable exclusion.  Nevertheless, the
strongest version of the argument, as expressed by Silvers, also has
limitations.  At present, some barriers are both natural and necessary.
There are some workers with disabilities whose impairments cannot
be ameliorated through reasonable (or even extra-reasonable) ac-
commodations.  Thus, not all exclusion from the workplace is artifi-
cial.87  By the same token, accommodations can also enable the occu-
pational participation of naturally excluded individuals with
disabilities.  I use the term artificial to mean avoidable, because it is
either (a) arbitrary and easily remedied, or (b) natural but nonethe-
less can be remedied through a manageable cost.  I therefore argue
below that ADA accommodations (which are limited by their reason-
able and proportionate expense), appropriately remedy historical ex-
clusion.88  Regardless of where one defines the boundaries of artificiality,
what is crucial to the plausibility of an assertion of artificial exclusion,
whether framed in terms of the social model of disability or otherwise,89
84
Id. at 120.  Silvers uses the example that equal opportunity to use the stairs does
not equate to equal opportunity to attend a program that takes place at the top of
those stairs.  Formal justice requires equal access to the program, although people
walking and using wheelchairs may take different routes.  Id. at 127.
85
See id. at 124 (“The ADA facilitates formal intervention into the rules of social
games by permitting questions to be raised about the justification of whatever dispar-
ately disadvantaging impact they may have.”).
86
Id. at 132.
87
Two points bear noting.  First, that with continuing technological and scientific
development, a variety of disabilities will be mitigated.  Thus, both the notion of what
disability means and the ability to accommodate individuals within the category are
fluid.  Second, that the term “artificial” conveys both a descriptive and a normative
element, and so must be used cautiously.
88
For an in-depth discussion, see Stein, supra note 6, at 90-109; see also infra Part
III.B.1 (describing the ADA’s “reasonable cost” limitation).
89
Madhavi Sunder makes a parallel argument in the context of women’s rights.
See Madhavi Sunder, Cultural Dissent, 54 STAN. L. REV. 495, 503 (2001) [hereinafter
Sunder, Cultural Dissent] (arguing against the reinforcement of repressive cultural
norms); Madhavi Sunder, Piercing the Veil, 112 YALE L.J. 1399, 1403 (2003) (maintain-
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is whether as a general matter those omissions are viewed as inevitable or
avoidable.90
Altering an instantiated “nomos,” meaning a socially accepted
definition of the normative universe,91 requires success in asserting
“the politics of recognition,” and as such is a difficult task.92  Law’s
force is largely grounded in its power to convince people that the sin-
gle option chosen from among many is the only legitimate one, and
then to reinforce the illusion of that validity.93  The disability studies
assertion that artificial barriers to inclusion are socially constructed,
and hence malleable, parallels assertions made concerning other
groups on the basis of race,94 sex,95 and sexual orientation.96  Nonethe-
ing that the legal system ought to resist fundamentalist religious groups who enforce
hegemonic and stifling norms against women).
90
See Paula E. Berg, Ill/Legal:  Interrogating the Meaning and Function of the Category of
Disability in Antidiscrimination Law, 18 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 3 (1999) (suggesting that
more attention needs to be paid to which “epistemological assumptions about the na-
ture of disability underlie judicial construction of a highly restrictive category”).  Carry-
ing the point of exclusion even further, historian Deborah Stone argues that “[t]he
very act of defining a disability category determines what is expected of the nondis-
abled—what injuries, diseases, incapacities, and problems they will be expected to tol-
erate in their normal working lives.”  DEBORAH A. STONE, THE DISABLED STATE 4
(1984).
91
See Robert M. Cover, Foreword:  Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 4 (1983)
(“No set of legal institutions or prescriptions exists apart from the narratives that locate it
and give it meaning.”).
92 Charles Taylor, The Politics of Recognition, in MULTICULTURALISM 25, 25 (Amy
Gutmann ed., 1994).  For example, Madhavi Sunder describes the way in which indi-
viduals within a culture challenge the empowered hegemony to modernize or broaden
its perspective.  She also points out that as society and cultural association diversifies,
law rather than culture comes to regulate acceptable limits of difference.  Thus, it be-
comes more difficult to challenge repressive normative communities as they become
more instantiated.  See Sunder, Cultural Dissent, supra note 89, at 509-23.
93
See Robert W. Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REV. 57, 109 (1984)
(“[T]he power exerted by a legal regime consists [substantially] . . . in its capacity to per-
suade people that the world described in its images and categories is the only alternative
world in which a sane person would want to live.”); see also ALAN HYDE, BODIES OF LAW
231 (1997) (“Law veils its own power . . . by pretending to find what it in fact makes
itself.”); Richard Delgado, Norms and Normal Science:  Toward a Critique of Normativity in
Legal Thought, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 933, 943 (1991) (pointing out that sometimes it is dif-
ficult to break with assigned norms because “[w]e assign the things their weights, and
then pretend that it is the scale that gives us the information”).
94
See, e.g., Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment:  Transfor-
mation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1376-87
(1988) (noting the pervasive and racist nature of seemingly neutral legal norms); Alan
David Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination Law:  A
Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1049, 1054 (1978) (noting
that antidiscrimination theory “views racial discrimination not as a social phenome-
non, but merely as the misguided conduct of particular actors . . . . [T]he task of anti-
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less, as Jerry Mashaw noted more than a decade ago, “[t]he notion
that there has been some systematic . . . social practice of discriminat-
ing against the disabled will strike most people as simply untrue.”97
2.  Inherent Inability and Fixed Identity
Because the canonical view of ADA accommodations is that they
are impelled by inherent inability rather than social construction,
these scholars equate the biological atypicalities associated with “dis-
ability” with an inherent and fixed limitation.98
Perhaps the most damaging manifestation of this concept, ex-
pressed in sociological terms, is that people with disabilities are viewed
as “inauthentic workers.”99  Set against the backdrop of public policies
that presume people with disabilities can and should receive public
assistance rather than engage in employment, this perception justifies
the disadvantaged socioeconomic position of workers with disabilities
who are employed in lower paying or less demanding positions.100  In
discrimination law is to separate from the masses of society those blameworthy indi-
viduals who are violating the otherwise shared norm”).
95
See Mary F. Radford, Sex Stereotyping and the Promotion of Women to Positions of
Power, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 471, 489-90 (1990) (noting that “[s]ex stereotyping in the
workplace is embedded in a complicated matrix of interlocking beliefs” based on so-
cially-constructed definitions of “male” and “female”).
96
See JANET E. HALLEY, DON’T:  A READER’S GUIDE TO THE MILITARY’S ANTI-GAY
POLICY 17 (1999) (“How long will we use the coercive powers of the state to define,
construct, and populate heterosexuality as a morally endorsable human and social
class of persons?”).
97
Jerry L. Mashaw, Against First Principles, 31 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 211, 219-20
(1994).
98
But see OLIVER SACKS, AN ANTHROPOLOGIST ON MARS:  SEVEN PARADOXICAL
TALES 77-107 (1995) (describing the life of a surgeon with Tourette’s Syndrome, a dis-
ability which might be thought of as disqualifying).  Similarly, the U.S. Commission on
Civil Rights noted that people with disabilities undergo a “spread effect” in which able-
bodied people assume that the existence of one impairment implies general disability.
For example, people speak more loudly or slowly to a person who is visually impaired.
CHRISTOPHER G. PELL & ROBERT L. BURGDORF, U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS,
ACCOMMODATING THE SPECTRUM OF INDIVIDUAL ABILITIES 25 (1983); see also WENDELL,
supra note 73, at 4 (“People without disabilities tend to assume that a person with a
disability is unable to participate in most of the life activities they consider impor-
tant.”).
99
I draw this phrase, as well as inspiration, from the very powerful Vicki Schultz,
Life’s Work, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1881, 1892 (2000).  See also Harlan Hahn, Advertising
the Acceptably Employable Image:  Disability and Capitalism, 15 POL’Y STUD. J. 551, 551
(1987) (averring that the dominant image projected by employers seeking to develop
an “industrial reserve army” was one that excluded the participation of workers with
disabilities).
100
Defining someone as disabled under the Social Security system “incorporates
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jurisprudential terms, this can be expressed as viewing people with
disabilities as not being similarly situated to those without disabilities;
in conventional terms, it means believing that the disabled, despite
analogies to other biologically atypical groups, nonetheless remain
“different” in an inferior sense.101
common expectations and shared values about what infirmities a person ought not to
have to bear and keep working.”  Lance Liebman, The Definition of Disability in Social
Security and Supplemental Security Income:  Drawing the Bounds of Social Welfare Estates, 89
HARV. L. REV. 833, 853 (1976); see also Richard V. Burkhauser, Post-ADA:  Are People with
Disabilities Expected to Work?, 549 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 71, 75 (1997)
(questioning whether the ADA was designed in a fashion that allowed the disabled the
choice, let alone the support mechanisms, of working); Matthew Diller, Dissonant Dis-
ability Policies:  The Tensions Between the Americans with Disabilities Act and Federal Disability
Benefit Programs, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1003, 1064 (1998) (“SSA’s disability determinations
represent social judgments about who should be expected to work, rather than find-
ings of medical fact.”); Matthew Diller, Entitlement and Exclusion:  The Role of Disability in
the Social Welfare System, 44 UCLA L. REV. 361, 386 (1996) (“[D]isability status is an in-
dication that an individual is deemed excused from the work force, rather than a
judgment that the individual is actually incapable of working productively.”); Harlan
Hahn, Accommodations and the ADA:  Unreasonable Bias or Biased Reasoning?, 21 BERKELEY
J. EMP. & LAB. L. 166, 169-70 (2000) (contending that social security eligibility rules
and workplace discrimination jointly deter people with disabilities from seeking em-
ployment); Anita Silvers & Michael Ashley Stein, Disability, Equal Protection, and the Su-
preme Court:  Standing at the Crossroads of Progressive and Retrogressive Logic in Constitutional
Classification, 35 MICH. J.L. REFORM 81, 84 (2002) [hereinafter Silvers & Stein, Standing
at the Crossroads] (describing “welfarist” policies which presume people with disabilities
will not engage in employment opportunity); Anita Silvers & Michael Ashley Stein,
From Plessy (1896) and Goesart (1948) to Cleburne (1985) and Garrett (2001):  A Chill
Wind From the Past Blows Equal Protection Away, in BACKLASH AGAINST THE ADA:
REINTERPRETING DISABILITY RIGHTS 221, 243 (Linda Hamilton Krieger ed., 2003)
[hereinafter Silvers & Stein, Chill Wind] (describing how Congress “imported into the
ADA’s definition of disability the Rehabilitation Act’s welfarist conception of the na-
ture of the disability category”).
In describing the parallel position of women, Schultz points out the odd position
of Nobel Prize-winning economist Gary Becker, who maintains that women are occu-
pationally disadvantaged because of their “comparative advantage” at child care and
housework.  Schultz, supra note 99, at 1893-98; see also GARY S. BECKER, A TREATISE ON
THE FAMILY 22 (1981) (arguing that an efficient allocation of resources “would mainly
allocate the time of women to the household sector”); VICTOR R. FUCHS, WOMEN’S
QUEST FOR ECONOMIC EQUALITY 60 (1988) (opining that women’s wage disparity is the
result of “women who devote a great deal of time and energy to childcare and associ-
ated housework [and] are often less able to devote maximum effort to market work”);
Gary S. Becker, Human Capital, Effort, and the Sexual Division of Labor, 3 J. LAB. ECON.
S33, S52 (1985) (“[M]arried women seek occupations and jobs that are less effort in-
tensive and otherwise are more compatible with the demands of their home responsi-
bilities.”).
101
See MINOW, supra note 78, at 106, 157-59 (observing that the use of categoriza-
tion in law and public policy often “treats differences as intrinsic to the person or insti-
tution, as functions of internal competencies and abilities”).
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Accordingly, such a perspective views providing accommodations
as a form of affirmative action or “special rights.”102  This is a position
that only a few commentators take explicitly,103 but which is the logical
extension of the canonical position equating the ADA with redistribu-
tion rather than as a remedy for simple discrimination.  Although I
would not object to the provision of affirmative action in addition to
rigorous ADA compliance, associating disability employment rights
strictly with affirmative action links the provision of accommodations
to political will rather than to equality jurisprudence.  Moreover, it
links disability rights with a politically endangered position that has
been the target of a strong backlash.104  Despite the Supreme Court’s
limited approbation of particular policies in the education area,105 re-
sistance to affirmative action has formed the heart of what Jed Ruben-
feld describes as the “Anti-Antidiscrimination Agenda.”106  And, as Pe-
ter Rubin has aptly noted, labeling rights as “special” rather than as
antidiscrimination is an invitation for decision makers to inject their
102
See Peter J. Rubin, Equal Rights, Special Rights, and the Nature of Antidiscrimination
Law, 97 MICH. L. REV. 564, 564-65 (1998) (fearing that “courts may conflate antidis-
crimination laws that essentially mirror the Constitution’s own command with affirma-
tive action provisions whose constitutionality can be determined under current law
only after they have been subjected to searching judicial scrutiny”).
103
But see SAMUEL LEITER & WILLIAM M. LEITER, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN AN-
TIDISCRIMINATION LAW AND POLICY:  AN OVERVIEW AND SYNTHESIS 53 (2002)
(“[S]ystematic bias against protected groups requires a cure that goes ‘beyond com-
pensation to individuals for direct individual injury.’”); Befort & Thomas, supra note
54, at 75 (arguing that because reasonable accommodation “is a concept alien to most
antidiscrimination claims brought under Title VII,” it is, “in essence, a form of affirma-
tive action for disabled individuals”); Karlan & Rutherglen, supra note 54, at 3 (claim-
ing that disabled workers seeking accommodations can “insist upon discrimination in
their favor”); Rosen, supra note 54, at 21 (asserting that the ADA “require[s] firms to
treat unequal people equally, thus discriminating in favor of the disabled”).
104
The existence of a backlash against disability rights was explored from a num-
ber of different angles by Marta Russell, in Backlash, the Political Economy, and Structural
Exclusion, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 335  (2000).  Russell asserts that “capitalist
opposition” to the ADA has “promoted the backlash among groups of workers who
have become fearful that their own interests are in jeopardy as a result of the Act’s en-
forcement powers.”  Id. at 336.  Stephen Percy has noted that critics of the ADA have
characterized the Act as an unacceptable “instance of expansive regulatory mandates
on the private sector.”  Stephen L. Percy, Administrative Remedies and Legal Disputes:
Evidence on Key Controversies Underlying Implementation of the Americans with Disabilities Act,
21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 413, 433 (2000).
105
See Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2342 (2003) (concluding that a law
school’s “compelling interest in a diverse student body” justified a “narrowly tailored”
affirmative action policy); see also Pauline T. Kim, The Colorblind Lottery, 72 FORDHAM L.
REV. 9, 9 (2003) (noting that the Supreme Court has “sent mixed messages” in recent
decisions on affirmative action in education).
106
Jed Rubenfeld, The Anti-Antidiscrimination Agenda, 111 YALE L.J. 1141 (2002).
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own normative judgments about the protected class’s character, and
so “introduce into their analyses their own stereotyped ways of think-
ing.”107
This perspective of disability rights being “special” and more of a
piece with affirmative action than with equality fits squarely with the
medical model of disability, and is in direct opposition to the social or
minority model of disability.108  The medical framework posits that dis-
ability is a biological infirmity to be “cur[ed]” or fixed by doctors and
rehabilitation professionals.109  Although academic commentators
holding fast to the canonical perspective do so from a medical model
of disability, to my knowledge only Richard Epstein has openly ex-
pressed the idea that people with disabilities ought to be treated with
pity.110  On the other hand, recent Supreme Court opinions provide
several examples of such sentiment.111  Within the employment con-
text, Justice Kennedy’s Garrett concurrence is perhaps the most obvi-
ous example of viewing ADA claims as exceeding equality.112  Instead
107
Rubin, supra note 102, at 567; see also Glenn C. Loury, Why Should We Care About
Group Inequality?, 5 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 249, 263 (1987) (“[R]eliance on affirmative ac-
tion . . . can have a decidedly negative impact on the esteem of the [beneficiary]
groups, because it can lead to the general presumption that members of the benefici-
ary groups would not be able to qualify for such positions without the help of special
preference.”).
108
Unintended, but nonetheless ironic, is that many people with disabilities bridle
at the term “special,” a euphemism associated with “special needs” schools and other
exclusionary experiences, as well as an overly polite term for invoking sympathy.  See,
e.g., Mary Johnson, Sticks and Stones:  The Language of Disability, in THE DISABLED, THE
MEDIA, AND THE INFORMATION AGE 25, 30-34 (Jack A. Nelson ed., 1994) (presenting
arguments that euphemisms such as “special” or “physically challenged” mask deeply
prejudicial and adverse actions against the disabled).
109
See Gareth Williams, Theorizing Disability, in HANDBOOK, supra note 71, at 123-44
(cataloging the ways in which people with disabilities have historically been viewed);
Drimmer, supra note 78, at 1345-59 (describing the moral, medical, social pathology,
and civil rights models of disability).
110
“Having a disability is the source of an enormous level of personal loss” leading
to “sympathies” that “tug knowingly at the heartstrings” and inspire “charitable giving
and charitable services.”  EPSTEIN, supra note 57, at 486.  Although I disagree with Ep-
stein on this point, as well as many others, I admire his honesty.
111
An alternative tack is taken by political scientist Ruth O’Brien, who argues that
modern disability employment practices are influenced by vocational rehabilitation
policies that only integrate disabled workers who have fully adapted themselves to the
workplace.  One consequence of this normative schema, which O’Brien avers influ-
ences judicial attitudes towards people with disabilities, is Supreme Court resistance to
disability rights, and especially the ADA’s employment provisions.  RUTH O’BRIEN,
CRIPPLED JUSTICE:  THE HISTORY OF MODERN DISABILITY POLICY IN THE WORKPLACE
(2001).
112
See Bd. of Trustees v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 375 (2001) (Kennedy, J., concur-
ring) (“[T]he accusation is based not on hostility but instead on the failure to act or
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of evaluating the circumstances that caused the suit, Justice Kennedy
characterized the issue as one that invoked a wrestling match between
“our own human instincts” on the one hand,113 and “the better angels
of our nature” that sympathize for “those disadvantaged by mental or
physical impairments” on the other.114  Also notable in Garrett was the
Chief Justice condoning state discrimination in employment as a le-
gitimate activity because “hardheartedly” refusing to make “allow-
ance[s]” or “special accommodations” for disabled workers was en-
tirely rational.115
The canonical treatment of ADA accommodations views the
source of whatever extra cost their provision engenders as arising
from the endogenous, inherent inability of the disabled, rather than
through the exogenous, constructed social environment.  In doing so,
the received wisdom is that workers with disabilities belong to a fixed
category of individuals with immutably lower ability.
B.  The Lessons of History
Similar to arguments now used in canonical scholarship to distin-
guish ADA accommodations from traditional antidiscrimination
claims are the arguments made against equalizing measures for
women and for African Americans.116  Accordingly, the first subsection
the omission to remedy.”).
113
Id. at 375.
114
Id. at 376.
115
Id. at 367-69. (Rehnquist, C.J.)  Also, in PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661
(2001), a Title III public accommodation decision, the Court upheld the reasonable
accommodation request of a well-known golf player with a mobility impairment to use
a golf cart rather than walk during a tournament.  Id.  Justice Scalia’s dissent testifies to
the persistence of the medical model by characterizing Martin’s claim as one for “be-
nevolent compassion” that would require the Court to undertake “misty-eyed” deci-
sions.  Id. at 691, 704 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
116
See, e.g., STEPHEN JAY GOULD, THE MISMEASURE OF MAN 30-72 (1981) (describ-
ing the use of scientific thought to mold thinking about the intellectual inferiority of
blacks); JOHN S. HALLER, JR. & ROBIN M. HALLER, THE PHYSICIAN AND SEXUALITY IN
VICTORIAN AMERICA 51 (1974) (describing the common notion that “the grown-up
Negro partakes, as regards his intellectual faculties, of the nature of the child”); Devon
W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Working Identity, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1259, 1307 (2000)
(concluding that outsiders groups—traditionally women and minorities—have, “to the
extent they wish to survive in the workplace . . . [had to] do extra work to make them-
selves palatable and their insider employers comfortable”); Kenneth L. Karst, Myths of
Identity:  Individual and Group Portraits of Race and Sexual Orientation, 43 UCLA L. REV.
263, 270 (1995) (noting that in the past “science reinforced white supremacy”); see also
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896) (upholding the legality of racial segrega-
tion on the ground that “[l]egislation is powerless to . . . abolish distinctions based
upon physical differences”); Id. at 562 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (bridling at how the ma-
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describes the workplace experiences of women, and the second de-
scribes the categorization of African Americans on the ground of sci-
entific and medical “reality.”  The last subsection demonstrates how
civil rights measures always engender cost.
1.  The Inherent Inability of Women
For much of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, social con-
vention held that women were physically less capable than men.  Un-
der the prevailing norms of that time, the sexes were believed to oc-
cupy different spheres.117  People believed that women’s physical
makeup, in particular their bodily functions relating to reproduction,
were demonstrated signs of inherent frailty.118  Physicians insisted that
biological characteristics only permitted women to pursue certain ac-
tivities outside of the home.119  (Male) doctors warned (male) legisla-
tors that women seeking to compete in a man’s world were a serious
threat to their own health.120  This opinion was not advanced as the re-
sult of empirically verified observation, but rather as an obvious and
understood physiological actuality.
Legislators accepted the social convention that women were
physically less capable than men, and courts enforced it.  The Su-
preme Court, composed of the same Justices who three years earlier
jority opinion reflected the notion that “the integrity of the white race may be cor-
rupted” by contact with black people); Crenshaw, supra note 94, at 1373 (asserting that
African Americans were traditionally misperceived by whites as immoral).  A seminal
treatment of the historical subjugation of African Americans is A. LEON HIGGIN-
BOTHAM, JR., IN THE MATTER OF COLOR:  RACE AND THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROCESS:
THE COLONIAL PERIOD (1978).
117
For a general overview, see CYNTHIA ELLEN HARRISON, ON ACCOUNT OF SEX:
THE POLITICS OF WOMEN’S ISSUES, 1945-1968 (1988); CHRISTINE A. LUNARDINI,
WOMEN’S RIGHTS (1996); SANDRA F. VANBURKLEO, BELONGING TO THE WORLD:
WOMEN’S RIGHTS AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL CULTURE (2001).
118
See BARBARA EHRENREICH & DEIRDRE ENGLISH, FOR HER OWN GOOD:  150
YEARS OF THE EXPERTS’ ADVICE TO WOMEN 134 (1979) (“Doctors had established that
women are sick, that this sickness is innate, and stems from the very possession of a
uterus and ovaries.”).
119
“The general theory which guided the doctors’ practice as well as their public
pronouncements was that women were, by nature, weak, dependent, and diseased.”  Id.
at 102-03.
120
See, e.g., id., at 110 (“In fact, the theories which guide the doctor’s practice from
the late nineteenth century to the early twentieth century held that woman’s normal
state was to be sick.”); SHEILA M. ROTHMAN, WOMAN’S PROPER PLACE:  A HISTORY OF
CHANGING IDEALS AND PRACTICES, 1870 TO THE PRESENT 23-25 (1978) (describing the
perceived dictatorship of a woman’s body over her daily activities).
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had (infamously)121 upheld broad freedom of contract in Lochner v.
New York,122 held in Muller v. Oregon123 that an Oregon statute restrict-
ing the hours of women’s employment to ten hours per day was a valid
exercise of the state’s police power.124  It predicated this divergence on
the notion that since “healthy mothers are essential to vigorous off-
spring,” women’s physical well being was “an object of public interest
and care.”125  Without citing any sound evidence of deleterious effects
that working more than ten hours a day at a laundry would have on
women, the Court stated that the restriction was warranted by
“woman’s physical structure and the performance of maternal func-
tions” which “place her at a disadvantage” relative to man with whom
“she is not an equal competitor.”126  Similar restrictions on the hours
women could work, the wages they could earn, and the occupations
they could hold were subsequently upheld in a number of other
cases.127  Each of these decisions relied on the broadly accepted, but
121
See, e.g., Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part
Three:  The Lessons of Lochner, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1383, 1383 (2001) (rebuffing revision-
ist attempts at demonstrating the decision’s legitimacy); David A. Strauss, Why was
Lochner Wrong?, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 373, 373 (2003) (opining that Lochner “would
probably win the prize . . . for the most widely reviled decision of the last hundred
years.”).  But see RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS:  PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF
EMINENT DOMAIN 128-29 (1985) (defending Lochner from a libertarian perspective);
PAUL KENS, LOCHNER V. NEW YORK:  ECONOMIC REGULATION ON TRIAL 2-5 (1998) (ana-
lyzing the decision within the historical context of conflicting political ideologies and
an incipient labor movement); David E. Bernstein, Lochner’s Legacy’s Legacy, 82 TEX.
L. REV. 1, 63-64 (2003) (same).
122
198 U.S. 45, 56 (1905) (holding that a state labor law that limited the hours
worked by bakery “employees” was an “unreasonable, unnecessary and arbitrary inter-
ference” with an individual’s personal liberty to contract for his own services).
123
208 U.S. 412 (1908).  See generally Anne C. Dailey, Lochner for Women, 74 TEX.
L. REV. 1217 (1996) (comparing the differential gender implications of Muller with
those of Lochner).
124
Muller, 208 U.S. at 423.  The statute restricted the employment of any “female”
in “any mechanical establishment, or factory, or laundry” for more than ten hours of
any twenty-four-hour cycle.  Id. at 416.
125
Id. at 421.
126
Id.  What the Court did cite, however, was Louis Brandeis’s brief containing a
series of reports, both domestic and international, that reiterated the social convention
“that long hours are dangerous for women, primarily because of their special physical
organization.”  Id. at 419 n.1.  I thank Catherine Wells for this observation.
127
See, e.g., Judith Olans Brown et al., The Mythogenesis of Gender:  Judicial Images of
Women in Paid and Unpaid Labor, 6 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 457, 537-39 (1996) (describing
how traditional stereotypes about women have informed judicial decision making, e.g.,
in Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972), King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968) and New
York Dep’t of Social Services v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405 (1973)).
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factually unsubstantiated, ground that women were relatively frail
when compared to men.128
This framework for justifying the exclusion of women from occu-
pational opportunity on the basis of unfounded stereotypical assump-
tions changed dramatically following the passage of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964.129  Previously held notions that automatically assigned
women to certain occupational roles, and precluded their participa-
tion in others based on stereotypes surrounding their bodily defi-
ciency, were replaced by a standard that examined the role of social
construction and which therefore placed a heavy burden of proof
upon employers seeking their exclusion.130  As a result, the Supreme
Court has evolved its sex-based jurisprudence from one that automati-
cally assumed that women were inherently less capable then men, and
therefore justifiably excluded from workplace opportunity, to one
where the Justices evaluate claims of physical difference and equality
in the light of social convention.131
Thus, the historical exclusion of women from employment oppor-
tunity parallels the current treatment of workers with disabilities.  In
both instances, the physical ability of a group was presumed to be less
than that of the mainstream due to social convention.  This is a per-
ception that continues to prevail with regard to disabled workers.
128
See generally JULIE NOVKOV, CONSTITUTING WORKERS, PROTECTING WOMEN:
GENDER, LAW, AND LABOR IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA AND NEW DEAL YEARS 131-82
(2001) (describing the ascendancy of regulation precluding women’s workplace par-
ticipation).  By contrast, the Lochner era Court invalidated some two hundred regula-
tory measures restricting (men’s) ability to freely contract.  Strauss, supra note 121, at
373.
129
Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
42 U.S.C.); see also Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 729 (1982) (observ-
ing that sex-based differential treatment was merely a codification of empirically un-
substantiated social conventions); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973)
(holding as a general, empirically verified proposition that one’s sex was frequently
unrelated “to ability to perform or contribute to society”).
130
See, e.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 328 (1977) (noting that Title VII
“required ‘the removal of artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers’” to women’s
employment) (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971)).  Al-
though Dothard is the only post-Title VII holding by the Court to exclude women from
occupational opportunity on safety grounds, what is important here is the methodol-
ogy utilized rather than the result achieved.
131
For a theoretical inquiry into the elements that unite disability discrimination
law with that of feminist and communitarian philosophies, see Carlos A. Ball, Looking
for Theory in all the Right Places:  Feminist and Communitarian Elements of Disability Discrimi-
nation Law, 66 OHIO ST. L.J.  (forthcoming 2005).
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2.  The Fixed Identity of African Americans
Canonical scholarship also distinguishes the treatment of people
with disabilities from that of other protected groups because it con-
ceives of and discusses disability as a biologically compelled reality,
rather than as a contingent social construct.  In so doing, these schol-
ars make the same error about disability that the law made about race
in earlier times:  they drape an issue of variable social construction in
the guise of fixed scientific veracity.132
Historically, race was treated as a biologically absolute reality, one
that could be determined scientifically by the percentage of non-white
ancestry an individual possessed.133  Consequently, states passed stat-
utes designating how much African “blood” was needed to classify a
person as black.134  This percentage varied from state to state:  for ex-
ample, being one-thirty-second black in Alabama,135 as compared with
one-fourth black in Virginia, categorized an individual as legally
black.136  Consequently, historians of race (as well as Critical Race
132
See, e.g., Peter David Blanck & Michael Millender, Before Disability Civil Rights:
Civil War Pensions and the Politics of Disability in America, 52 ALA. L. REV. 1, 2-3 (2000)
(“[T]he medical model never questioned the physical and social environment in which
disabled people were forced to function . . . .”).
133
See, e.g., IAN F. HANEY LÓPEZ, WHITE BY LAW:  THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF
RACE 118-19 (1996) (listing the different tests that states employed to determine the
amount of African blood needed to make a person “black”).  According to the notion
of the times, there were five distinct races:  Mongolian (yellow), Negro (black), Cauca-
sian (white), Indians of North and South America (red), and Malay (brown).  One sys-
tem, however, identified some twenty-nine races.  Gary A. Greenfield & Don B. Kates,
Jr., Mexican Americans, Racial Discrimination, and the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 63 CAL. L.
REV. 662, 676-94 (1975); see also Henry P. Lundsgaarde, Racial and Ethnic Classifications:
An Appraisal of the Role of Anthropology in the Lawmaking Process, 10 HOUS. L. REV. 641,
648 (1973) (demonstrating that “[a]ny scientific definition of race . . . must clearly dis-
tinguish between taxonomic criteria within the species, and the scientific purpose
served by such a classification”).
134
Some commentators assert that the “one-drop rule,” meaning any black ances-
try, was sufficient to denote black identity.  F. JAMES DAVIS, WHO IS BLACK?  ONE
NATION’S DEFINITION 5 (1991); see also Trina Jones, Shades of Brown:  The Law of Skin
Color, 49 DUKE L.J. 1487, 1495 n.25 (2000) (“[F]or much of its history in the United
States, the Black race has been defined by the one-drop rule.”).  Whichever interpreta-
tion is ultimately correct, the common theme is that some percentage of black ancestry,
however much it might have been, was considered sufficient to “taint” a person’s iden-
tity.  See Neil Gotanda, A Critique of “Our Constitution is Color Blind,” 44 STAN. L. REV. 1,
26-27 (1991) (discussing the “one drop of blood” rule).
135
ALA. CODE § 2 (1923).  For a discussion of the significance of this classification
to miscegenation cases in that state due to its large black population and racist ten-
dencies, see Julie Novkov, Racial Constructions:  The Legal Regulation of Miscegenation in
Alabama, 1890-1934, 20 LAW & HIST. REV. 225, 236-50 (2002).
136
See A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr. & Barbra K. Koppytoff, Racial Purity and Interra-
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scholars)137 have uniformly and correctly argued that race was not, in
fact, inherently biological, but was instead a socially constructed and
politically contingent category.138
Ariela Gross’s scholarship on the historical use of law in determin-
ing race adds further evidence to the notion of race as a social con-
struct.139  Gross wisely demonstrates how, because the fractions of
blood were not determinative, trials in nineteenth century southern
county courts investigated the “racial ‘essence’ inhering in one’s
blood” by asking juries to decide whether particular individuals “per-
formed” white or black roles.140  These trials turned on evidence pre-
sented by neighbors and other community witnesses about the way a
given person acted in the community, their civic acts, associations, and
cial Sex in the Law of Colonial and Antebellum Virginia, 77 GEO. L.J. 1967, 1978 (1989)
(citing 12 THE STATUTES AT LARGE, BEING A COLLECTION OF ALL THE LAWS OF
VIRGINIA 184 (William Waller Hening ed., 1823) (enacted 1785; effective 1787)).
137
Thus, according to John Calmore, “Critical Race Theory begins with a recogni-
tion that ‘race’ is not a fixed term.  Instead, ‘race’ is a fluctuating, decentered complex
of social meanings that are formed and transformed under the constant pressures of
political struggle.”  John O. Calmore, Critical Race Theory, Archie Shepp, and Fire Music:
Securing an Authentic Intellectual Life in a Multicultural World, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 2129,
2160 (1992); see also HANEY LÓPEZ, supra note 133, at 13.  Haney López examines four
factors that characterize the struggle leading to the formation of race.  According to
him:
First, humans rather than abstract social forces produce races.  Second, as
human constructs, races constitute an integral part of a whole social fabric
that includes gender and class relations.  Third, the meaning-systems sur-
rounding race change quickly rather than slowly.  Finally, races are con-
structed relationally, against one another, rather than in isolation.
Ian F. Haney López, The Social Construction of Race:  Some Observations of Illusion, Fabrica-
tion, and Choice, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 28 (1994).
138
See, e.g., HANEY LÓPEZ, supra note 133, at 124 (averring that law served to “le-
gitim[ize] the existence of race” as a category); see also DAVIS, supra note 134, at 1-15
(discussing the social construction of race); SCOTT MALCOMSON, ONE DROP OF BLOOD:
THE AMERICAN MISADVENTURE OF RACE 11-122 (2000) (discussing racial identities of
Native Americans); EDMUND S. MORGAN, AMERICAN SLAVERY, AMERICAN FREEDOM:
THE ORDEAL OF COLONIAL VIRGINIA 328-37 (1975) (describing Virginia’s statutory ap-
proach to race in the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries).
139
See Ariela Gross, Beyond Black and White:  Cultural Approaches to Race and Slavery,
101 COLUM. L. REV. 640, 688 (2001) (“The legal history of race and slavery may be
seen as a case study of the relationship between law and social norms.”); Ariela Gross,
Pandora’s Box:  Slave Character on Trial in the Antebellum Deep South, 7 YALE J.L. & HUMAN.
267, 271 (1995) (analyzing “the legal constructions of black character” during slavery);
see also Susan F. Hirsch & Mindie Lazarus-Black, Introduction to CONTESTED STATES:
LAW, HEGEMONY AND RESISTANCE 1, 10 (Mindie Lazarus-Black & Susan F. Hirsch eds.,
1994) (providing trenchant accounts of courts as foras for “performing” racial roles).
140
What follows owes a deep debt to the superlative Ariela J. Gross, Litigating
Whiteness:  Trials of Racial Determination in the Nineteenth-Century South, 108 YALE. L.J. 109,
111-12 (1998).
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general demeanor, as the means of determining racial status.141  In
some cases, judges gave juries guidance on what evidence they could
consider; in others, juries were instructed as to the effect their rulings
would have, but were otherwise left to their own devices.142  Gross con-
cludes from her study of sixty-eight such trials that legal categories did
not themselves define a person’s race in the antebellum South.  Ac-
cording to Gross, the defining law of this period was not limited to
“coercive rules handed down from high courts and legislatures.”143
Also contributing to this definition of race were more subtle factors,
such as the identity of the litigants (and the arguments they chose),
the jurors, and the community members who testified as witnesses.144
In contrast to the nineteenth century circumstances described by
Gross, race is now acknowledged as a social construct, rather than a
biological truism.145  A good illustration of this fact is the treatment of
race as capable of encompassing more than only one category (“multi-
racial”) in the most recent Census, a significant break with past prac-
tice as this is the first time that individuals may claim multiple racial
identities.146  Moreover, scientific evidence clearly indicates that, from
141
Id. at 112-13.
142
This approach was explained by Judge Roane in the case of Hudgins v. Wright,
11 Va. (1 Hen. & M.) 134, 141-43 (1806) (Roane, J.).  In describing Roane’s view,
Gross writes, “trials of racial determination required testimony as to ancestry, reputa-
tion in the community, other socially and legally defined criteria, as well as physiology
and medical science.”  Gross, supra note 140, at 130.  Some judges believed that jurors
needed only to look at the litigant to determine his or her race.  See, e.g., id. at 129
(noting one particular judge’s belief in “the reliability of appearance”).
143
Gross, supra note 140, at 181.
144
Id. at 130-32.  The Supreme Court has also interpreted racial identity.  See, e.g.,
United States v. Bhagat Singh Thind, 261 U.S. 204, 215 (1923) (holding that an Indian
high-caste Hindu was not a white person for purposes of immigration); Yamashita v.
Hinkle, 260 U.S. 199, 200 (1922) (same for Japanese immigrant); United States v.
Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 694 (1897) (same for Chinese immigrant); see generally
JOEL PERLMANN, “RACE OR PEOPLE”:  FEDERAL RACE CLASSIFICATIONS FOR EUROPEANS
IN AMERICA, 1898—1913, (Jerome Levy Economics Institute Working Paper No. 320,
2001) (surveying legal treatment of European individuals) available at http://
www.levy.org/pubs/wp/320.pdf.  This is a different inquiry from assessing the constitu-
tionality of statutes that exclude individuals on the basis of race, which the Court has
done with mixed results.  Compare Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954)
(striking down as unconstitutional “separate but equal” status in education), with Plessy
v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 550-51 (1896) (upholding the constitutionality of legal seg-
regation on public railways).
145
Charles F. Abernathy, Advocacy Scholarship and Affirmative Action, 86 GEO. L.J.
377, 400 (1997) (book review) (“Psychologists, sociologists, and others now widely
agree that race is a ‘social construct.’”).
146
See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, RACIAL AND ETHNIC CLASSIFICATIONS USED IN CENSUS
2000 AND BEYOND, at http://www.census.gov/population/www/socdemo/race/
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a genetic perspective, race is either a nonexistent or an insignificant
factor, at least insofar as one’s DNA identity.147
Thus, the current treatment of disability mirrors that of the his-
torical treatment of race.  In each circumstance, law was the vehicle
through which socially contingent definitions were held out as immu-
table biological reality.  In the context of race, the drops-of-blood laws
ascertained fixed identity.  The identities of both groups of individu-
als, respectively, were couched in terms of neutral scientific principles
that in turn prescribed people’s appropriate social roles.148
racefactcb.html (Apr. 12, 2000) (explaining that the change in Census practice stems
from considering race and ethnic origin as separate concepts); see also Cindy Ro-
dríguez, Census Cites Growing Diversity, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 13, 2001, at A2 (reporting
that the 2000 Census was the first in which “Americans were able to choose more than
one racial group”).
147
Specifically, any two humans are likely to have their DNA sequences differ by
only 0.1%.  More broadly, some 95% of all genetic variation exists within a population,
whereas variation between different populations only accounts for between 3% and 5%
of the total.  Noah A. Rosenberg et al., Genetic Structure of Human Populations, 298 SCI.
2381, 2381 (2002).  The variation is generally attributed to differences among five dis-
tinct population groups.  Mary-Claire King & Arno G. Motulsky, Mapping Human His-
tory, 298 SCI. 2342, 2342-43 (2002).  Those scientists who do assert the pertinence of
race do so because race correlates to certain anomalies (for example, African Ameri-
cans are disproportionately susceptible to sickle cell anemia, and Ashkenazi Jews are
disproportionately vulnerable to Tay-Sachs disease), and thus race remains a relevant
variable for some research purposes.  See Morris W. Foster & Richard R. Sharp, Race,
Ethnicity, and Genomics:  Social Classifications as Proxies of Biological Heterogeneity, 12
GENOME RES. 844, 849 (2002) (describing the debate and tension over the last decade
between those who view racial and ethnic categories as biologically meaningful and
those who assert that race and ethnicity are social classifications with little or no bio-
logical significance); Nicholas Wade, Race is Seen as Real Guide to Track Roots of Disease,
N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 2002, at F1 (“[A] leading population geneticist says that race is
helpful for understanding ethnic differences in disease and response to drugs.”).  At
the same time, the correlations are not that clear.  See, e.g., Richard S. Cooper et al.,
Race and Genomics, 348 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1166, 1168 (2003) (“Race . . . has not been
shown to provide a useful categorization of genetic information about the response to
drugs, diagnosis, or causes of disease.”).  Because the majority of African Americans
have European ancestors, and all European Americans (and Europeans) have African
ancestors, one commentator advises that racial categories “disguise[] rather than ac-
knowledge[] our multifaceted histories.”  STEVE OLSON, MAPPING HUMAN HISTORY:
DISCOVERING THE PAST THROUGH OUR GENES 69 (2002).
148
See Janet E. Halley, Sexual Orientation and the Politics of Biology:  A Critique of the
Argument from Immutability, 46 STAN. L. REV. 503, 546-66 (1994), for the argument that
strong parallels also exist between the “constructivism” debates of race and that of sex-
ual orientation.
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3.  Civil Rights Always Engender Cost
Antidiscrimination theory, as expressed in the canonical principle,
seeks to compel employers to treat groups that have historically been
excluded from workplace opportunity in the same manner that they
treat individuals of equal economic value from the empowered major-
ity.  In this scheme, employers who themselves possess biased tastes re-
spond to the prejudicial feelings held by third parties (such as cus-
tomers or existing employees), or rely on inaccurate proxies of
productivity, to justify the illegal and inefficient exclusion of certain
groups.  Civil rights statutes respond to this situation by coercing the
inclusion of protected class members.  Consequently, an employer’s
previously held misperceptions about the “relevant” characteristics of
particular groups are corrected.  In addition, the workplace is ren-
dered more efficient because now each employee is treated “imper-
sonally” according to her “economic function,” meaning her actual
net-profit value.149
It is important to emphasize that the canonical framework as-
sumes that the economic worth of disabled employees is at issue, not
their moral worth, and that the two assessments under this analysis are
distinct from one another.  Put another way, canonical scholarship
posits as a factual matter that rational discrimination distinguishes the
exclusion of accommodated disabled workers from that of members
of other protected classes.  This is because hiring accommodated
workers with disabilities engenders cost, whereas hiring non-
accommodated workers does not.  These scholars believe that as a by-
product of capitalistic rationality, excluding disabled employees on
economic efficiency grounds does not raise the same ethical issues of
wrongdoing as does irrational omission of other workers.  Thus, al-
though the canonical framework acknowledges the legal obligation of
employers to accommodate disabled workers under the ADA—a re-
quirement to which the scholarship does not object as a matter of so-
cial policy—it nevertheless views that requirement as one that is dif-
ferent from that of more established antidiscrimination measures.150
149
See Kelman, Market Discrimination, supra note 24, at 841 (“An employer dis-
criminates insofar as he treats the plaintiff employee or job applicant worse than he
treats statistically typical employees or applicants whose marginal product is no
higher.”).
150
Id.  This is a position with which Bagenstos takes issue, arguing that employers
are under a moral obligation to remedy historic exclusion of disabled workers.  Ba-
genstos, supra note 16, at 845-66.  Owen Fiss and Paul Brest each took similar positions
in the context of racial discrimination.  See Fiss, supra note 70, at 260 (“[T]o the victim
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Contrary to the canonical view of traditional antidiscrimination
measures, applying the remedies provided by Title VII and other tra-
ditional regulations always engenders cost to employers because civil
rights laws challenge, and when necessary amend, discriminatory
workplace norms.  Moreover, even when providing accommodations is
more expensive than not accommodating equivalently nondisabled
workers (a circumstance that will certainly occur for some unknown
part of that population), accommodation costs are similar to expenses
raised in the context of ameliorating sex or race discrimination in that
they each remedy historical exclusion.
An initial failing in the canonical conception is the notion that
traditional civil rights laws only compel irrational employers to swap
employees that are equal in their productivity value.  This has a cen-
tral flaw in assuming that workers of equal profitability are fungible,
i.e., that replacing an employee with majority characteristics with an
economically identical one who also happens to have certain pro-
tected group characteristics is a cost-free endeavor.151  Yet, a primary
remedy in Title VII cases is reinstatement of the claimant to the posi-
tion from which she has been wrongfully excluded and another indi-
vidual put in her place.152  As a practical consequence, traditional an-
tidiscrimination measures require employers either to employ a
greater number of individuals for the same position (thus incurring
redundancy costs) or to dismiss an equivalent number of “wrongfully”
employed workers and thereby sustain severance expenses.153  A suc-
of the employment decision the appearance of the conduct is identical, whether the
use of race is efficiency-related or not.”); Paul Brest, Foreword:  In Defense of the Antidis-
crimination Principle, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1, 7 (1976) (“[R]ace-dependent decisions that
are rational and purport to be based solely on legitimate considerations are likely in
fact to rest on assumptions of the differential worth of racial groups or on the related
phenomenon of racially selective sympathy and indifference.”).  I agree with these
three scholars as to employers’ moral obligations, but I do not concede that the costs
disabled workers engender are different in kind from those imposed by other groups
seeking to eradicate artificial barriers, even if I would acknowledge that due to the
greater systemic environmental exclusion, those costs may be greater in degree.
151
See Kelman, Market Discrimination, supra note 24, at 892 (asserting that a plaintiff
wishing to “block simple discrimination asks to be treated no worse than others who
are equivalent sources of money . . . or embodied net marginal product”).
152
See Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 763, 765-66 (1976) (holding
that reinstatement and retroactive seniority are remedies available under Title VII).
153
As a general matter, courts award discrimination victims priority in applying for
vacancies, but do not force employers to displace present jobholders.  An exceptional
displacement case is Walters v. City of Atlanta, 803 F.2d 1135 (11th Cir. 1986), wherein
the court ordered the city to “bump” the current employee and instate the plaintiff
due in part to the “uniqueness of the position” which the plaintiff was denied.  Id. at
1148-50.
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cessful Title VII employee will also be entitled to back pay covering
the period between her wrongful exclusion and the filing of suit (an
expense that yields no profit whatsoever),154 as well as any difference
in pay during that period (a differential which itself might have moti-
vated the employer)155 and during the remainder of her employ-
ment.156
Furthermore, it is factually incorrect to assume that successful Ti-
tle VII claimants never engender expenses, for courts can, and fre-
quently do, mandate changes to employers’ businesses.  Hiring mem-
bers of previously excluded groups can require the building of new
facilities, as in the case of restrooms or locker rooms for women, or
the provision of alternatively sized uniforms for protected group
members who are sized differently.157  Remedying discrimination can
also invoke less immediately obvious expenses when altering business
practices, including methods of job testing or administration.158  These
last emendations can be very expensive, as demonstrated by the terms
of some recent class action settlements for race- and sex-based em-
ployment discrimination.159  To cite just two examples, Coca-Cola’s
$192.5 million settlement for racial discrimination included $43.5 mil-
lion for changes in human resource programs so as to prevent future
154
See Pettway v. Am. Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211, 251-63 (5th Cir. 1974) (al-
lowing back pay as a remedy in a disparate impact case).
155
See Franks, 424 U.S. at 764 n.21 (holding that, to achieve the congressionally
mandated goal of closing the “earnings gap,” the “other consequences” of discrimina-
tory practices on back pay, such as loss of potential seniority, should be considered
when determining what pay is owed); Love v. Pullman Co., No. C-899, 13 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. (BNA) 423, 427 & n.6 (D. Colo. 1976) (applying Franks in calculating back
pay to include wages and seniority lost due to discriminatory practices).
156
Because of these considerations, Title VII suits require courts to give a lot of
thought on how to fashion remedies for wrongfully excluded workers without also pe-
nalizing those “innocent” employees who had been hired or promoted in their place.
157
See, e.g., Lynch v. Freeman, 817 F.2d 380, 388 (6th Cir. 1987) (overturning a
district court ruling that the lack of a sanitary toilet did not establish sex discrimination
under Title VII); see also EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination on the Basis of Sex, 29
C.F.R. § 1604.2(b)(5) (2004) (“Some States require that separate restrooms be pro-
vided for employees of each sex.  An employer will be deemed to have engaged in an
unlawful employment practice if it refuses to hire or otherwise adversely affects the
employment opportunities of applicants or employees in order to avoid the provision
of such restrooms . . . .”)
158
See United States v. City of San Francisco, 656 F. Supp. 276, 283-85 (N.D. Cal.
1987) (upholding plaintiff’s claims that San Francisco’s entry-level and promotional
firefighter exams violated Title VII).
159 For a thorough description of three exemplary settlements, including a finding
that employment discrimination class action suit settlements do not substantially effect
stock prices, see Michael Selmi, The Price of Discrimination:  The Nature of Class Action
Employment Discrimination Litigation and Its Effects, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1249, 1268-98 (2003).
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discrimination in promotion and pay;160 similarly, $35 million of the
$172 million that Texaco agreed to in its racial discrimination settle-
ment went to pay for a five-year task force to revise its personnel pro-
grams.161
Additionally, economist Kenneth Arrow noted over three decades
ago that intentional (and therefore, more morally reprehensible) dis-
crimination can be both economically rational and profit-
maximizing.162  Forcing an employer’s choice of an employee will cost
that employer both in terms of autonomy (due to coercion) and in
terms of third-party preferences (such as clients or coworkers who are
disinclined towards members of the protected class).163  This is true
whether those third-party preferences were legitimate (as in customers
who desire clean-shaven pizza deliverers because they are averse to
unshaven men coming to their doors at night)164 or illicit (for exam-
ple, lascivious businessmen who will fly only on airlines with attractive
female flight attendants).165  The same is true when an employer util-
160
Abdallah v. Coca-Cola Co., 133 F. Supp. 2d 1364, 1371 (N.D. Ga. 2001).
161
Roberts v. Texaco, Inc., 979 F. Supp. 185, 191-92 & n.6 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); cf. Set-
tlement Agreement, Burton v. Toshiba Am. Consumer Prod., Inc., No. 3:01CV21 (M.D.
Tenn. 2002)  (agreeing, as part of a $1.4 million settlement, to implement specific an-
tidiscrimination measures, including management training programs) (on file with
author); Butler v. Home Depot, Inc., No. 94-4335 SI (N.D. Cal. Jan 14, 1998) (provid-
ing, as part of a $65 million sex discrimination settlement, for $17 million to be spent
on upgrading the company’s human resource programs) (consent decree, on file with
author); Haynes v. Shoney’s, Inc., No. 89-30093-RV, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 749, at *17-
20, *86-92 (N.D. Fla. Jan. 25, 1993) (providing, as part of a $105 million race discrimi-
nation settlement, for the creation of training and education programs and the expan-
sion of a tuition reimbursement program to reimburse black employees for continuing
education).
162
Kenneth J. Arrow, Models of Job Discrimination, in RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN
ECONOMIC LIFE 83, 83-87 (Anthony H. Pascal ed., 1972) (showing that lack of available
workers and inequalities in education level cannot account by themselves for wage dis-
parities between blacks and whites).
163
Elizabeth F. Emens, The Sympathetic Discriminator:  Mental Illness and the ADA, 93
GEO. L.J. (forthcoming 2005), argues that in the context of people with mental dis-
abilities, employers are required to bear the “hedonic costs”—i.e., emotional and psy-
chic discomfort—that those individuals inevitably and irremediably inflict upon third
party coworkers and clients.  I am not convinced that whatever discomfort is caused by
the presence of a person with a mental (as opposed to physical) disability is either in-
exorable or insurmountable.
164
See Bradley v. Pizzaco of Neb., Inc., 7 F.3d 795, 797-99 (8th Cir. 1993) (striking
down a no-beard policy despite testimony and evidence on the effect it would have
upon future sales).
165
See Wilson v. Southwest Airlines Co., 517 F. Supp. 292, 298-99 (N.D. Tex. 1981)
(disallowing an employer’s policy of catering to male business travelers by hiring only
female flight attendants).
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izes rational statistical discrimination, meaning that the proxies used
for measuring the relative average productivity of members of a given
group turn out in the end to be accurate (i.e., that clean-shaven pizza
deliverymen or comely female-staffed airlines offer greater appeal to
their clients) and therefore yield greater profit.166  Each circumstance
leads courts to set aside preferences, and in doing so imposes a cost
on employers.167
Moreover, other examples of how discrimination can be rational
in excluding members of a protected group abound, even when
viewed in a nondiscriminatory light.  Consider, for instance, that hir-
ing a woman rather than a man may be, on average, more expensive
because women live longer and therefore engender greater pension
costs,168 and that women alone are functionally capable of childbirth.169
Thus, the premise that race or sex-based discrimination on the basis
of those group characteristics is economically irrational is errone-
ous.170  Not only does rational discrimination exist in the sex and race
arenas, but the Supreme Court has gone to lengths to prohibit it un-
166
For an overview of rational discrimination, see Kenneth J. Arrow, The Theory of
Discrimination, in DISCRIMINATION IN LABOR MARKETS 3 (Orley Ashenfelter & Albert
Rees eds., 1973); Edmund S. Phelps, The Statistical Theory of Racism and Sexism, 62 AM.
ECON. REV. 659 (1972).  For an argument that rational statistical discrimination is the
most significant current race discrimination problem, see GLENN C. LOURY, THE
ANATOMY OF RACIAL INEQUALITY (2002).
167
This point has been made before by Jolls, supra note 10, at 651-52 (“Employers
are often required by disparate impact law to incur special costs . . . [even when] the
employer had no intention of treating the group differently on the basis of group
membership.”); see also Bagenstos, supra note 21, at 464 (emphasizing the necessity of
antidiscrimination statutes where discrimination against people with disabilities is sta-
tistically rational).  In passing, empirical studies also note that attractive workers are
likely to be better paid (and presumably more profitable) than less attractive ones.  See
Daniel S. Hamermesh & Jeff E. Biddle, Beauty and the Labor Market, 84 AM. ECON. REV.
1174, 1192 (1994) (“[W]e find some evidence of a positive impact of workers’ looks on
their earnings.”).
168
For a practical application of this concept, see City of L.A. Dep’t of Water & Power
v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 704 (1978) (rejecting a discriminatory pension funding pol-
icy despite noting that “[a]s a class women live longer than men”); id. at 705 (report-
ing that, “[b]ased on a study of mortality tables and its own experience” the employer
found “[t]he cost of a pension for the average retired female is greater than for the
average male retiree”).
169
Accordingly, antidiscrimination protection for child bearing under Title VII or
the Pregnancy Discrimination Act only extends to women.  By contrast, childcare (and
other family caring situations) under the FMLA extends to all individuals regardless of
sex.  See Rabin-Margalioth, supra note 40, at 113-18 (discussing the reach of, and con-
fluence between, various employment mandates).
170
Underlying part of that rationality, and uniting it with disability exclusion, is
the fact that each of the baselines way designed by the mainstream with only itself in
mind.
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der traditional antidiscrimination regulations.  For example, the
Court held in UAW v. Johnson Controls that “[t]he extra cost of employ-
ing members of one sex . . . does not provide an affirmative Title VII
defense for a discriminatory refusal to hire members of that gen-
der.”171  Even in circumstances where employers can show that a statis-
tical proxy demonstrating median productivity is an overall correct as-
sessment of the entire group,172 or less costly than making individual
inquiries,173 courts still require an individualized assessment of a spe-
cific employee’s abilities.174  Only when those employers can also dem-
onstrate that “all or substantially all” members of the class are unable
to perform the job in question may an employer exclude all members
of a given class,175 and then only after a costly inquiry into individual
ability.176
Even if, however, all the arguments put forward in the canonical
framework were true—namely, that accommodation is more expen-
sive than nonaccommodation, and accommodating any disabled
worker is more expensive than not accommodating any other
worker—they still cannot distinguish the ADA in kind from Title VII
and other traditional antidiscrimination norms.  The expenses en-
gendered by those plaintiffs may vary in degree for a number of rea-
sons, including Title VII’s twenty-six-year head start on the ADA, the
heterogeneity of disabled people, and the efficacy of enforcement, but
these do not distinguish the statutes in kind.  This is because part and
171
499 U.S. 187, 210 (1991); see also Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433
(1971) (“The facts of this case demonstrate the inadequacy of broad and general test-
ing devices as well as the infirmity of using diplomas or degrees as fixed measures of
capability.”).
172
Cf. Christine Jolls, Hands-Tying and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 74
TEX. L. REV. 1813, 1814 (1996) (noting astutely that retaining less productive older
workers might be more economically efficient in the long run).
173
As such, statistical discrimination is rational from a second perspective.  CASS R.
SUNSTEIN, Why Markets Don’t Stop Discrimination, in FREE MARKETS AND SOCIAL JUSTICE
151, 156 (1997).
174
“Employers . . . are still required to base their hiring decisions . . . upon an as-
sessment of the relevant qualities of each individual applicant.”  Rubin, supra note 102,
at 572.
175
See W. Air Lines, Inc. v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400 (1985) (overturning forced re-
tirement policy for all flight engineers over sixty years of age); Weeks v. S. Bell, 408
F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969) (overturning gender-discriminatory hiring policy where the
employer failed to show that all or substantially all women could not perform the du-
ties involved).
176
See, e.g., City of L.A. Dep’t of Power & Water v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 708
(1978) (“Even a true generalization about the class is an insufficient reason for dis-
qualifying an individual to whom the generalization does not apply.”).
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parcel of antidiscrimination jurisprudence is the requirement that
employers bear costs to remedy the artificial exclusion of protected
groups from the workplace.  And, as is shown below, ADA accommo-
dations do just that.177
Thus, the canonical premise that traditional civil rights remedies
do not engender costs, but disability accommodations do, is factually
erroneous.  All civil rights actions engender cost in that they change
an instantiated and prejudicial status quo.
C.  The Continuum of Perceived Biological Difference
Disability-related civil rights are the most recent empowerment of
a group that society perceives as biologically atypical.  Nonetheless, at
least in part due to the unique civil rights chronology of people with
disabilities, notions and perspectives that would be considered retro-
grade when applied to women or African Americans continue to in-
fluence assessments of the disabled.  This is especially apparent when
reviewing the Supreme Court’s disability-related jurisprudence.
1.  Links in the Civil Rights Chain
The ADA is the newest law empowering a perceived biologically
atypical group with civil rights.  Prior to granting disabled persons
rights through the ADA, society recognized the legal rights of women
and African Americans.178  Thus, although canonical scholars view
those individuals as equal to, respectively, men and white Americans—
and would probably be taken aback by anyone who did not—those
selfsame scholars uniformly (and ironically) adhere rigorously to the
analogous position that people with disabilities are, both as a logical
and an empirical matter, inherently less capable than nondisabled
persons.179
177
Infra Part III.A.
178
See supra Part II.B (discussing historical lessons from the struggle for civil
rights); see also, e.g., Angela P. Harris, Equality Trouble:  Sameness and Difference in Twenti-
eth-Century Race Law, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1923, 1989-96 (2000) (discussing the civil rights
movement for African Americans); Michael Straubel, Gender Equity, College Sports, Title
IX and Group Rights:  A Coach’s View, 62 BROOK. L. REV. 1039, 1041 (1996) (describing
Title IX as “the legal force behind the push for gender equity”).
179
See supra Part II.A.1 (rebutting the canonical assumptions about accommoda-
tion costs); Hahn, supra note 72, at 103 (“Disabled persons probably comprise the only
group that has not yet been successful in refuting accusations of biological inferior-
ity.”).
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Further along the continuum, and therefore still fighting for legal
recognition, are individuals with nonmajority sexual orientations,
most notably gays and lesbians.180  On the federal level,181 those indi-
viduals have been left without specific protection,182 are prohibited
from expressing their identities in the military183 or through marriage
or marriage-like arrangements,184 are excluded from certain security-
level positions,185 and are denied full immigration rights.186
180
See, e.g., Chai R. Feldblum, The Federal Gay Rights Bill:  From Bella to ENDA, in
CREATING CHANGE:  PUBLIC POLICY, CIVIL RIGHTS, AND SEXUALITY 149, 185 (John
D’Emilio et al. eds., 2000) (describing the failure to pass the proposed federal Em-
ployment Non-Discrimination Act); Laura Grenfell, Embracing Law’s Categories:  Anti-
Discrimination Laws and Transgenderism, 15 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 51, 53 (2003) (observ-
ing that “traditional Title VII jurisprudence refuses to protect transgender persons
from discrimination in the workplace”).  Despite the bleak picture painted by these
commentators, the present state of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgendered rights
marks an improvement over the situation in 1966, when Time magazine published an
essay describing homosexuality as “a pathetic little second-rate substitute for reality.”
The Homosexual in America, TIME, Jan. 21, 1966, at 41.  Today, some large corporations
provide benefits to same-sex partners.  See D’EMILIO, Introduction to CREATING CHANGE:
PUBLIC POLICY, CIVIL RIGHTS, AND SEXUALITY, supra at vii (detailing advances in civil
rights for same-sex couples over the past thirty years).
181
Some states, however, have passed antidiscrimination protections.  See William
Rubenstein, Do Gay Rights Laws Matter?:  An Empirical Assessment, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 65,
69 (2001) (debunking the myth that state antidiscrimination laws that include sexual
orientation as a protected category rarely see litigation action).  Rubenstein uses data
from the states that have passed laws prohibiting discrimination based on sexual orien-
tation to combat the argument that gay workers do not exercise their rights as regu-
larly as other protected groups.  Id. at 67.  He concludes that those workers use the
laws that are designed to protect them and that, when protected, gay workers may even
exercise their rights at a “slightly higher” rate than female workers.  Id. at 68.  For ex-
amples of the variety of states’ gay rights laws, see CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12940 (West
Supp. 2003); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-81c (West 1995); WIS. STAT. ANN. §
111.321 (West 2001).
182
On occasion, rights are inferential, as in the case of a male suing for Title VII
sexual harassment on the basis of having had certain gender stereotypes ascribed to
him.  See, e.g., Jones v. Pac. Rail Servs., No. 00C5776, 2001 WL 127645, at *1 (N.D. Ill.
Feb. 14, 2001) (upholding male plaintiff’s ability to maintain a Title VII claim for sex-
ual harassment under circumstances where fellow employees made remarks in the
men’s locker room that included “your hands are so soft—what are you doing after
work?” and “why don’t you come strip for me?”).  This theme is explored in Mary Anne
C. Case, Disaggregating Gender from Sex and Sexual Orientation:  The Effeminate Man in the
Law and Feminist Jurisprudence, 105 YALE L.J. 1 (1995).
183
HALLEY, supra note 96, at 1 (challenging the 1993 revisions to the military’s
policies regarding homosexual service members).
184
Some courts have recognized a right to same-sex marriage at the state level.
See, e.g., Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 948 (Mass. 2003) (holding
that under the Massachusetts Constitution the state offered no “constitutionally ade-
quate reason for denying civil marriage to same-sex couples”).  A question exists, how-
ever, as to whether most homosexuals want access to the institution of marriage.  See
generally Frank Browning, Why Marry?, in SAME-SEX MARRIAGE:  PRO AND CON 132 (An-
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Similarly, people with genetic anomalies are generally unpro-
tected at the federal level from employment discrimination.187  Al-
though the Constitution and the Privacy Act of 1974 provide some
protection against the collection, use, and dissemination of genetic
information on privacy grounds,188 effective federal regulation specifi-
cally protecting individuals from genetic discrimination in employ-
ment is almost nonexistent.189  As well, the Equal Employment Oppor-
drew Sullivan ed., 1997) (arguing for legal support for nontraditional families as a su-
perior option to same-sex marriage).
185
See, e.g., James M. Donovan, Baby Steps or One Fell Swoop?:  The Incremental Exten-
sion of Rights Is Not a Defensible Strategy, 38 CAL. W. L. REV. 1, 10 (2001) (“Senate Repub-
licans blocked James Hormel’s confirmation as the U.S. Ambassador to Luxembourg
because he was an openly gay man.”).
186
See Desiree Alonso, Note, Immigration Sponsorship Rights for Gay and Lesbian Cou-
ples, 8 CARDOZO WOMEN’S L.J. 207, 212 (2002) (arguing that the “family-based immi-
gration sponsorship program discriminates against U.S. citizens who are in bi-national
relationships with same-sex partners”).
187
See Anita Silvers & Michael Ashley Stein, An Equality Paradigm for Preventing Ge-
netic Discrimination, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1341, 1343-45 (2002) (noting that the ADA ap-
plies only to severely symptomatic individuals, while genetic discrimination law covers
those who are nonsymptomatic or asymptomatic, leaving presymptomatic individuals
exposed).  By contrast, the scope of state statutes varies by jurisdiction.  About half of
the jurisdictions prohibit workplace discrimination on the grounds of genetic informa-
tion, and a handful of jurisdictions have established individuals’ property rights to
their personal DNA information.  Id. at 1346-48.
188 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (unreasonable searches and seizures); id. amend. V
(due process); id. amend. XIV (due process and equal protection); 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)
(1996 & Supp. 1999) (describing what records must be made available to the public
under the Freedom of Information Act).  The qualification reflects both theoretical
and practical encumbrances to privacy-based protection.  First, it may not be feasible
for employers to maintain a firewall between health care records that may reveal em-
ployees’ genetic conditions and information used in personnel decisions.  Second,
when a proprietor waives a privacy right for one purpose, the information may no
longer be protected from use for other purposes.  Third, where more than one person
has a property right in certain information, it is unclear how their interests are priori-
tized with respect to maintaining control.  Last, it is not known if circumstances where
lack of access to the information threatens public safety, places commercial interests at
considerable disadvantage, or deprives the subject of significant benefits override pri-
vacy protections.  Additionally, genetic information about an individual can be discov-
ered in several different ways, including:  a chance remark about family history, a for-
mal requirement to relate family history, dissemination of data accumulated in a
medical setting where patients consent to contributing a specimen for certain panels
of tests without specifying what is to be learned from the tests, and situations where a
physician orders a panel for one reason but the entire set of test results becomes part
of the patient’s record.  Moreover, a genetic anomaly that is at present correlated with
one condition may, in the future, be correlated with another, or anomalies may cluster,
so that the presence of one suggests the presence of another.  Silvers & Stein, supra
note 187, at 1348-54.
189
Specifically, a single executive order bars federal agencies from discriminating
in employment on the basis of “genetic information.”  See Exec. Order No. 13,145, 65
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tunity Commission (EEOC) has had mixed initial success in applying
the antidiscrimination provisions of the ADA to the realm of genetic
discrimination.190
And because people with disabilities are the most recent group to
win formal legal recognition, recognizing them as equal requires a
general transformation in social attitudes, most especially acknow-
ledgement of disability rights as rights191 rather than as a product of
Fed. Reg. 6877 (Feb. 8, 2000) (barring federal employment discrimination on the basis
of genetic information).  And, despite repeatedly voiced intentions, Congress has yet
to pass legislation specifically prohibiting misuse of genetic information in the areas of
employment, although a five-year-old bill is (once more) pending.  See Genetic Non-
discrimination in Health Insurance and Employment Act, H.R. 602, 107th Cong.
(2001) (prohibiting discrimination on the basis of genetic information with respect to
health insurance);  see also Jeremy A. Colby, Note, An Analysis of Genetic Discrimination
Legislation Proposed by the 105th Congress, 24 AM. J.L. & MED. 443, 443-44 (1998) (discuss-
ing legislative responses to advances in genetic research).
190
Only a handful of cases clearly charging genetic discrimination have been filed
by the EEOC, the most prominent (and the only successful) one of which was a settle-
ment in EEOC v. Burlington N. Santa Fe R.R. Co., Civil Action No. C01-4013 (N.D. Iowa)
(filed Feb. 9, 2001) (on file with author).  Claimants in Burlington Northern, through
their EEOC attorneys, alleged genetic discrimination as the result of the railroad’s na-
tional policy of requiring union members claiming to suffer from carpal tunnel syn-
drome to submit to DNA tests to determine whether those workers were predisposed
to carpal tunnel injuries.  Id.  By contrast, a second suit alleging genetic discrimination
on the basis of adverse employment decisions grounded in predisposition to carpal
tunnel injury was dismissed at the summary judgment stage.  EEOC v. Woodbridge
Corp., 124 F. Supp. 2d 1132, 1139 (W.D. Mo. 2000).  Statements, Congressional testi-
mony, and scholarship by EEOC Commissioner Paul Steven Miller indicate that the
agency will continue to pursue this line of legal argument.  See Paul Steven Miller, Ge-
netic Discrimination in the Workplace, 26 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 189, 191 (1998) (discussing
the application of federal statutes to genetic discrimination); Paul Steven Miller, Is
There a Pink Slip in My Genes?:  Genetic Discrimination in the Workplace, 3 J. HEALTH CARE
L. & POL’Y 225, 237-47 (2000) (outlining concerns about genetic discrimination and
suggesting methods for addressing such discrimination).  Although the articles were
written in his personal capacity, his view of the agency’s position has also been reiter-
ated in statements made in his authorized capacity.  For example, Miller has stated that
the EEOC “will continue to respond aggressively to any evidence that employers” mis-
use genetic information.  See EEOC Settles First ADA Genetic Discrimination Suit, EEOC
COMPLIANCE MANUAL REP. NO. 157, at 1, 2 (EEOC, Milwaukee, Wisc., Apr. 27, 2001);
see also Prepared Statement of Paul Steven Miller, Commissioner of U.S. Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Commission, Before the Senate Committee on Health, Educa-
tion, Labor and Pensions (July 20, 2000) (Federal News Service).
191
The way that discriminatory action against people with disabilities is not even
viewed as discrimination raises a parallel circumstance to those Deborah Rhode de-
scribes in the context of sex-based prejudice.  DEBORAH L. RHODE, SPEAKING OF SEX:
THE DENIAL OF GENDER INEQUALITY (1997).  According to Rhode, sex-based discrimi-
nation suffers at the hands of the “no problem problem” wherein the “dynamics of de-
nial” fall into three patterns:  (1) “denial of gender inequality” or not recognizing chal-
lenges that women face; (2) “denial of injustice” in which women’s relative lesser
socioeconomic position is attributed to an inherent shortcoming; and (3) “denial of
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goodwill.192  Ironically, some of the challenges embedded in bringing
about a change in the general social attitude towards people with dis-
abilities are exasperated by their unique civil rights chronology, which
is set forth in the next section.193
2.  A Unique Civil Rights Chronology
Unlike other marginalized minority groups, disabled Americans
were empowered by civil rights legislation prior to a general elevation
of social consciousness about their circumstances and capabilities.194
Prior to mobilizing in support of the passage of the ADA, the disability
rights movement encompassed many individual groups representing
distinct disabilities, each advocating on behalf of its own constituency
and agenda.195  For example, the massive protest by deaf and hearing-
impaired students for appointment of a deaf president at Gallaudet
University, a higher learning institution for the deaf and hearing im-
paired,196 was unrelated to the advocacy that People First proffered on
behalf of developmentally disabled individuals seeking both integra-
tion into mainstream society and greater control over the structure of
their own lives.197  Moreover, these individual disability rights groups
responsibility,” which removes personal ability and responsibility to effect change.  Id.
at 1-3.
192
Hence, the title of sociologist Richard Scotch’s classic story of the disability
rights movement needs to be reversed.  RICHARD K. SCOTCH, FROM GOOD WILL TO
CIVIL RIGHTS (2d ed. 2001).
193
Additional, extralegal factors that could precipitate change are discussed in the
Conclusion, infra.
194
What follows owes a large debt to SHAPIRO, supra note 4, at 183-210.  See gener-
ally Thomas F. Burke, On the Rights Track:  The Americans with Disabilities Act, in
COMPARATIVE DISADVANTAGES?  SOCIAL REGULATIONS AND THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 242
(Pietro S. Nivola ed., 1997) (detailing the failure of the ADA to achieve its stated
goals); David Pfeiffer, Overview of the Disability Movement:  History, Legislative Record, and
Political Implications, 21 POL’Y STUD. J. 724, 726 (1993) (outlining the history of the dis-
ability rights movement).
195
SHAPIRO, supra note 4, at 62.
196
See generally JACK R. GANNON, THE WEEK THE WORLD HEARD GALLAUDET (1989)
(relating the story of the week-long student protest that led to the appointment of the
first deaf president of Gallaudet University); Mary Elena Fernandez, Gallaudet Recap-
tures Spirit of Historic ‘88 March: On Anniversary, Protesters Use Same Route to Press New Con-
cerns for the Deaf, WASH. POST, Mar. 12, 1998, at B3 (same).
197
See generally Charles Curtis, The Changing Role of the People First Advisor, J. AM.
REHABILITATION (Apr. 1984) (detailing the desired qualities for People First mentors),
available at http://www.independentliving.org/toolsforpower/tools29.html; People
First,  at http://www.people1.org/index.htm (describing the organization and posting
upcoming events); see also NANCY M. CREWE & IRVING K. ZOLA, INDEPENDENT LIVING
FOR DISABLED PEOPLE:  DEVELOPING, IMPLEMENTING, AND EVALUATING SELF-HELP
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frequently clashed with each other:  curb cuts fought for by wheel-
chair users were opposed by visually-impaired people who needed
those same curbs intact to derive a sense of location from their
canes.198  Nevertheless, the campaign for the ADA’s passage unified
this previously splintered population. As noted at the time by ADA
lobbyist Liz Savage, “People with epilepsy now will be advocates for the
same piece of legislation as people who are deaf.  That has never hap-
pened before.  And that’s really historic.”199
Nevertheless, much of the strength of the disability rights move-
ment’s success in gaining the ADA’s passage came from what Repre-
sentative Tony Coelho referred to as a “hidden army” of legislators
who had instinctive and personal understanding of the stigma at-
tached to disability.200  For instance, both Coelho, who sponsored the
original ADA bill in the House, and Maryland Representative Steny
Hoyer’s wife were epileptic.  Senator Lowell Weicker of Connecticut,
the original sponsor of the ADA bill in the Senate, had a son with
Down Syndrome.  Senator Bob Dole of Kansas and Senator Bob Ker-
rey of Nebraska were disabled war veterans.  Senator Tom Harkin of
Iowa had a deaf brother, Senator Edward Kennedy an amputee son
and a developmentally disabled sister, and Senator Orrin Hatch of
Utah a post-polio brother-in-law.201  Hence, the impetus for changing
the legal (and social) regime towards Americans with disabilities was
in large measure a personally-driven legislative initiative, rather than a
response to a recognized social movement.
Moreover, although efforts to pass the ADA transformed parallel
but uncoordinated efforts of disability-specific advocacy groups and
REHABILITATION PROGRAMS (1983) (discussing the Independent Living movement,
which advocates allowing people with disabilities to live in their communities rather
than institutions); Dirk Johnson, Tight Labor Supply Creates Jobs for the Mentally Disabled,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 1999, at A1 (recounting a People First protest of an employer’s
hiring practices).
198
See SHAPIRO, supra note 4, at 126 (illustrating how groups view issues in rela-
tion to their disability).
199
Id.; see also Richard K. Scotch, Politics and Policy in the History of the Disability
Rights Movement, 67 MILBANK Q. 380, 382-84 (1989) (describing the then-emerging
pan-disability rights movement).
200
See SHAPIRO, supra note 4, at 117-41 (describing how bipartisan will from a
broad coalition of legislators and executives, including President Bush himself, en-
abled the ADA’s passage despite little attention to the issue from the public and press).
But see Bagenstos, supra note 5, at 927, 954 (arguing that dependency-avoidance was
one of the prime considerations impelling the statute’s passage, which was “sold to a
significant extent as a means of welfare reform”).
201
See SHAPIRO, supra note 4, at 118 (listing personal experience major political
figures had with disabilities or with disabled friends and relatives).
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individuals into a unified disability rights movement, this union was
short-lived.202  People with disabilities remain largely uncoordinated
(and sometimes conflicted)203 in their activities, without either an ac-
knowledged figurehead (paralleling, for example, Jesse Jackson) or a
central political vision (such as that expressed by NOW or NAACP)
through which to voice their concerns and desires.204  This lack of ad-
hesion has also precluded a univocal litigation strategy, with some
deleterious results.205
202
See Michael Ashley Stein, Employing People with Disabilities:  Some Cautionary
Thoughts for a Second-Generation Civil Rights Statute, in EMPLOYMENT, DISABILITY, AND
THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT:  ISSUES IN LAW, PUBLIC POLICY, AND RESEARCH
51, 54-56 (Peter David Blanck ed., 2000) (“[T]he history of disability rights advocacy
has been one of uncoordinated activity among disparate disability-specific groups.
Thus, the disabled have neither a nationally recognized figure . . . nor an established
central political congress . . . through which to voice their concerns and desires.”).
203
Compare, for example, the opposite positions in the right to die debate held by
the groups Not Dead Yet, at http://www.notdeadyet.org, opposing physician-assisted
suicide, and Compassion in Dying, at http://www.compassionindying.org/info.php,
advocating for the right of the terminally ill to die in comfort and dignity by means of
physician-assisted suicide.  This intradisability conflict is somewhat analogous to the
one described within the gay and lesbian community.  See Janet E. Halley, The Politics of
the Closet:  Towards Equal Protection for Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Identity, 36 UCLA L.
REV. 915, 932-63 (1989) (discussing academic and legal disagreement, both within and
outside the gay and lesbian community, about the immutability of homosexual iden-
tity); William B. Rubenstein, Divided We Litigate:  Addressing Disputes Among Group Mem-
bers and Lawyers in Civil Rights Campaigns, 106 YALE L.J. 1623, 1639-44 (1997) (high-
lighting disputes over legal goals and strategies among lawyers pursuing broader gay
and lesbian civil rights).  For a treatment of broader intergroup conflict arising from
conflicting civil rights agendas, see Linda Hamilton Krieger, Civil Rights Perestroika:
Intergroup Relations After Affirmative Action, 86 CAL. L. REV. 1251 (1998).
204 Yet, the formation and continuing development of the American Association of
People with Disabilities, with its focus on securing accessible voting and political par-
ticipation, is a welcome and promising change.  Their website is http://
www.aapd.com/.
205
This is especially true in the context of the idiosyncratic choices made regard-
ing how to litigate ADA cases and then whether to petition the Supreme Court to re-
view those claims.  Two examples illustrate this point.  In Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S.
624 (1998), the Court held that Abbott, an asymptomatic HIV-positive dental patient,
was disabled within the terms of the statute on the narrow ground that fear of trans-
mitting her infection to either a male partner or to their offspring functionally im-
paired her ability to reproduce.  Id. at 641-43.  Although Abbott was ultimately victori-
ous, her attorneys could also have litigated the case under the ADA’s “regarded as”
prong.  See 42 U.S.C. § 12,102(2)(c) (2000).  Framing an argument in that fashion
would have raised several issues capable of broader subsequent application, including
whether certain conditions are entitled to disability status per se and the extent to
which stigma extends the reach of the regarded as prong.  For the contrary perspective
of one of the architects of that litigation, see Wendy E. Parmet, The Supreme Court Con-
fronts HIV:  Reflections on Bragdon v. Abbott, 26 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 225, 236-37 (1998)
(examining the relationship between public health and legal perspectives).  Sutton v.
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Since people with disabilities were empowered with civil rights ab-
sent the necessary political tools and organization for inducing a gen-
eral elevation in social consciousness, it is not entirely surprising that
popular opinion about people with disabilities (which the canonical
treatment reflects) has yet to conform to the goals underlying passage
of the ADA.
3.  Old Stereotypes Die Hard:  The Supreme Court
As demonstrated above in the context of women’s employment
participation rights and scientifically “neutral” classifications that de-
fined race, unfounded assertions that were once regularly made about
the members of those groups are now considered outmoded and un-
acceptable.206  Nonetheless, analogous assumptions persist in holding
that people with disabilities require accommodations due to their
atypical biology and that those differences (which render them less
capable) are immutable, rather than socially contingent.207  The theo-
United Air Lines, 527 U.S. 471 (1999), arose from the certiorari petition of severely my-
opic twins who were denied positions as global airline pilots for failing to meet the air-
line’s minimum vision requirement, although their vision was correctable with glasses.
In affirming this outcome, the Court held that the ADA status of potential claimants
was limited to the extent that mitigating measures corrected their disabilities.  Thus,
the petitioners did not fall under the disability definition because they could correct
their impairments.  Although the decision can be construed as holding no more than
that people who need to wear eyeglasses are not ordinarily considered disabled, see
Bagenstos, supra note 21 at 484-85, it can also be understood as raising a duty to miti-
gate one’s disability.  See Hasday, supra note 58, at 13-21.  In any event, the Sutton twins
raised an extremely unsympathetic claim, which may have contributed to the general
backlash against ADA claims.  See Krieger, supra note 41, at 10-11 (describing the back-
lash against ADA claims, asserted by contributors to the symposium).
206
See supra Parts II.B.1-2 (documenting how widely assumed notions of the frail-
ness of women and the genetic inferiority of African Americans gradually began to dis-
sipate).  Consider, as a further example, the memorandum written by Chief Justice
Rehnquist as a law clerk to Justice Jackson in preparation for Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion that read:  “I think Plessy v. Ferguson was right and should be re-affirmed . . . the
Fourteenth Amendment did not enact . . . Myrdahl’s [sic] American Dilemma.”  William
H. Rehnquist, A Random Thought on the Segregation Cases (1952), 117 CONG. REC. 45,
440-41 (1971), quoted in MARK V. TUSHNET, MAKING CIVIL RIGHTS LAW:  THURGOOD
MARSHALL AND THE SUPREME COURT, 1936--1961, at 190 (1994).
207
This is not to say that misperceptions about other groups have disappeared,
even from the legal academy.  See, e.g., Kingsley R. Browne, Sex and Temperament in Mod-
ern Society:  A Darwinian View of the Glass Ceiling and the Gender Gap, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 971,
984 (1995) (proclaiming that a good deal of the glass ceiling effect is “the product of
basic biological sex differences in personality and temperament”); A. Dean Byrd &
Stony Olsen, Homosexuality:  Innate and Immutable?, 14 REGENT U. L. REV. 383, 384-99,
422 (2001) (arguing that, in spite of biological origin, those homosexuals who want to
change and become heterosexual can do so through therapy).
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retical consequence of this social convention is the canonical view that
treating disabled workers as if they were of a level with nondisabled
ones results in those individuals being provided with more-than-equal
treatment.  Accordingly, disabled participation in society is not a mat-
ter of right but is instead contingent on humanitarian considerations
and must therefore be measured against competing (and sometimes
greater) social need.208
Practical application of this misconception is aptly demonstrated
in both pre- and post-ADA Supreme Court cases involving people with
disabilities.  Among the more noteworthy cases that preceded the
ADA, Alexander v. Choate209 recognized the fact of disability discrimina-
tion but refused to strike down cost-effective administrative Medicaid
regulations that adversely affected the group.210  Youngberg v. Romeo211
held that the constitutional interest in freedom from involuntary con-
finement of mentally disabled people had to be balanced against “the
demands of an organized society,”212 and the Court in Hendrick Hudson
Central District Board of Education v. Rowley213 ruled that the requirement
of a “free appropriate public education” contained in the Education
of All Handicapped Children Act of 1975 was “significantly different
from any notion of absolute equality,” even for those with equal ca-
pasbility, and so mandated only the provision of “some educational
benefit upon the handicapped child.”214  Significantly, in City of
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center,215 the Court struck down a zoning
ordinance that discriminated against the establishment of group
homes for people with mental retardation but proposed that, in con-
trast to race- or sex-based classifications, disability was not entitled to
heightened scrutiny as a quasi-suspect classification.216  Although Jus-
208 “Accommodation claims are best conceived of as zero-sum, distributive claims
to a finite pot of redistributed social resources, competing not only with the demands
of others who seek accommodation . . . but with all claimants on state resources.”
Kelman, Market Discrimination, supra note 24, at 852.
209
469 U.S. 287 (1985).
210
Id. at 296, 299.
211
457 U.S. 307 (1982).
212
Id. at 319-20.  According to Chief Justice Burger’s separate concurring opinion,
he “would hold flatly that respondent ha[d] no constitutional right” at all.  Id. at 329.
213
458 U.S. 176 (1982).
214
Id. at 198-99, 200-01 (citing Education for All Handicapped Children Act of
1975, Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 (1975)).  The legislation is now called The Indi-
viduals with Disabilities Education Act, Pub. L. No. 102-119, 105 Stat. 587 (1991) (codi-
fied  as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1461 (2000)).
215
473 U.S. 432 (1985).
216
Zoning permits were also required for people with mental illness or addictions
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tice White’s majority opinion recognized that “requiring the permit in
this case appears to us to rest on an irrational prejudice against the
mentally retarded,”217 the Court determined that there should be no
general presumption that legislative action employing the disability
classification makes unconstitutional distinctions regarding their
treatment, even if such legislation systematically disadvantages indi-
viduals who fall within the classification.218  Thus, according to the
Cleburne majority, statutory provisions that limit the opportunities of
mentally disabled individuals are perceived as being rationally related
not only to an impartial state interest, but also to the interests of those
who will be deprived through its action.219
Post-ADA Supreme Court rulings likewise demonstrate that the
Justices continue to subscribe to the notion that disability-based rights
differ in kind from more traditional civil rights, are contingent on
humanitarian concerns rather than equality, and are thus subject to
the availability of competing resources.220  In Board of Trustees of Univer-
but not for housing the same number of unrelated, unimpaired people in a boarding
house, apartment, fraternity house, or convalescent home.  Id. at 446-47.  But see
Marcia Pearce Burgdorf & Robert Burgdorf, Jr., A History of Unequal Treatment:  The
Qualifications of Handicapped Persons as a “Suspect Class” Under the Equal Protection Clause,
15 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 855, 902 (1975) (“As a class repeatedly abused and neglected
by society and its public officials and institutions, handicapped persons have a legiti-
mate claim for special judicial solicitude under the equal protection clause.”).  When
drafting the ADA, Congress attempted to rebut the Supreme Court’s Cleburne doctrine
by creating a heightened level of statutory scrutiny.  It did so, first, by including a de-
tailed legislative history of the repressed position that people with disabilities have his-
torically held, and second, by using the then-operative language for indicating height-
ened scrutiny.  Nevertheless, because Congress was inartful in drafting the statute, it
failed in this purpose.  Silvers & Stein, Standing at the Crossroads, supra note 100, at 102.
See generally LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 991-1136 (2d ed.
1978) (describing differing levels of scrutiny).
217
City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 450.
218
Id. at 446.
219
See Silvers & Stein, Chill Wind, supra note 100 (arguing that the Court’s attitudes
toward the disabled and states’ rational interests in legislation restricting the rights of
the disabled are throwbacks to patronizing attitudes towards African Americans); Sil-
vers & Stein, Standing at the Crossroads, supra note 100 (portraying how the Court’s atti-
tudes toward the disabled are driven more by legislative definitions and findings than
by “open-minded empirical study”).
220
Legal scholars differ on whether communal institutions can, in fact, express
attitudes.  Compare Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of
Law:  A General Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503, 1520-27 (2000) (believing collec-
tive entities capable of such expression), with Matthew D. Adler, Expressive Theories of
Law:  A Skeptical Overview, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1363, 1389 (2000) (averring the oppo-
site).  I agree with Susan Bandes that the values expressed in the Court’s opinions “are
both a product of and an expression of certain emotional assumptions and commit-
ments.”  Susan Bandes, Fear and Degradation in Alabama:  The Emotional Subtext of Uni-
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sity of Alabama v. Garrett,221 Patricia Garrett sued the University after
having been demoted from her position of nursing supervisor to a
lower-paying job because she had undergone treatment for breast
cancer.222  The Supreme Court did not reach the merits of her claim.223
Rather, the Court ruled that as a state actor the defendant was pro-
tected by the Eleventh Amendment and thus immune from Garrett’s
private ADA suit for monetary damages.224  In reaching this decision,
versity of Alabama v. Garrett, 5 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 520, 521 (2003); see also Susan Ban-
des, Empathy, Narrative, and Victim Impact Statements, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 361, 366-82
(1996) (maintaining that emotional presumptions underlie juridical action).  Of
course, it is possible to divine many different themes running through any area of the
Court’s jurisprudence.  The academic literature on the Supreme Court’s ADA juris-
prudence, to take just one example, can be organized into three broad categories that
explore the (1) disharmony between the ADA’s stated goals and its practical effects;
(2) discomfort of the Justices about the group of people legislated as “disabled” and
the effect that has upon application of the ADA; and (3) underlying principles the Jus-
tices seek to achieve as well as the goals the ADA ought to effectuate.  Stein, supra note
13, at 623-26.  Much ink has been, and will continue to be, spilled on this issue.
221
531 U.S. 356 (2001).
222
Id. at 362.  Garrett’s case was consolidated with that of prison guard Milton
Ash, an asthmatic whose physician recommended that he not be assigned to work in
areas polluted with cigarette smoke or to drive cars with carbon monoxide leaking into
the interior compartment.  Id. at 363.
223
Id. at 362 n.2.  Parenthetically, the Court did not contest Garrett’s classification
as a person with a disability, despite her claim not to have functional impairment.  This
is unusual in light of the Court’s prior line of decisions denying ADA protection on
coverage grounds, either because the plaintiffs were functionally capable or could have
mitigated their impairments.  See, e.g., Toyota Motor Mfg. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184,
198, 202 (2001) (holding that an employee with carpal tunnel syndrome who was un-
able to perform a repetitive job function at a car manufacturing plant was not disabled
enough to qualify for protection under the ADA because she was able to perform
normal household chores); Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 489 (1999)
(holding that severely myopic twins who were precluded from positions as global air-
line pilots were not disabled within the meaning of the ADA because they were not
“substantially limited in any major life activity”); Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc.,
527 U.S. 516, 520 (1999) (same for a mechanic with high blood pressure); Albertson’s,
Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 563-66 (1999) (same for driver with monocular vi-
sion).
224
The holding restricts only Title I claims for monetary damages brought in fed-
eral court by state employees or applicants for state employment against state actors.
Suits against the same state actors for injunctive relief are not affected.  Garrett, 531
U.S. at 360, 374 n.9.  Moreover, claims for money damages can still be brought in fed-
eral court by federal government agencies (such as the EEOC) on behalf of state ap-
plicants or employees, or in state courts by aggrieved persons themselves, so long as
the state in which the suit is brought has consented to being sued in cases of this type.
See generally Judith Olans Brown & Wendy E. Parmet, The Imperial Sovereign:  Sovereign
Immunity and the ADA, 35 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1 (2001) (discussing the Court’s doc-
trine of state sovereign immunity from suit under the ADA after Garrett).  Most re-
cently, in Tennessee v. Lane, 124 S. Ct. 1978 (2004), the Court held that states lack sov-
ereign immunity from suit for ADA Title II claims.  Id. at 1983-84.  That case was not an
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however, the twin tenets of the canonical framework were invoked.
Chief Justice Rehnquist’s majority opinion stated that state workplace
practices that unquestionably discriminate against people with dis-
abilities for economic reasons are constitutional.225  This is because “it
would be entirely rational . . . for [state employers] to conserve scarce
financial resources by hiring employees who are able to use existing
facilities” rather than accede to ADA requests.226  Hence, state actors
“could quite hardheadedly—and perhaps hardheartedly—hold to job-
qualification requirements which do not make allowance for the dis-
abled.”227  Although Patricia Garrett did not request any form of ac-
commodation, the Chief Justice characterized her ADA claims as be-
ing for “special accommodations.”228  To Justice Kennedy, who
concurred in the judgment,229 the adjudication of ADA claims was not
a matter of determining equality.  Rather, it required a great internal
struggle between “our own human instincts” that cause us to ostracize
unfamiliar types of people and “the better angels of our nature” that
sympathize for “those disadvantaged by mental or physical impair-
ments.”230  Thus, according to the Court’s ruling, ADA rights involve
something more than equality and are motivated by pity rather than
by social justice.231
employment discrimination suit, even if it did raise (inferentially) the ability of the two
wheelchair-using plaintiffs to ply their legally-related trades in an inaccessible court-
house.  The Chief Justice dissented, asserting that remedying the inaccessible nature of
the courthouse so as to ensure access to court services was a disproportionate remedy
to their systemic exclusion.  This is notable for two reasons:  substantively, it is a clear
expression of the canonical principles as influenced by the medical model of disability;
procedurally, with one additional vote, it could have comprised the majority opinion.
Cf. Michael Selmi, Remedying Societal Discrimination Through the Government’s Spending
Power, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1575, 1575 (2002) (asserting, as a general matter, the practicality
and good sense of utilizing the spending power as a means of combating discrimina-
tion).
225
Garrett, 531 U.S. at 369-72.
226
Id. at 372.
227
Id. at 367-68.
228
Id. at 368.
229
Justice Kennedy was joined by Justice O’Connor.  Id. at 375.
230
Id. at 375-76 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).  Why Justice Kennedy (as well as the
concurring Justice O’Connor) would make such a progressive statement immediately
prior to skewering Title I liability against states as employers is open to conjecture.
Addressing this point, Aviam Soifer argues that a majority of the Justices remain firmly
unconvinced that the disabled require, or even deserve, legal protection.  Aviam
Soifer, Disabling the ADA:  Essences, Better Angels, and Unprincipled Neutrality Claims, 44
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1285, 1290 (2003).
231
In contrast to the majority, Justice Breyer dissented on the ground that “Con-
gress compiled a vast legislative record” that documented extensive and “powerful evi-
dence of discriminatory treatment” of the disabled that both “implicate[d] state gov-
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The Court emphasized the distinction between antidiscrimination
and accommodation, and particularly the differences between the
ADA and other forms of accommodation, in Nevada Department of Hu-
man Resources v. Hibbs.232  Hibbs was a case brought and decided under
the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA)233 and did not involve the
ADA.  Nevertheless, in upholding the right of a state employee to re-
cover monetary damages in federal court against a state employer un-
der that statute, the Court took care to explain that Hibbs’s FMLA suit
was to be treated in a manner distinct from Patricia Garrett’s ADA
claim.234  According to the Court, this was because the former statute
was passed in an effort to eviscerate unwarranted gender discrimina-
tion and stereotyping that had kept women from enjoying employ-
ment opportunity.235  By contrast, barring people with disabilities from
the workplace, at least as far as states were concerned, was rational
and therefore maintainable.236  What is also notable about the Hibbs
opinion is that, although the Justices correctly acknowledged the im-
proper way women historically have been excluded from the work-
place due to their socially ascribed gender roles (especially as caretak-
ers),237 the Court characterized the FMLA as being specially protective
of women.238  Though the statute is invoked to a greater degree by
women than by men,239 the FMLA is a “universal mandate” that applies
ernments” and supported the rights-based theory evoked by the plaintiffs.  Garrett, 531
U.S. at 377-78 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
232
538 U.S. 721 (2003).
233
Pub. L. No. 103-3 (codified in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C. and 29 U.S.C.).
234
Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 735 (noting that, unlike gender, disability is judged under a
rational basis standard).
235
Id. at 731-32.  See Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Legislative Constitutionalism
and Section Five Power:  Policentric Interpretation of the Family and Medical Leave Act, 112
YALE L.J. 1943, 1984 (2003) (describing the historical development of the FMLA as
arising from the second wave feminist movement of the 1970s).
236
Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 735.
237
See, e.g., HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., WOMEN, WORK, AND FAMILY HEALTH:
A BALANCING ACT (Apr. 2003) (finding that “[a]pproximately 80% of all mothers are
responsible for selecting their child’s doctor, taking children to doctor’s appoint-
ments, and follow-up care”), available at http://www.kff.org/womenshealth/3336-
index.cfm (last visited Oct. 24, 2004).
238
Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 731-32.
239
The Department of Labor’s 2000 study reported that 58.1% of FMLA leave-
takers were women.  Overall, 47.2% of individuals took leave for reasons relating to
their own health, 7.8% for maternity-disability reasons, 17.9% to care for a newly ar-
rived child, and a collective 27.1% to care for an ill child, spouse or parent.  U.S. DEP’T
OF LABOR, BALANCING THE NEEDS OF FAMILIES AND EMPLOYERS:  FAMILY AND MEDICAL
LEAVE SURVEYS 2000 UPDATE, at 2-6 & tbl.2.5, 2-8 (2001), available at http://
www.dol.gov/asp/fmla/toc.htm (last visited Nov. 30, 2004).
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equally to members of both sexes,240 hence the ability of William Hibbs
to challenge the denial of unpaid leave time to care for his ailing
wife.241  Nevertheless, the Court distinguished the FMLA’s role of evis-
cerating prejudice from that of the ADA (among other statutes regu-
lating employer behavior), which it maintained invoked special
rights.242
More subtle than the statements above, but also supporting the
canonical framework, are the omissions in two other Court opinions.
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Echazabal 243 illustrates the difference between the
Court’s treatment of claims brought under Title I and Title VII.  The
Echazabal Court held that employers may exclude not only disabled
workers who pose dangers to others, but also those who endanger
themselves.244  In so doing, the Court explained only the potential
costs (such as tort liability) that would be borne by the employer, ig-
noring the potential harm to the plaintiff’s own health.245  This is in
stark contrast to the Court of UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc.,246 which
went to great lengths to explain that an employer’s potential liability
was not a valid consideration for precluding either workplace oppor-
tunity or autonomous health care choices for women.247
Similarly, in U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett,248 the Court held that a
requested ADA accommodation that conflicts with an established sen-
iority system is usually unreasonable.249  However, an employee could
endeavor to show “special circumstances” where it might be reason-
able to make an exception and thereby compel an employer to pro-
vide an accommodation.250  What those circumstances entail remains
unknown since the Court’s ruling did not enumerate any factors that
could be considered when determining the reasonableness of an ac-
240
29 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(4) (2000).  See generally Rabin-Margalioth, supra note 40, at
115-17 (differentiating between universal, antidiscrimination, and accommodation
mandates).
241
Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 725.
242
Id. at 729-36.
243
536 U.S. 73 (2002).
244
Id. at 76.
245
Id. at 84.
246
499 U.S. 187 (1991).
247
Id. at 197-99.
248
535 U.S. 391 (2002).
249
See id. at 403.  Robert Barnett injured his back handling baggage for the defen-
dant U.S. Airways, was transferred to a then-vacant, less physically strenuous position in
the airline’s mailroom, and sought to remain in that position, in opposition to the air-
line’s seniority-based system.  Id. at 1521.
250
Id. at 405-06.
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commodation.251  Moreover, the Court neither acknowledged nor dis-
tinguished Barnett from settled Title VII jurisprudence wherein senior-
ity systems that artificially exclude members of protected classes are
examined and altered.252  That the Court elided an ADA accommoda-
tion request from such investigation demonstrates how different the
Justices believe the ADA is from Title VII.253
Finally, it bears noting that in Cleveland v. Policy Management Sys-
tems Corp.,254 plaintiff Cleveland was deemed to have ADA protection
in retaining employment, even though she had exercised a statutory
entitlement to Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) benefits.255
However, the burden shifted to her to show that with reasonable ac-
commodation she could overcome the crucial aspects of the employ-
ment-related dysfunction on which her SSDI application was based.256
The Court thereby reinforced the principle that an assignment to the
disability classification carries a presumption of being an inauthentic
worker, and that individuals so classified were expected to prove
themselves exceptions to the presumption in order to gain access to
the normal opportunity range, including employment.
These Supreme Court opinions illustrate how a majority of the
current Justices believe that the ADA differs in kind from previous
civil rights statutes because it engenders special disability-specific costs
for employers, bestowing more than equality upon ADA accommoda-
tion recipients.
III. ADA ACCOMMODATIONS AS ANTIDISCRIMINATION
The ADA’s accommodation mandate is an appropriate antidis-
crimination remedy because it corrects artificial (i.e., non-inevitable
and/or easily remediable) exclusion.  Title I is a reasonable remedy in
that it engenders costs that are reasonable and proportionate to em-
ployers’ resources.  Economic and prudential justifications demon-
251
See Stein, supra note 6, at 93-96.
252
The litmus test is whether the seniority system is “an otherwise neutral, legiti-
mate” one.  Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 353 (1977).  This, of
course, begs the very question raised.
253
Cf. Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 124 S. Ct. 376, 382 (2003) (holding that
the Social Security Administration can promulgate a rule stating that a person is not
disabled for social security purposes if she is functionally capable of some type of em-
ployment, even if the position she once held is either terminated or no longer exists in
the national economy).
254
526 U.S. 795 (1999).
255
Id. at 797-98.
256
Id. at 798.
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strate that, from a normative perspective, ADA accommodation costs
are properly allocated to employers through antidiscrimination regu-
lation rather than by tax-and-spend subsidies.
A.  An Appropriate Antidiscrimination Remedy
The ADA’s accommodation mandate is an appropriate antidis-
crimination remedy because, like Title VII, the statute remedies the
avoidable workplace exclusion of a targeted group.  A practical exam-
ple of how accommodations achieve this goal is through the applica-
tion of Universal Design principles.
1.  Artificial Exclusion
During hearings on the ADA, Congress was presented with a cata-
log of evidence on the historical exclusion of people with disabilities
from American society.257  Among the more dramatic evidence pre-
sented were the results of an independent nationwide poll of one
thousand Americans with disabilities, which found that two-thirds of
working-age people with disabilities were unemployed and that almost
half of those individuals wanted to work but could not do so because of
employer attitudes.258  The study also found that during the year pre-
ceding the ADA hearings, nearly two-thirds of individuals with disabili-
ties did not attend movies, three-fourths of the disabled population
did not see live theater or music performances, two-thirds of disabled
people had not attended sporting events, seventeen percent did not
eat in restaurants, and thirteen percent had not shopped in grocery
257
Congress summarized its conclusions as to this evidence in the ADA’s Findings
Section.  42 U.S.C. § 12101(a) (2000).  See also PELL & BURGDORF, supra note 98, at 159
(“Historically, society has tended to isolate and segregate handicapped people.  De-
spite some improvements, . . . discrimination against handicapped persons continues
to be a serious and pervasive social problem.”).
258
LOUIS HARRIS & ASSOCS., THE INT’L CTR. FOR THE DISABLED SURVEY OF
DISABLED AMERICANS:  BRINGING DISABLED AMERICANS INTO THE MAINSTREAM 47-
51(1986) [hereinafter HARRIS/ICD SURVEY]; see Guaranteed Job Opportunity Act of 1987:
Hearing on S. 777 Before the Subcomm. on Employment and Productivity and Subcomm. on the
Handicapped of the Comm. on Labor & Human Res., 100th Cong., pt. 2, at 9 (1987)
(statement of Humphrey Taylor, president of Lewis Harris & Associates) [hereinafter
Statement of Humphrey Taylor] quoted in S. REP. NO. 101-116, at 8 (1989), also quoted
in H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 31 (1990) (summarizing these results to Congress
during the hearings on the ADA).  For a thorough overview by one of the ADA’s draft-
ers, see Burgdorf, supra note 54, at 449-51.  For a good journalistic account of the poli-
tics behind the passage of the ADA, see SHAPIRO, supra note 4, at 105-41.
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stores.259  Of course, the accuracy of these particular results, especially
the employment figures, as with poll-based evidence in general, can
be challenged in light of the sample size.  Nevertheless, these findings
were corroborated with more empirically rigorous data as well as by
anecdotal evidence.260  As a result of those hearings, Congress was per-
suaded that the overall status of disabled people in America was a
dismal one, concluding that they have historically been “relegated to a
position of political powerlessness in our society”261 and “continually
encounter various forms of discrimination.”262
Consequently, the legislators found that people with disabilities
have been denied equal opportunities in society, in such realms as
employment, education, transportation, access to public services, and
voting.263  Congress, moreover, identified the source of this exclusion
as an artificial one, sustained by the “continuing existence of unfair
and unnecessary discrimination and prejudice.”264  Among the forms of
unwarranted exclusion encountered by people with disabilities on a
daily basis, Congress noted “the discriminatory effects of architectural,
transportation, and communication barriers.”265
Accordingly, Congress premised the ADA on the belief that the
repercussions of having a disability are often mutable and can be re-
259
HARRIS/ICD SURVEY, supra note 258, at 37-38.
260
For example, Census data reported at that time that more than twenty percent
of working age individuals with disabilities were below the poverty level.  NAT’L
COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, TOWARD INDEPENDENCE 5 (1986), available at http://
www.ncd.gov/newsroom/publications/1986/toward.htm. Previous testimony before
the Senate had concluded that “[b]y almost any definition . . . disabled Americans are
uniquely underprivileged and disadvantaged.  They are much poorer, much less well
educated, and having much less social life, enjoy fewer amenities and have a lower
level of life satisfaction than other Americans.”  Statement of Humphrey Taylor, supra
note 258, at 9.  The more compelling anecdotal examples included testimony by a
wheelchair-using future under-secretary of the Department of Education who was re-
moved from an auction house for being deemed “disgusting to look at,” about indi-
viduals with Down Syndrome who were banned from a zoo because of the keeper’s fear
they would frighten the chimpanzees, that an academically competitive and nondis-
ruptive child was barred from attending public school because of a teacher’s allegation
that his physical appearance “produced a nauseating effect” upon classmates, and of
the denial of a job to a competent arthritic woman by a college because of its trustees’
belief that “normal students shouldn’t see her.”  S. REP. NO. 101-116, 6-7 (1989) (cita-
tions omitted); see also Silvers & Stein, Standing at the Crossroads, supra note 100, at 114-
15.
261
42 U.S.C. § 12,101 (a)(7) (2000).
262
Id. § 12,101(a)(5).
263
Id. § 12,101(a)(3).
264
Id. § 12,101(a)(9) (emphasis added).
265
Id. § 12,101(a)(5).
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lieved when the social environment accommodates physical and cog-
nitive difference instead of excluding it.266  Here again, legislative his-
tory shows that Congress was presented with a prodigious body of evi-
dence which showed that being disabled led to capable citizens being
denied opportunity and excluded from social participation.267  In re-
sponse to avoidable exclusion, the ADA seeks to redesign society to al-
low the integration of disabled people, rather than to predicate inclu-
sion on their realignment.  As an expression of the social model of
disability, the ADA differs both from the medical model and from the
canonical view of antidiscrimination, precisely because it does not
view disability-related impairments as being intrinsically disadvanta-
geous.268
It is worth noting once more that Congress did not mandate that
every requested accommodation be made for disabled workers.269  In-
stead, the ADA requires only the provision of reasonable and propor-
tionately expensive accommodations, meaning those avoidable
and/or easily remediable workplace exclusions referred to through-
out this Article as “artificial.”
By so recognizing that many disadvantages associated with disabil-
ity are the results of social construct rather than biological destiny, the
ADA helps to eliminate an environment that is unnecessarily hostile to
those impairments.
266
See Silvers & Stein, Standing at the Crossroads, supra note 100, at 89-98 (discussing
the shift in the perception of women in society and contrasting with that of the dis-
abled).
267
See Timothy M. Cook, The Americans with Disabilities Act:  The Move to Integration,
64 TEMP. L. REV. 393, 407-18 (1991) (exploring the history behind and implications of
the ADA).
268
As Silvers has aptly pointed out, the most common argument that negatively
construes impairment by equating it with deficiency would describe deafness as “an
intolerable deprivation” because those individuals are unable to enjoy music.  Yet many
people physically capable of enjoying music voluntarily do not enjoy it to the fullest
extent possible.  Those hearing people, however, are neither pitied for lost opportu-
nity, nor required to defend the quality of their lives.  Silvers, supra note 79, at 90; see
also Harlan Hahn, Towards a Politics of Disability:  Definitions, Disciplines, and Policies, SOC.
SCI. J., Oct. 1985, at 87, 88-96 (noting the shift from a medical to a sociopolitical per-
spective of disability and its coterminous effect upon the development of anti-
discrimination norms).
269
See supra Part II.A.1 (explaining the ADA’s limitation to only avoidable exclu-
sion).
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2.  Universal Design
A clear example of how accommodations remedy artificial, as op-
posed to natural or inherent, exclusion is the way Universal Design
principles alter the physical environment.270  This architectural con-
cept has as its tenet an approach to creating environments and prod-
ucts that are “usable by all people to the greatest extent possible.”271
Recall that a common assertion of disability rights advocates is that
it is the environment, rather than a person’s disability, that deter-
mines the ability of disabled people to participate in mainstream so-
cial roles.272  They argue that because our physical surroundings are
structured to include an idealized bodily norm, people with disabili-
ties have historically been excluded from opportunity.273  Perhaps the
270
For discussions confined to the disability-specific context, see SELWYN
GOLDSMITH, UNIVERSAL DESIGN:  A MANUAL OF PRACTICAL GUIDANCE FOR ARCHITECTS
(2000); ROB IMRIE, PROPERTY DYNAMICS AND THE MULTIPLE DESIGN NEEDS OF
DISABLED PEOPLE (Dep’t of Geography, Royal Holloway, Univ. of London, Disability,
Planning, and the Built Environment Project Paper No. 10 1999); ROB IMRIE & PETER
HALL, INCLUSIVE DESIGN:  DESIGNING AND DEVELOPING ACCESSIBLE ENVIRONMENTS
(2001).  Less obvious is the related ameliorative impact that changes in physical design
have on exclusionary methods of job structuring and administration.
271
Ronald L. Mace et al., Accessible Environments:  Toward Universal Design, in
DESIGN INTERVENTIONS:  TOWARD A MORE HUMANE ARCHITECTURE 155, 156 (Wolf-
gang F.E. Prieser et al. eds., 1991).
272
See supra Part II.A.1 (explaining the “social” or “minority” model of disability);
see also DEBORAH A. STONE, THE DISABLED STATE 117 (1984) (recommending greater
scrutiny of “how particular [disability] constructs and measures systematically exclude
certain understandings and include others, how they serve the political interests of
some groups at the expense of others, and how they work to produce particular types
of policy results”); Hahn, supra note 100, at 173-75 (claiming that features of the con-
structed environment “represent conscious choices” based on “bodily traits” that form
the basis for discrimination based on “labeling”).
273
See, e.g., PELL & BURGDORF, supra note 98, at 93 (“Structuring society’s tasks
and activities on the basis of assumptions about the normal ways of doing things re-
flects the idea that there are ‘normal’ people who can participate and there are people
with physical and mental handicaps who cannot.”); WENDELL, supra note 73, at 40
(“Much architecture has been planned with a young adult, non-disabled male para-
digm of humanity in mind.”); Chai R. Feldblum, Antidiscrimination Requirements of the
ADA, in IMPLEMENTING THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT:  RIGHTS AND RE-
SPONSIBILITIES OF ALL AMERICANS 35, 36 (Lawrence O. Gostin & Henry A. Beyer eds.,
1993) (“[B]arriers to people with disabilities have been established because members
of society have not historically viewed people with disabilities as part of the societal
norm.  Thus, no effort has been made to ensure that barriers to people with disabilities
are not built into the structural frameworks of society.”); cf. Harlan Hahn, Civil Rights
for Disabled Americans:  The Foundation of a Political Agenda, in IMAGES OF THE DISABLED,
DISABLING IMAGES 181, 184 (Alan Gartner & Tom Joe eds., 1987) (arguing that “all
aspects of the external world–-including architecture, communications, and social or-
ganizations–-are shaped by public policy and that policies are a reflection of pervasive
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strongest version of this assertion is articulated by feminist and disabil-
ity rights advocate Susan Wendell, who avers that “the entire physical
and social organization of life” has been created with the belief that
“everyone [was] physically strong, as though all bodies were shaped
the same, as though everyone could walk, hear, and see well, as
though everyone could work and play at a pace that is not compatible
with any kind of illness or pain.”274  By contrast, in a society utilizing
Universal Design criteria:
a person who cannot walk would not be disabled, because every major
kind of activity that is accessible to someone who can walk would be ac-
cessible to someone who cannot, and likewise with seeing, hearing,
speaking, moving one’s arms, working for long stretches of time without
rest, and many other physical and mental functions.
275
Wendell’s point, although valid (as is Silvers’s earlier characteriza-
tion of disabled exclusion as artificial exclusion),276 should similarly
not be overstated.  Not every aspect of disability-based exclusion is cre-
ated by the environment, nor is every exclusion from the mainstream
the result of an artificial social convention.  There are some people
with disabilities for whom even a broad expansion of what comprises
the bodily norm will not guarantee their inclusion.  And among these
individuals, only those whose accommodation costs are reasonable are
statutorily remediable.
Nevertheless, many (even, arguably, most) disability-related exclu-
sions from social participation based on the design of the physical en-
vironment are indeed artificial.277  At the very least, the impact of the
cultural values and attitudes,” one of which is “widespread aversion to the presence of
disabled individuals”); Earl D. McBride, Concept of Disability, CLINICAL ORTHOPAEDICS &
RELATED RES., Aug. 1987, at 3, 5 (“The terms ‘normal,’ ‘physically fit,’ and ‘non-disabled’
do not denote statistical standards. They represent value judgments in which we use
ourselves as the standard and the subject of our attention as the deviation from that
standard.”).
274
WENDELL, supra note 73, at 39.
275
Id. at 55; accord Simi Litvak & Alexandra Enders, Support Systems:  The Interface
Between Individuals and Environments, in HANDBOOK, supra note 71, at 711 (enhancing
the argument that disability is contingent on environment by demonstrating how sup-
port systems, including personal care assistants, improve individuals’ functional capa-
bilities in any environment).
276
See supra Part II.A.1 (summarizing and evaluating Silvers’s argument).
277
By extension, an argument can be made that we also order and construct soci-
ety according to conceptions of ordinary working hours, the working week, and even
standardized time.  See generally CLARK BLAISE, TIME LORD:  SIR SANDFORD FLEMING
AND THE CREATION OF STANDARD TIME (2000) (describing the way western time came
to be made uniform during the course of the nineteenth century); PRICE WATER-
HOUSE, DOING BUSINESS IN BAHRAIN 11-13 (Price Waterhouse Guides, 1996) (putting
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environment—how it is constructed, and from whose perspective—
has to be acknowledged in order to assess the inevitability of limita-
tions.278  Notably, although the inclusive nature of Universal Design
extends beyond disability (for example, to the design of new public
venues with a higher proportion of toilets allocated to women than to
men),279 the concept is frequently described as a disability-specific is-
sue, and thus one more instance of invoked special rights.280  In this
respect, Universal Design is similar to a number of other technologi-
cal developments that originally were developed to assist people with
disabilities, but which have become useful to the general popula-
tion.281  Examples include the telephone,282 the typewriter,283 the Ja-
travelers on notice regarding the closure of businesses on Fridays for Islamic obser-
vance); Thomas Riis, Analysis of Working Hours, 149 DIOGENES 65, 65-85 (1990) (de-
scribing the evolution of standardized time and the variations, including hours in a day
and working days in a year, that have developed in synchrony with social patterns).
278
See WENDELL, supra note 73, at 45 (“We need to acknowledge that social justice
and cultural change can eliminate a great deal of disability while recognizing that
there may be much suffering and limitation that they cannot fix.”); Harlan Hahn, Dis-
ability Policy and the Problem of Discrimination, 28 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 293, 303 (1985)
(arguing for “an environment designed to meet the needs of everyone, that does not
contain any implicit prerequisite concerning the capacities necessary to survive or to
engage in social life.”).  A strong application of this assertion would have every hearing
person learning to sign, which although not unprecedented, is unusual.  Cf. NORA
ELLEN GROCE, EVERYONE HERE SPOKE SIGN LANGUAGE:  HEREDITARY DEAFNESS ON
MARTHA’S VINEYARD 1-3 (1985) (describing a mostly-hearing community fluent in sign
language).
279
See, e.g., Selwyn Goldsmith, Access All Areas, ARCHITECTS’ J., Mar. 15, 2001, at 42,
43-44 (asserting that Universal Design encompasses not only people with disabilities
but also parents with small children and women forced to wait for public toilets).  For
the cultural implications of restroom allocation, which has been a source of research
and advocacy by Mary Anne Case, see Changing Room?  A Quick Tour of Men’s and
Women’s Rooms in U.S. Law over the Last Decade, from the U.S. Constitution to Local Ordi-
nances, 13 PUB. CULTURE 333 (2001).  To this end, she maintains a survey on her Uni-
versity of Chicago website, at http://www.law.uchicago.edu/toiletsurvey/.  In a similar
vein, architect William McDonough designs buildings that are environmentally sus-
tainable, a construct once thought either unobtainable or impracticable.  Brian Du-
maine, Are You Ready for the Green Revolution?, FORTUNE SMALL BUS., Dec. 2001–Jan.
2002, at 44; Roger Rosenblatt, William McDonough:  The Man Who Wants Buildings to
Love Kids, TIME, Feb. 22, 1999, at 70.
280
For examples of insistence that Universal Design is not to be disabled-specific,
see SELWYN GOLDSMITH, DESIGNING FOR THE DISABLED:  THE NEW PARADIGM, at vi
(1997); ROBERT IMRIE, DISABILITY AND THE CITY:  INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES
(1996).
281
See generally Heidi M. Berven & Peter David Blanck, The Economics of the Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act Part II—Patents and Innovations in Assistive Technology, 12 NOTRE
DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 9, 85-89 (1998) (illustrating the economic benefit of
the wider application of technology conventionally believed to be strictly limited to use
for individuals with disabilities).
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cuzzi,284 and closed-captioning.285  The construction of an inclusive en-
vironment not only provides the disabled with a means of equal par-
ticipation, but also affords greater access for people without disabili-
ties.286
To illustrate the effect of Universal Design on the inclusion of
both disabled and nondisabled persons, assume that Phoebe, who has
suffered a traumatic brain injury,287 wishes to work as a tax preparation
expert at H&R Shlock (H&R).  The essential job requirements are fa-
cility with basic accounting principles, ability to work long hours dur-
ing the months surrounding the national filing deadline, and verbal
and social skills sufficient to interview and develop a rapport with cli-
ents.  Suppose as well that Phoebe is a certified public accountant,
that little in life accords her more pleasure than interacting with a cal-
culator for extensive periods of time, and that she nonetheless has an
engaging personality.  However, H&R’s client interviewing area is at
the back of the office and up a flight of stairs, which Phoebe has diffi-
culty negotiating because of her poor balance.288  Consequently, after
282
See AN ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF THE HISTORY OF TECHNOLOGY 719 (Ian McNeil ed.,
1990) (attributing the invention of the telephone by Alexander Graham Bell as the
result of him “as a teacher trying to find better ways to teach deaf students to speak”).
283
See EDWARD TENNER, OUR OWN DEVICES:  THE PAST AND FUTURE OF BODY
TECHNOLOGY 193 (2003) (describing Charles Thurber’s invention of a forerunner of
the typewriter as a means of assisting those who could not write with a pen).
284
See Harvey Skolnick, Test Your Marketing Knowledge, TORONTO STAR, Sept. 1,
1991, at F1 (reporting that the “famous whirlpool” was developed by a father seeking
relief for his son with rheumatoid arthritis).
285
See Stephanie Argy, Barnathan Opened Doors with Closed Captions, VARIETY, Nov.
29, 1998, at A8 (describing the inventions of Julius Barnathan, among them closed-
captioning for the hearing impaired).  Conversely, accommodations routinely be-
stowed on nondisabled people, such as providing chairs to sit upon, are not seen as
special forms of advantage.  Hahn, supra note 72, at 104; see also Ball, supra note 36, at
645-46 (pointing out that people who are dependent on communal resources, such as
police protection, are not stigmatized for their dependency).
286
This point is illustrated with numerous examples in GARY MOULTON ET AL.,
ACCESSIBLE TECHNOLOGY IN TODAY’S BUSINESS (2002).
287
This condition has many pathologies, ranging from the congenital to contem-
porary causes.  Among adults, automotive accidents are a common cause.  See generally
DOE Assistance to States for the Education of Children With Disabilities, 34 C.F.R. §
300.7(c)(12) (2004) (defining traumatic brain injury); NAT’L INST. OF NEUROLOGICAL
DISORDERS & STROKE, TRAUMATIC BRAIN INJURY:  HOPE THROUGH RESEARCH (2002)
(providing information on the causes and manifestations of traumatic brain injury),
available at http://www.ninds.nih.gov/health_and_medical/pubs/TBI.pdf (last ac-
cessed Nov. 2, 2004).
288
See generally Cynthia M. Zablotny et al., Comparison Between Successful and Failed
Sit-to-Stand Trials of a Patient After Traumatic Brain Injury, 84 ARCHIVES OF PHYSICAL MED.
& REHABILITATION 1721 (2003) (assessing the efficacy of rehabilitation treatments for
644 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 153: 579
being offered a position, Phoebe notifies H&R of her visibly indis-
cernible disability289 and requests as an accommodation that she be al-
lowed to meet with clients at some alternative location on the ground
floor of the office.290
The initial argument for Universal Design in this circumstance is
that had H&R’s office been built in an inclusive manner, without
stairs, Phoebe would not have needed to request an accommodation
in the form of an alternative meeting venue.  Moreover, the disability
rights advocate would point out, it is the unnecessary incorporation of
stairs into H&R’s office that has engendered an artificial barrier to
Phoebe’s full and unaided participation as a tax preparer.291  Further,
although in this hypothetical it is Phoebe who questions the necessity
traumatic brain injury patients with difficulty standing due to balance impairments).
289
Pursuant to Title I, employers cannot inquire into the history, existence, or ex-
tent of a person’s disability, unless the inquiry is “job-related and consistent with busi-
ness necessity.”  42 U.S.C. § 12,112(d)(4) (2000).  However, when a person has a dis-
ability that is not readily ascertainable and does not disclose the existence of her
disability to her employer, she will not be protected under the ADA’s auspices.  See 42
U.S.C. § 12,112(a)(5) (requiring “reasonable accommodations to the known physical
or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability”).  Much as,
under Title VII, if a person’s religious convictions prevent her from performing her
employment, she is not protected unless she had previously disclosed that limitation.
See, e.g., Johnson v. Angelica Unif. Group, Inc., 762 F.2d 671, 673 (8th Cir. 1985) (de-
nying recourse to an employee who was terminated for missing work on religious holi-
days because she had not informed her employer of the holidays).  This raises a very
interesting (but secondary) issue relating to individuals with nondiscernable disabili-
ties that I have not seen addressed in the literature.  Verkerke analyzes the circum-
stance of a not-readily-knowable disability in the context of what happens when that
nondiscernable impairment prevents the employee from fulfilling her essential job
functions (“mismatching”) and discusses the implications for her firing (“churning”)
and possible exclusion from similar future employment (“scarring”).  J.H. Verkerke, Is
the ADA Efficient?,  50 UCLA L. REV. 903, 910-23 (2003).  Two related issues remain un-
addressed.  First, for the purposes of enculturating within a firm and avoiding preju-
dice, when should a person with a nonvisible disability disclose that disability?  This is
an especially pertinent question if the disability is an episodic one and/or a mental
disability that is likely to encounter strong prejudice.  See generally SUSAN STEFAN,
HOLLOW PROMISES:  EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION AGAINST PEOPLE WITH MENTAL
DISABILITIES (2002) (examining the implications of the ADA for persons with mental
disabilities).  Second, does the notion of constructive notice, which is not universally
accepted as case law in the Title VII context, extend to disability discrimination?
290
See 42 U.S.C. § 12,111(9)(B) (2000) (allowing job restructuring, equipment
modification, variation in existing methods of administration, and the provision of
readers or interpreters).
291
The barrier would be characterized as artificial because there was no intrinsic
reason for H&R’s office to include a second level.  By contrast, if the structure was in
Papua, New Guinea, where stilt houses are necessary to avoid tidal damage, that would
alter the imperative.  See generally PAUL OLIVER, DWELLINGS:  THE HOUSE ACROSS THE
WORLD (1987).
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of stairs in the workplace, one could imagine clients who equally dis-
like climbing the stairs.  These could include both clients with disabili-
ties292 and those without disabilities who are overweight, elderly, suffer-
ing from a variety of health-related impairments, caring for small
children or animals, or merely burdened with packages.293
B.  A Reasonable Antidiscrimination Remedy
The ADA’s accommodation mandate is a reasonable antidiscrimi-
nation remedy both because the costs it invokes are circumscribed
and because it applies those expenses in a manner proportionate to
the resources of the providing employers.
292
This phenomenon is overlooked in the literature.  Because ADA Title III re-
quires that places of public accommodation be made readily accessible, 42 U.S.C. §§
12,181-12,189, some employment-related accommodation costs should be subsumed by
employers in their role as owners or operators of those venues if they are otherwise
ADA-compliant.  However, barring suit, many venues are not readily accessible.  For
example, the Empire State Building complied with the ADA’s regulations only after
being targeted for litigation by the Department of Justice.  Lindsey Gruson, Getting to
Top of Empire State:  Opening the Way for Disabled, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 1994, at B3.  For an
initial discussion of the confluence of Titles I and III, see Stein, supra note 6, at 89-90.
293
I list these examples as illustrations of the principle, elaborated upon by recent
Supreme Court decisions, that people can be functionally impaired without those im-
pairments rising to the level of ADA protection.  See, e.g., Toyota Motor Mfg. v. Wil-
liams, 534 U.S. 184, 202 (2002) (holding that an employee with carpal tunnel syn-
drome who was unable to perform repetitive job functions at a car manufacturing
plant was not disabled enough to qualify for protection under the ADA because she
was able to perform normal household chores); Albertson’s, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527
U.S. 555, 562-67 (1999) (ruling that a monocular truck driver who was not rehired be-
cause he failed to meet Department of Transportation vision standards did not qualify
for ADA protection, as he was able to compensate for his impairment); Murphy v.
United Parcel Serv., Inc., 527 U.S. 516, 521 (1999) (ruling that a mechanic with high
blood pressure did not qualify as disabled under the ADA because “when medicated,
petitioner’s high blood pressure [did] not substantially limit him in any major life ac-
tivities”); Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 475 (1999) (holding that se-
verely myopic twins who were precluded from positions as global airline pilots were not
considered disabled because their vision was correctable with glasses).  Because it is
also plausible that these same individuals could be construed as disabled within the
ADA’s definition, the Court’s gatekeeping has been the subject of much ire from dis-
ability rights advocates.  See, e.g., Burgdorf, supra note 54, at 539 (“The results in many
of these decisions are manifestly inequitable and, because the constriction of the pro-
tection against discrimination is at odds with the underlying aims of the ADA and Re-
habilitation Act, often illogical.”); Chai R. Feldblum, Definition of Disability Under Federal
Anti-Discrimination Law:  What Happened?  Why?  And What Can We Do About It?, 21
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 91, 93-94 (2000) (offering “some ideas on how to get out of
the convoluted mess that is the state of interpretation today regarding the definition of
disability under the ADA”); Arlene Mayerson & Matthew Diller, The Supreme Court’s
Nearsighted View of the ADA, in EXPLORING IMPLICATIONS, supra note 21, at 124, 125
(“When it comes to the ADA, the Court just does not ‘get it.’”).
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1.  Reasonable Cost
Title I requires employers to provide “reasonable” accommoda-
tions to “qualified” employees with disabilities, meaning only those
individuals capable of performing the essential job functions of the
respective positions sought.294  Although the statute very clearly man-
dates the provision of reasonable accommodations, it leaves as a “great
unsettled question” the matter of precisely what can or should be con-
sidered a reasonable accommodation.295  Specifically, Title I delineates
294
Thus, a blind person would certainly not be qualified to drive a truck, but she
might well be a qualified molecular biochemist. See 42 U.S.C. § 12,111(8) (2000) (de-
fining qualified individual with respect to essential functions of the job).  Statutory
protection also extends to disabled workers capable of performing essential job func-
tions without provision of reasonable accommodations, id., but those individuals are
beyond the scope of this Article.  For a discussion, see Stein, supra note 6 at 133.  The
question of who is an individual with a disability, let alone a “qualified” one, has been
the focus of much case law and legal scholarship and is likely to continue as a source of
contention.  For now, it suffices to say that Supreme Court holdings require disabilities
to be significant ones, as measured in their mitigated states, with any attendant limita-
tions impairing a wide range of functional activities.  See, e.g., Toyota, 534 U.S. at 202
(holding that an employee with carpal tunnel syndrome who was unable to perform
repetitive job functions at a car manufacturing plant was not disabled enough to qual-
ify for protection under the ADA because she was able to perform normal household
chores); Sutton, 527 U.S. at 475 (holding that severely myopic twins who were pre-
cluded from positions as global airline pilots were not disabled within the meaning of
the ADA because their visual impairment was commonplace).
295
Karlan & Rutherglen, supra note 54, at 8.  Overall, reasonable accommodations
encompass a wide range of individualized adjustments to existing workplace conditions
but are mainly conceptualized as falling into one or both of two categories.  The first
category requires the alteration or provision of a physical plant, such as ramping a stair
to accommodate the needs of an employee who uses a wheelchair.  Accommodations
of this type involve “hard” costs, meaning that they invoke readily quantifiable out-of-
pocket expenses.  Purchasing and installing a ramp, for example, is usually a one-time
expenditure with a fixed and knowable cost.  See 42 U.S.C. § 12,111(9)(A) (2000) (re-
quiring an employer to make “existing facilities used by employees readily accessible to
and usable by individuals with disabilities”); cf. Stein, Empirical Implications, supra note
68, at 1677 (noting that most ADA studies focus on these “hard” costs).  The second
type of accommodation involves the alteration of the way in which a job is performed.
This might mean not requiring a wheelchair-using store clerk to stack high shelves.
These accommodations bring into play “soft” costs, which are more difficult to quan-
tify.  Our hypothetical employee might require a fellow worker to stack the high
shelves while she staffed the register.  Her circumstance might also necessitate that a
human resource manager meet with other employees to explain the change in their
daily duties or that a supervisor be required to learn how to take these alterations into
consideration when evaluating overall job performance.  See 42 U.S.C. § 12,111(9)(B)
(allowing job restructuring or modification, variation in existing methods of admini-
stration, and the provision of readers or interpreters); Stein, supra note 68, at 1677
(claiming that existing “studies do not adequately appraise ‘soft’ costs, including non-
physical plant expenses, such as educating human resource personnel”).  For a com-
prehensive treatment that initiates dialogue on this topic, see Stein, supra note 6, at
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the boundary between reasonable and unreasonable as an otherwise
undefined point at which a requested accommodation engenders an
“undue hardship” to the providing employer.296  In determining
whether a given disability-related accommodation is reasonable, inter-
ested parties are advised to take into consideration the totality of an
employer’s circumstances.297  Among the factors to be assessed are an
employer’s size, location, economic condition, and the number of
people employed.298  I have addressed the implications of this formula
elsewhere;299 for now it suffices to say that Judge Posner was correct
when ruling that reasonable “requires something less than the maxi-
mum possible care” as measured “in relation to the benefits of the ac-
commodation to the disabled worker as well as to the employer’s re-
sources.”300
Therefore, although the exact parameters of reasonableness are
not set forth by the ADA, what is clear is that an employer is meant to
incur reasonable expenses as a means of remedying workplace exclu-
sion.
2. Proportionate Cost
The ADA is also a properly allocated antidiscrimination remedy
because it allows employers to engender costs proportionate to their
resources.  Because workplace accommodations may impose an undue
hardship upon employers as measured against the totality of their fi-
nancial circumstances, ADA accommodation costs are relative rather
than absolute.301  Consequently, if the same person with a disability re-
quested identical accommodations from two different employers, the
144-78 (demonstrating how disability-related accommodations span a cost continuum
ranging from the wholly efficient to the wholly inefficient and explaining what entities
should bear the costs for each of these categories).  Although the confluence between
Title I and Title III access is incomplete, see Burgdorf, supra note 4, at 451 (discussing
some of the political compromises which facilitated the ADA’s passage), this is a point
to which I return infra Conclusion.
296
See 42 U.S.C. § 12,111(10)(A) (2000) (defining “undue hardship” as “an action
requiring significant difficulty or expense”).
297
These parties can include a worker with a disability seeking an accommodation,
an employer considering the viability of its provision, or a court rendering a determi-
nation of reasonability in the event that a conflict arises between the two.
298
See 42 U.S.C. § 12,111(10)(B) (2000) (listing factors to be weighed in deciding
“whether an accommodation would impose an undue hardship on a covered entity”).
299
Stein, supra note 6, at 90.
300
Vande Zande v. Wis. Dep’t of Admin., 44 F.3d 538, 542-43 (7th Cir. 1995).
301
See Stein, supra note 6, at 170-71 (“[A]ccommodation costs are relative rather
than absolute.”).
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ADA might consider one request reasonable but not consider the
other one to be so.
This is a calculus unique to the ADA and is caused by the statutory
requirement that accommodations be reasonable as measured by the
totality of a given employer’s financial circumstances.302  By contrast,
Title VII suits view the relative costs of bringing about a nondiscrimina-
tory equilibrium as irrelevant, at least superficially, because by infer-
ence Title VII suits consider the absolute cost of a remedy when an
employer either raises business necessity as a defense or rebuts a
claimant’s assertion of the existence of an alternative business prac-
tice.303  Ironically, this proscription might make some ADA accommo-
dations relatively less costly than their contemporary Title VII coun-
terparts.304
A second issue raised uniquely in the ADA context is whether
firms who either voluntarily provide accommodations or are coerced
to do so through litigation will, as a result, attract additional disabled
workers.  According to Issacharoff and Nelson, this clustering effect is
deleterious because it forces employers to repeatedly accommodate
less productive workers with disabilities, driving down profits.305  As a
result, employers who once accommodate a disabled worker might
then be “penalized” by having more of those workers imposed into
their workforce.306  But this argument only works if, empirically, con-
centrating workers with disabilities at particular sites will not increase
the likelihood that physical plant or equipment accommodations will
see repeated usage, or that an economy of scale will not ultimately
bring down the cost of accommodation.307  More crucially, the reason-
302
Id.; see also 42 U.S.C. § 12,112(b)(5)(A) (2000) (“[A business must] mak[e]
reasonable accommodations . . . unless [it] can demonstrate that the accommodation
would impose an undue hardship on the operation of the business . . . .”).
303
See generally John J. Donohue III, Further Thoughts on Employment Discrimination
Legislation:  A Reply to Judge Posner, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 523 (1987) (arguing that Title VII
is economically efficient); Thomas A. Cunniff, Note, The Price of Equal Opportunity:  The
Efficiency of Title VII After Hicks, 45 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 507 (1995) (analyzing the role
of economic efficiency as a driving force in Title VII case law).
304
The qualification reflects the fact that Title VII has been in effect thirty-six
years longer than the ADA, hence many architectural emendations may already have
been carried out in the ensuing years.
305
Issacharoff & Nelson, supra note 54, at 347.
306
See id. (“[M]ore disabled employees would ‘match’ with the employer who had
already accommodated either through settlement or coercion . . . .”).
307
See EPSTEIN, supra note 57, at 492-94 (“The concentration of workers with spe-
cific disabilities, far from being seen as handicap ghettoization, will be regarded as a
sensible effort to economize on public funds.”); Verkerke, supra note 289, at 931-33
(“Whether imposing such a duty to accommodate is good public policy depends cru-
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ableness of an ADA accommodation is always determined by the total-
ity of that particular employer’s financial circumstances.308  Thus, al-
though repeatedly imposing disability-related accommodations on a
single providing employer may well reduce its profit margin per
worker on each occasion, causing that employer to bear an unwanted
financial obligation, whatever total reductions ensue will ultimately be
curbed by an overriding standard of reasonableness.309
C.  A Properly Allocated Antidiscrimination Remedy
Although ADA accommodations are an appropriate and a reason-
able antidiscrimination device, historical exclusion from workplace
opportunity can also be remedied through tax-and-spend provisions.
This section argues that, for reasons of both economic efficiency and
prudential propriety, ADA accommodations are more properly allo-
cated as an antidiscrimination device (whose costs are borne by em-
ployers) than as a subsidy program (where the expenses are paid for
by the state).
cially on . . . its distributional consequences.”).  An important point that is tangential
to this Article bears noting.  When advocating in favor of the efficiency of repeated ac-
commodations, Epstein and Verkerke each support, by inference, the notion of di-
rected placements, meaning that they favor specific vocational placements for workers
with disabilities who evidence certain skills.  See EPSTEIN, supra note 57, at 493-95
(“[F]ederal grants can be made to particular firms, to be spent in making their facilities
accessible to certain classes of disabled persons.”); Verkerke, supra note 289, at 931-33
(“Employers forced to retain comparatively less productive disabled workers suffer
higher labor costs”).  To the extent that this policy either limits the development of
disabled workers or shunts them into certain careers, I would very strongly disagree
with it and point to the parallel history among women.  See, e.g., Dawn Michelle
Baunach, Trends in Occupational Sex Segregation and Inequality, 1950 to 1990, 31 SOC. SCI.
RES. 77, 90-93 (2002) (discussing decreasing occupational sex inequality); Jo Anne
Preston, Occupational Gender Segregation:  Trends and Explanations (Women at the End of the
Millennium:  What We Know, What We Need to Know), 39 Q. REV. ECON. &  FIN. 611, 614-
16 (1999) (showing substantial reduction of occupational-level gender segregation).
For disabled people, these measures, even when well-intentioned, have historically re-
sulted in sheltered workshops and make-work that demean and isolate those workers.
See Weber, supra note 78, at 889-956 (cataloguing and analyzing past treatment).  How-
ever, to the extent that such a policy duplicates some of the gains made in the past
through vocational rehabilitation that afforded the recipients job support and options,
I would endorse it.  See O’BRIEN, supra note 111, at 85-86 (discussing construction of
rehabilitation centers).  For a more global view, see David A. Gerber, Disabled Veterans
and Public Welfare Policy:  Comparative and Transnational Perspectives on Western States in the
Twentieth Century, 11 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 77, 88-89 (2001) (discussing
vocational rehabilitation of disabled World War I veterans).
308
42 U.S.C. § 12,111(10)(B) (2000).
309
Id. § 12,111(9)-(10).
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1.  Policy Choices
Policymakers considering how to rectify historical inequities,
whether motivated by reasons of equality or by a desire to redistribute
social resources, usually choose between the options of regulation (for
example, antidiscrimination legislation) and tax-and-spend (i.e., sub-
sidy) programs.310  This choice is also recognized in the canonical lit-
erature examining ADA accommodations.  Several commentators
have advocated for subsidies in lieu of Title I’s mandates as a way of
providing employers with incentives to accommodate and retain
workers with disabilities.311  Additional options which go beyond the
scope of this Article include abrogating the ADA and reverting to an
unregulated or “natural” market equilibrium,312 amending some of the
310
See KELMAN, STRATEGY OR PRINCIPLE, supra note 24, at 85-94 (discussing the use
of regulations and taxes); Robert Howse, Retrenchment, Reform or Revolution?:  The Shift to
Incentives and the Future of the Regulatory State, in REGULATION, ECONOMICS AND THE LAW
259 (Anthony I. Ogus ed., 2001) (exploring the alternatives of regulation and incen-
tives); Cass R. Sunstein, The Functions of Regulatory Statutes, in REGULATION, ECONOMICS
AND THE LAW, supra at 3 (exploring the nature and uses of regulatory statutes).  Kel-
man also discusses the possibility of exacting user fees from individuals who receive
certain services to preserve the availability of these services for nonusers.  See KELMAN,
STRATEGY OR PRINCIPLE, supra note 24, at 84 (“[When] the government chooses to
employ user fees, third parties always gain from the use.  If third parties benefit, of
course, the actor’s decision to forgo the purchase of the government’s service may be
privately rational but socially undesirable . . . .”).  Within the ADA context, such a
scheme would require workers with disabilities who benefited as the result of subsidies
paid to their employers to pay a tax on those subsidies to support future subsidies.  He
does not address this last option, probably because these subsidies do not currently
exist.  Overall, Kelman is agnostic as between regulation and tax-and-spend programs
as vehicles for social change.  See id. at 88.  Issacharoff and Nelson are equally agnostic,
but they take umbrage at redistribution masquerading as equality.  See Issacharoff &
Nelson, supra note 54, at 536 (lauding “Kelman’s discomfort with redistribution mas-
querading as entitlement or antidiscrimination”).
311
See, e.g., EPSTEIN, supra note 57, at 486-88 (criticizing the ADA as economically
inefficient); Schwab & Willborn, supra note 54, at 1278-79 (arguing for an extension of
the ADA by allowing disabled employees to pay for their extra-reasonable accommoda-
tions); Sue A. Krenek, Note, Beyond Reasonable Accommodation, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1969,
2009-13 (1994) (proposing to effectuate accommodations through a public-private
partnership wherein private employers pay for most permanent, site-specific improve-
ments to their physical plants and the federal government pays for the rest); Scott A.
Moss & Daniel A. Malin, Note, Public Funding for Disability Accommodations:  A Rational
Solution to Rational Discrimination and the Disabilities of the ADA, 33 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 197, 219-20 (1998) (arguing for a grant system to federally fund reasonable dis-
ability accommodation in the workplace).
312
The suggestion, not surprisingly, originates with Epstein who also advocates for
eliminating all antidiscrimination legislation because such statutes restrict free mar-
kets.  EPSTEIN, supra note 57, at 494, 505.
[Epstein’s solution, however,] would only sanction and perpetuate the same
irrational biases the ADA was designed to correct.  This is true for a number
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statute’s provisions (especially its definition of disability),313 and pro-
viding subsidies for per se unreasonable accommodations when it is
socially beneficial to retain disabled people in the workplace rather
than on social welfare programs.314
The general economic efficiency and prudential propriety of both
regulation and tax-and-spend programs form part of an old debate
of reasons.  First, labor markets have never been demonstrated, either empiri-
cally or anecdotally, to have acted rationally with regard to nonmajority group
members.  Hence, no evidence supports Epstein’s notion that eliminating an
antidiscrimination norm will yield greater rationality to the employment
sphere.  Second, labor markets do not function nearly as well as other mar-
kets, such as capital markets, where information is freely disseminated, as well
as systemically disclosed, through governmentally enforced regulations.  This
is particularly certain with regard to a market failure in which the costs of in-
cluding people with disabilities in a workforce are perceived as being greater
than they really are.  Third, applying the neoclassical economic model con-
ceivably would compel disabled workers to underbid the value of their services
in order to subsidize workplace accommodations, whether of a hard or soft
variety.  As a result, the disabled would be discouraged from investing in their
own human capital and be further segregated from mainstream society.  In
sum, eliminating the ADA would only promote irrationalities that already exist
in the employment decisionmaking process.
Stein, supra note 68, at 1682-83 (footnotes omitted).
313
For example, Hoffman, supra note 54, at 1271-76, proposes amending the
scope of coverage so that the protected class more closely resembles the type of minor-
ity classifications utilized in other civil rights areas.  Id.  See also Steven B. Epstein, In
Search of A Bright Line:  Determining When an Employer’s Financial Hardship Becomes “Un-
due” Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 48 VAND. L. REV. 391, 452-53 (1995) (advo-
cating for a definite fixed-sum cost for accommodation); Lisa A. Sciallo, Note, The ADA
through the Looking Glass, 68 BROOK. L. REV. 589, 605-06 (2002) (critiquing the Su-
preme Court’s definition of disability and its impact on the application of the ADA).
314
As such:
When an employer cannot profit from retaining a worker with a disability
due to her accommodation cost, there still may be reason to compel that em-
ployer to accommodate the disabled worker on the ground that society in
general may benefit [as a result].
. . . .
In this circumstance, social efficiency is measured by any net positive gain
to society.  Specifically captured by this policy are disabled workers who can
perform productive work through the provision of unreasonable (or, extra-
reasonable) accommodations.  Many of these individuals are from the group
referred to in the economic literature as members of the “transfer” popula-
tion, meaning that they are functionally capable of work (and thus avoiding
welfare dependence), but do not have that opportunity.
. . . .
[This] is an appropriate [Kaldor-Hicks efficient] departure point from
which to consider state-funded employment opportunities through the pay-
ment of subsidies to employers.
Stein, supra note 6, at 175-78 (footnotes omitted).
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within the field of public finance.315  The following sections argue in
favor of antidiscrimination regulation within the context of disability-
related accommodations.
2.  Economic Efficiency
Economic justifications favor the use of regulations over tax-and-
spend subsidies in the context of disabled workers.  Although a few
commentators aver that regulation and tax-and-spend schemes are
equally efficient devices for managing public policy,316 most scholars
divide on whether regulations or tax-and-spend programs are more
efficient.317
Those commentators who disfavor regulation on efficiency
grounds (as opposed to, say, libertarian autonomy objections)318 argue
that mandates do not actually achieve the type of redistribution that
canonical scholarship attributes to the ADA.  Lawrence Summers, for
instance, argues that mandated benefits do not really shift wealth
from employers to employees.319  Rather, he asserts that those regula-
tions shift the accommodation costs from employers to employees by
offsetting the engendered expenses through wage reduction or the
315
See Howse, supra note 310, at 259-96 (exploring the alternatives of regulation
and incentives).  For an attack on regulation, see Roger G. Noll, Economic Perspectives on
the Politics of Regulation, in REGULATION, ECONOMICS AND THE LAW, supra note 310, at
35-68 (giving a broad overview of regulations, their use and effectiveness, and the mo-
tivating factors behind their implementation).  For a defense of regulation, see Sun-
stein, supra note 310, at 3-34 (exploring the nature and uses of regulatory statutes).
316
See KELMAN, STRATEGY OR PRINCIPLE, supra note 24, at 44 (“[R]egulation and
taxation are substitutes one for the other . . . .”); Yoram Margalioth, The Many Faces of
Mandates:  Beyond Traditional Accommodation Mandates and Other Classic Cases, 40 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 645, 648 n.148 (2003) (finding that mandated benefits and tax-financed
programs are, as an initial matter, equal in efficiency).
317
Compare, e.g., Julie A. Roin, Note, Reconceptualizing Unfunded Mandates and Other
Regulations, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 351, 382 (1999) (asserting the long term efficiency of
unfunded mandates relative to funded ones), with Anthony J. Vlatas, Note, An Economic
Analysis of Implied Warranties of Fitness in Commercial Leases, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 658, 686
(1994) (observing that welfare laws would be inefficient from a tax-and-spend perspec-
tive).
318
Perhaps the staunchest advocate is EPSTEIN, supra note 57, at 76-78, who has
long advocated against any form of employment discrimination regulation for this very
reason.  See also RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, EQUAL OPPORTUNITY OR MORE OPPORTUNITY?
THE GOOD THING ABOUT DISCRIMINATION 1-17 (2002) (updating and reiterating many
of the same arguments about the economic inefficiency of antidiscrimination legisla-
tion).
319
Lawrence H. Summers, Some Simple Economics of Mandated Benefits, 79 AM. ECON.
REV. 177, 181 (1989).
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reduction of other employee benefits.320  What Summers avers may
well be true in general employment circumstances.321  Within the ADA
context, however, Christine Jolls’s model, measuring the effects of ac-
commodation mandates, demonstrates that the wage level protection
of disabled workers does indeed bind employers.322  Thus, Summers’s
theorem would not operate in the context of ADA mandated accom-
modations.323
Conversely, commentators advocating in favor of regulation typi-
cally do so on the two related grounds of administrative efficiency and
cost spreading.324  Administrative efficiency theory holds that it is more
economically expedient to coerce the activities of individual employ-
ers by the passage of a broad regulation than it is to have the govern-
ment administer a detailed subsidy program.325  Anne Alstott, for ex-
320
Id. at 181-82.
321
See, e.g., Margalioth, supra note 316, at 649 (asserting that some mandates, for
instance those related to pension vesting and overtime pay, can have the opposite ef-
fect of reducing benefits to targeted groups).
322
Jolls, supra note 40, at 270.
323
On the other hand, because Jolls posits that restrictions on employment differ-
entials are unlikely to be binding (even as restrictions on wage differentials are likely to
bind), she predicts that Title I’s reasonable accommodation mandates will reduce the
relative employment rate of workers with disabilities while either increasing their wage
levels or leaving them unchanged.  Id. at 273-81.  At the end of the day, Jolls may be
correct, although there is a growing body of economic literature, which both precedes
and follows her work, that argues both sides of the issue regarding the cause and effect
of post-ADA employment rates among disabled workers.  See, e.g., THE DECLINE IN
EMPLOYMENT OF PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES:  A POLICY PUZZLE 1-10 (David C. Stapleton
& Richard V. Burkhauser eds., 2003) (publishing many of these studies).  What is clear
is that Jolls’s work needs to be engaged, regardless of the outcome one believes more
plausible.
324
See, e.g., HARVEY S. ROSEN, PUBLIC FINANCE 90-96 (6th ed. 2002) (discussing the
need for intervention in order to achieve economic efficiency when externalities are
present in a market); David A. Dana, The Case for Unfunded Environmental Mandates, 69
S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 36 (1995) (averring the efficiency of unfunded environmental man-
dates); Noll, supra note 315, at 39 (giving a broad overview of regulations, their use,
their effectiveness, and the motivating factors behind their implementation); Roin,
supra note 317, at 382 (asserting policy reasons supporting unfunded mandates).
Other reasons for supporting regulation can be political.  For example, the argument
has been made that because of certain social norms only one or the other method is
expedient.  See generally APPROACHES AND DILEMMAS IN ECONOMIC REGULATION:
POLITICS, ECONOMICS AND DYNAMICS (Atle Midttun & Eirik Svindland eds., 2001).  Al-
ternatively, two economists have argued that even an inefficient redistributive labor
market policy has the benefit of preserving the constituency that it is directed towards
because it creates an incentive for those targeted individuals to enter or remain in that
group, thus ensuring the continuation of political power of those beneficiaries.  Daron
Acemoglu & James A. Robinson, Inefficient Redistribution, 95 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 649,
649-52 (2001).
325
See KELMAN, STRATEGY OR PRINCIPLE supra note 24, at 863-65 (discussing when
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ample, argues strongly that subsidies are ineffective because “they re-
quire sustained intervention in labor market processes that are little
understood.”326
Complementing this notion is the cost-spreading precept, which
maintains that it is more efficient to have employers pass on their
added costs to consumers through the price of their services than it is
to have an unwieldy governmental agency pass on those costs to the
general tax base.  This is a point that Amy Wax advances within the
ADA context.327  Employer-provided workplace accommodations, she
argues, can improve overall social utility so long as disabled workers
are able to perform the “core elements” of the job at issue.328  For even
if “many disabled persons” are less productive than nondisabled ones,
Wax argues that the alternative—labor market exclusion resulting in
social welfare expenditures—is ultimately more expensive to society as
a whole.329
An additional reason for favoring regulation over subsidy, and one
that I have not seen addressed in the literature, has to do with avoid-
ing moral hazard.330  At best, subsidies can balance existing market in-
efficiencies by raising the labor market participation of a targeted
group towards a nondiscriminatory equilibrium.331  Subsidies them-
regulation is an appropriate remedy to group subordination); Wax, supra note 54, at
1449-50 (discussing possible alternatives for more efficient national policy for disabled
workers).
326
Anne L. Alstott, Work vs. Freedom:  A Liberal Challenge to Employment Subsidies, 108
YALE L.J. 967, 1019 (1999).
327
See Wax, supra note 54, at 1423 (analyzing “the cost-effectiveness of the ADA”).
This article continues her research cycle on welfare rights and reciprocity.  See Amy L.
Wax, A Reciprocal Welfare Program, 8 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 477, 501-09 (2001) (arguing
for conditional reciprocity as an appropriate basis of social welfare policy); Amy L.
Wax, Rethinking Welfare Rights:  Reciprocity Norms, Reactive Attitudes, and the Political Econ-
omy of Welfare Reform, 63 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 257, 261 (2000) (exploring the pos-
sibility and potential impact of constitutional recognition of economic welfare rights,
with regard to both social insurance and need-based transfers).
328
Wax, supra note 54, at 1421; see also id. at 1426 (noting that given sufficient
productivity by the disabled employee, the result for society as a whole may be “net
positive”).
329
See id. at 1423-24 (arguing that if labor markets tailored for marginal productiv-
ity force employers to hire disabled persons at excessive wages, the result may be costly
for taxpayers).  Nevertheless, Wax asserts that minimum wage and equal pay legislation
prevent employers from hiring and retaining workers with disabilities, even though it is
economically beneficial to society as a whole to do so.  Id. at 1424.
330
See NEW PALGRAVE:  A DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 549-51 (John Eatwell et al.
eds., 1998) (defining and discussing the concept of a moral hazard).
331
The qualification exists for two reasons.  First, employers may not actually un-
derstand the relative economic value that targeted workers with subsidies achieve.
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selves will not, however, change the ingrained negative prejudices that
cause those inequities to exist, nor preclude similarly inefficient prac-
tices from recurring in the event that the subsidies are discontinued.332
Moreover, tax-and-spend programs may have the negative effect of
creating an incentive for employers not to hire workers from subsi-
dized groups of their own accord, even when they are valued equally
to majority members.  Because denying employment to previously
subsidized workers might galvanize the legislature to reissue those
subsidies, savvy employers could game the system and reap windfall
profits.
Finally, as John Donohue has noted, “while prohibiting employers
from discriminating may be inefficient in the short run, it may be effi-
cient in the long run.”333  This is because in a discriminatory equilib-
rium, employers frequently rely on proxies (e.g., educational degrees
or workplace experience) to make employment decisions, as an im-
mediately efficient method of assessing ability.334  When those signals
do not accurately correlate with empirical reality, equally productive
workers are shut out of workplace opportunity.  The result is statistical
discrimination, a form of market failure that is initially caused by in-
formational asymmetry 335 and is then reinforced because information
Second, even if subsidies make targeted workers equally (or even more) profitable,
and employers realize this effect, they may not want to expend administrative re-
sources in managing the employment of those individuals when they can employ oth-
ers without similar concerns.  Stein, supra note 6, at 155-62.
332
Id.
333
Donohue, supra note 303, at 532.  See also John J. Donohue III, Prohibiting Sex
Discrimination in the Workplace:  An Economic Perspective, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1337, 1347-56
(1989) (averring that civil rights laws precipitate the speed by which social exclusions
are eventually, or conceivably, remedied).  For arguments about the transformative
value to African Americans of civil rights laws, see John J. Donohue III & James Heck-
man, Continuous Versus Episodic Change:  The Impact of Civil Rights Policy on the Economic
Status of Blacks, 29 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1603, 1640-41 (1991).
334
See generally Arrow, supra note 166, at 24 (noting that “[s]kin color and sex are
cheap sources of information” for distinguishing between different groups of workers);
Peter Norman, Statistical Discrimination and Efficiency, 70 REV. ECON. STUD. 615, 624-26
(2003) (noting that statistical discrimination is more efficient than individualized dis-
crimination when the increased investment cost outstrips the informational gains).
335
“Statistical discrimination occurs when two groups vary on average in terms of
some relevant characteristic, and an employer treats all members of each group as if
they all possess that average characteristic.”  Katherine V.W. Stone, The New Psychologi-
cal Contract:  Implications of the Changing Workplace for Labor and Employment Law, 48
UCLA L. REV. 519, 599 (2001).  “For example, if employers assume women will have
short job tenure and treat all women on the basis of that belief, then employers will
avoid hiring women for jobs requiring longevity.”  Id. at 599-600.  This type of dis-
crimination was best evidenced in the internal labor markets of the twentieth century.
Id.  Most commentators consider statistical discrimination to be a market failure and
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itself costs something to acquire.336  Yet, forcing employers to act inef-
ficiently, that is, requiring them to expend sums to gather information
about particular workers, can benefit those employers in the long run,
even if it incurs inefficient short-term costs.337
In the case of workers with disabilities, employers are sometimes
ignorant of the actual costs and benefits of accommodations.338  Thus,
an employer may overestimate the cost of an accommodation, may
not be familiar with the potential benefits and costs that are associated
with providing accommodations, or may include unsubstantiated costs
an inefficient event.  See, e.g., David Charny & G. Mitu Gulati, Efficiency-Wages, Tourna-
ments, and Discrimination:  A Theory of Employment Discrimination Law for “High-Level” Jobs,
33 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 57, 63-66 (1998) (arguing that statistical discrimination re-
sults in inefficient job assignments and “reduces incentives for its victims to acquire
human capital”); Kelman, Job Testing, supra note 27 at 1204-05 (contending that gen-
eral ability job tests have very low statistical validity and are therefore discriminatory);
Richard H. McAdams, Cooperation and Conflict:  The Economics of Group Status Production
and Race Discrimination, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1003, 1074-78 (1995) (pointing out that the
deadweight loss of race discrimination consists of material sacrifices made by the origi-
nal discriminators to lower the status of the victim and the investments made by the
original discriminators).
336
Since the 1960s, economists have recognized the importance of information
when modifying pre-existing economic models.  The seminal article is by George J. Sti-
gler, The Economics of Information, 69 J. POL. ECON. 213 (1961), in which he analyzes
economic organization in light of the search for information.  As such, real-world re-
sults may differ from those that academic economists observe under a perfect competi-
tion framework, such as the one put forward in the neoclassical model, precisely be-
cause information costs something to acquire.  Moreover, the perfect competition
model (and its assumptions) is better reserved for addressing a firm’s pricing and out-
put decisions instead of its input-purchasing decisions.  There also are some depar-
tures from perfect competition, e.g., product differentiation, that really have no im-
pact on this analysis.  Hence, business practices that may seem inexplicable in a world
with perfect competition assumptions suddenly become explicable.  RONALD H.
COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW 13-15 (1988).
337
See generally John F. Newman & Roxan E. Dinwoodie, Impact of the Americans with
Disabilities Act on Private Sector Employers, 20 J. REHABILITATION ADMIN. 3, 9 (1996) (re-
porting on a study of 20,000 private sector employers in Georgia, which found that
employers lacked information about both the ADA and workers with disabilities).
338
To give just one example, a December 2002 study by the General Accounting
Office (GAO) found that only a “very small proportion” of businesses utilized either
the two available federal tax credits for hiring disabled workers or the barrier removal
deduction, which would make their premises accessible to disabled customers (and,
with some overlap, workers with disabilities).  GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, BUSINESS
TAX INCENTIVES:  INCENTIVES TO EMPLOY WORKERS WITH DISABILITIES RECEIVE
LIMITED USE AND HAVE AN UNCERTAIN IMPACT, at page preceding page i (GAO-03-39
Dec. 2002), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0339.pdf.  Respectively, the
two hiring incentives provide for $2,400 per disabled employee and $5,000 (combin-
able) per annum; the public accommodation credit allows for as much as $15,000 per
year.  Id.
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(or benefits) when calculating productivity.339  In this circumstance,
the disabled employee may be wrongly perceived as being a member
of a group of individuals that, on average, are less productive than
workers without disabilities.340  Although an employer could investi-
gate whether a particular applicant has productivity above or below
that of the rest of the disabled category, she will not do so to avoid in-
formation costs.  Thus, the employer uses the signal of disability and
ends up believing, at times incorrectly, that an individual employee is
less productive than she actually is.
The ADA provides three avenues through which this information
asymmetry, causing individual employers to suffer from inefficient
market failures, may be cured.  First, as part of assessing the reason-
ableness of accommodations, employers are required to engage in an
“interactive process” with the disabled workers requesting those work-
place alterations.341  This procedure is one that should generate the
information necessary to cure an informational asymmetry caused by
market failure.342  During this process, employers and employees meet
339
An example from the academic literature is provided by Verkerke, supra note
289, who believes that the reasonableness of an accommodation will vary depending
on whether the job in question is high or low risk.  Id. at 941-43.  His argument neces-
sarily assumes that people with disabilities are at greater risk of danger and are also less
capable of protecting themselves from those hazards.  This is a proposition without any
basis in empirical fact, although one could plausibly interpret the Supreme Court’s
decision in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73 (2002), to be in harmony with
this presupposition. See id. at 76 (holding that a prospective employee who is a threat
to his own safety may be denied an employment opportunity under the ADA).
340
See J. HOULT VERKERKE, AN ECONOMIC DEFENSE OF DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION
LAW 20-21 (University of Virginia School of Law Legal Studies Working Paper No. 99-
14, June 1999) (arguing that employers who rely on signals or proxies for gauging
productivity run the risk of relying on data which may either be absolutely wrong or
may be a statistically accurate statistical inference that is often wrong in particular
cases), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=170014.
341
29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.2(o)(3), 1630.9 (2004).  See, e.g., Alysa M. Barancik, Com-
ment, Determining Reasonable Accommodations under the ADA:  Why Courts Should Require
Employers to Participate in an “Interactive Process,” 30 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 513, 542-45 (1999)
(examining the scope of employers’ participation in the interactive process); Amy
Renee Brown, Note, Mental Disabilities Under the ADA:  The Role of Employees and Employers
in the Interactive Process, 8 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 341, 352-68 (2002) (addressing the im-
portance of the interactive process and the need for an EEOC mandate on that proc-
ess).
342
One would think that profit-maximizing employers acting in their own self-
interest would have already expended resources to find out general information on
positive and negative externalities.  Nonetheless, although employers might have gen-
eral information on these effects, they may not have particular information related to
individuals with disabilities because of a lack of experience with, or exposure to, those
workers.
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not only to exchange formal requests but also, equally important, to
trade information and perspectives about the accommodations at is-
sue.343  As a result, disabled workers are guaranteed a forum in which
they can inform their employers what accommodations they feel they
require to perform the essential job functions of their particular em-
ployment.344  In turn, employers have the opportunity to accede to
these requests or to explain to those workers why the accommodations
requested would engender an undue hardship.345  This interactive
process is intended to be a cooperative, informational exchange
rather than a confrontational process.346  Second, assuming that the
interactive process does not result in a mutually acceptable solution,
employees with disabilities can file disability discrimination complaints
with local EEOC offices.347  Once a complaint has been filed, either
343
Nor must individual employees and their employers go through the interactive
process blindly or in a vacuum.  Well-financed, federally-funded centers facilitate the
interactive process by providing concrete accommodation options and suggestions and
by informing employers about existing federal and state tax incentives and credits.
These government-supported facilitators include the ten regional offices of the Job
Accommodation Network, available at http://www.dol.gov/odep/programs/job.htm;
the Office of Disability Employment Policy, available at http://www.dol.gov/odep; and
the Social Security Administration’s Employment Support Program, available at
http://www.ssa.gov/work.  State-level equivalents also exist.  For instance, the Florida
Governor’s Alliance for Employment of Citizens with Disabilities provides an online
job bank for disabled job seekers and potential employers, including a free CD-ROM
generated by the privately-funded Able Trust that profiles some 1200 college students
with disabilities who are seeking internships or jobs upon graduation.  The Able Trust,
available at http://www.abletrust.org; The Florida Alliance for Assistive Services and
Technology, available at http://www.faast.org.
344
This is because the disabled worker has information about herself that may not
be readily available to or knowable by the employer, and thus an exchange of informa-
tion during the interactive process can add to the employer’s calculus.
345
The employer has greater familiarity and knowledge about the workplace and
its operation and may be able to suggest less costly alternatives or other avenues toward
achieving a mutually agreeable position.
346
See Sam Silverman, The ADA Interactive Process:  The Employer and Employee’s Duty
to Work Together to Identify a Reasonable Accommodation Is More Than a Game of Five Card
Stud, 77 NEB. L. REV. 281, 288 (1998) (“[B]oth parties can benefit if they are willing to
place all their cards on the table in an effort to determine if a reasonable accommoda-
tion can be identified.”).
347
42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)(5) (2000); see 29 C.F.R. §§ 1601.6-1601.14 (2004) (estab-
lishing the guidelines for this process).  These complaints can include reasons beyond
failure-to-accommodate; for instance, disability harassment is a cause of action recently
recognized by the Fourth and Fifth Circuits.  See, e.g., Fox v. Gen. Motors Corp., 247
F.3d 169, 176 (4th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he ADA, like Title VII, creates a cause of action for
hostile work environment harassment.”); Flowers v. S. Reg’l Physician Servs., Inc., 247
F.3d 229, 232 (5th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he ADA embraces claims of disability-based harass-
ment.”); see also Lisa Eichhorn, Hostile Environment Actions, Title VII, and the ADA:  The
Limits of the Copy-and-Paste Function, 77 WASH. L. REV. 575, 577 (2002) (“[T]he circuit
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the employer or the employee can request mediation of their differ-
ences, a process which the ADA does not require but strongly encour-
ages.348  Studies, including the EEOC’s own internal report to Con-
gress, evidence that mediation is an excellent vehicle through which
to have employers and employees exchange information and perspec-
tives.349  Mediation as a process also engenders less psychic cost and
emotional damage to the employment relationship than the third op-
tion, litigation (although it is true that the filing of a discrimination
complaint is unlikely to resound very well with employers).350  Third, if
mediation has not proven satisfactory (or has not even transpired, be-
cause it is voluntary), those same disabled workers can sue their em-
ployers.  Commencing a Title I lawsuit is the least effective, as well as
the most acrimonious, means of curing an employer’s market failure.
In theory, the litigation of such a claim should, in the course of
events, provide the means to correct flawed assumptions held by both
employers and employees as to the real costs of accommodations.  As
a practical matter, this result is precluded by the overwhelming rate of
defendant victories.351
courts began their examinations of whether hostile environment harassment could be
actionable under the ADA by noting that the statute explicitly prohibits discrimination
related to the ‘terms, conditions, and privileges’ of employment.”); Holland M. Ta-
hvonen, Note, Disability-Based Harassment:  Standing and Standards for a “New” Cause of
Action, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1489, 1494-95 (2003) (“[D]isability harassment as a
cause of action is modeled after the Title VII harassment claim.”).
348
42 U.S.C. § 12,212 (2000).
349
See E. Patrick McDermott et al., An Evaluation of the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission Mediation Program (Sept. 20, 2000), available at http://www.eeoc.gov
/mediate/report/chapter6.html (finding “high participant satisfaction with the vari-
ous elements of the EEOC mediation program”); Philip Zimmerman, The Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Commission’s Mediation Program, 71 CPA J., Mar. 2001, at 66 (ac-
knowledging that the first year of the EEOC’s voluntary mediation pilot program was
“highly successful”).  EEOC mediation has continued in spite of inadequate funding;
although the EEOC’s workload increased by over forty percent due to the addition of
ADA disputes, its budget remained the same.  Kathryn Moss et al., Unfunded Mandate:
An Empirical Study of the Implementation of the Americans with Disabilities Act by the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission, 50 U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 19 (2001).  Nonetheless, the
current EEOC chair has aggressively pursued increased mediation through a “proac-
tive prevention” program.  See EEOC Chair Offers Updated Plan to Combat Discrimination, 3
EMP. DISCRIMINATION L. UPDATE, July 2002, at 6.
350
The possible souring of employer-employee relations is an important point to
emphasize as job reinstatement is one of the primary remedies sought by Title I plain-
tiffs.  Cf. Ivan E. Bodensteiner & Rosalie B. Levinson, Litigating Age and Disability Claims
Against State and Local Government Employers in the New “Federalism” Era, 22 BERKELEY J.
EMP. & LAB. L. 99, 100 (2001) (explaining the difficulty of bringing civil rights claims).
351
Specifically, an American Bar Association report found that employers pre-
vailed in more than ninety-two percent of Title I cases between 1992 and 1997.  Study
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Although each of these measures, in turn, carries increasingly
heavy short-term transaction costs, they are collectively designed to
correct long-term information asymmetry through the coerced ex-
change of information.  The prudential propriety of ADA accommo-
dations is discussed in the next section.
3.  Prudential Propriety
ADA accommodations are also a properly allocated antidiscrimi-
nation remedy in that they require employers to remedy the subordi-
nated status of disabled workers at a reasonable and proportionate
cost.352  That requirement arises from an antidiscrimination mandate
Finds Employers Win Most ADA Title I Judicial and Administrative Complaints, 22 MENTAL &
PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 403, 403-04 (1998).  A subsequent study of outcomes in
1998 indicates that the employers’ win rate increased to ninety-three percent.  Ruth
Colker, The Americans with Disabilities Act:  A Windfall for Defendants, 34 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 99, 99-100 (1999).  The empirical study by Colker substantiates these findings
but with greater nuance, concluding that a large measure of plaintiff losses under the
ADA are because “[c]ourts are abusing the summary judgment device” by “refusing to
send ‘normative’ factual questions” to juries.  Id. at 101.  These results are also substan-
tiated in the smaller sample size of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.  See Louis S.
Rulli, Employment Discrimination Litigation Under the ADA from the Perspective of the Poor:
Can the Promise of Title I Be Fulfilled for Low-Income Workers in the Next Decade?, 9 TEMP.
POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 345, 365-75 (2000) (finding that employers won about ninety-
seven percent of the Title I cases).
It bears noting that in the circumstance of actually going before a jury, the
courts of appeals are divided as to which party bears the burden of proving the reason-
ableness of a given accommodation.  For example, the D.C. Circuit places both the
burden of production and of persuasion on the plaintiff.  Barth v. Gelb, 2 F.3d 1180,
1186 (D.C. Cir. 1993).  In contrast, the Fifth and Ninth Circuits place the burdens of
proving both the unavailability of a reasonable accommodation, as well as the undue
hardship that one would cause, on defendants.  Mantolete v. Bolger, 767 F.2d 1416,
1423-24 (9th Cir. 1985); Prewitt v. U.S. Postal Serv., 662 F.2d 292, 308 (5th Cir. Unit A
Nov. 1981).  The Second Circuit takes a middle ground that alternates burdens.
Borkowski v. Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 63 F.3d 131, 137-38 (2d Cir. 1995).  Its reasoning
in so doing is persuasive.  The disabled plaintiff may have personal knowledge of her
own disability and therefore bears the initial burden of persuasion.  Id.  This parallels
the duty of a Title VII plaintiff after McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802
(1973) (“The complainant in a Title VII trial must carry the initial burden under the
statute of establishing a prima facie case of racial discrimination.”).  In turn “the em-
ployer has far greater access to information” regarding “its own organization and,
equally importantly, about the practices and structure of the industry as a whole.”
Borkowski, 63 F.3d at 137.  This compromise steers a wise course between the intercir-
cuit poles in that it duplicates, through coerced circumstances, the type of informa-
tional exchange that should have happened during the earlier stages of the interactive
process.  This symmetry was intentional.  See Burgdorf, supra note 4, passim (describing
which portions of the ADA were modeled after existing civil rights provisions).
352
See supra Part III.B (surveying the initial regulatory interpretations of § 504 leg-
islation).
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(as opposed to a subsidy) and, therefore, has moral flavor.  Accord-
ingly, as a normative matter, the ADA is capable of effectuating a
change in societal perception towards the disabled.
By conceiving of accommodation costs as part of the process of
antidiscrimination reform rather than by characterizing them as a
subsidy program, Congress has sent a clear message to employers that
the ADA’s remedies are intended as a correction of past injustice
rather than as a charitable handout.  Specifically, Congress declared
that the statute’s main purpose was “to provide a clear and compre-
hensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination
against individuals with disabilities”353 by promulgating “clear, strong,
consistent, enforceable standards addressing” both individual and sys-
tematic forms of discrimination.354  This language indicates that Con-
gress, through passage of the ADA, desired sweeping changes in social
policy.  Hence, Congress’s overt intention in promulgating the statute
was to raise the level at which social exclusion of the disabled would
be examined by courts in the future.355  Moreover, Congress used lan-
guage in its legislative findings that was specifically taken from Su-
preme Court decisions approving equal protection classifications.356
The use of this specific language in the ADA—responding to what the
Supreme Court, circa 1990, required for heightened constitutional
scrutiny—demonstrates that Congress was consciously attempting to
frame ADA remedies as part of an antisubordination agenda, a classic
goal of civil rights law.357
353
42 U.S.C. § 12,101(b)(1) (2000).
354
Id. at § 12,101(b)(2).
355
“The congressional findings . . . serve as a useful aid for courts to discern the
sorts of discrimination with which Congress was concerned.”  Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel.
Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 613 (1999) (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also Sutton v. United
Air Lines, 527 U.S. 411, 494 (1999) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (opining that the Find-
ings Section affords “[t]he strongest clues to Congress’ perception of the domain of
the Americans with Disabilities Act”).
356
See Burgdorf, supra note 4, at 436 (noting that the finding that, inter alia, the
disabled constituted a “discrete and insular minority” drew its cumbersome language
from several Supreme Court decisions); Silvers & Stein, Standing at the Crossroads, supra
note 100, at 88-96 (discussing the way the Supreme Court has addressed the ADA).
357
See Bagenstos, supra note 21, at 453-84 (arguing that an antisubordination ap-
proach can help give content to the ADA’s broad and ambiguous definition of disabil-
ity); Ruth Colker, Anti-Subordination Above All:  Sex, Race, and Equal Protection, 61 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1003, 1007-10 (1986) (“[C]ourts should analyze equal protection cases from an
anti-subordination perspective.”(footnote omitted)); Kenneth L. Karst, Why Equality
Matters, 17 GA. L. REV. 245, 247-49 (1983) (suggesting that the stigma of subordination
imposed by organized society is a violation of the principle of equal citizenship); cf.
Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107, 154-55
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Nevertheless, canonical scholarship typifies the ADA as a redistri-
bution device.  When so doing, Kelman correctly states that the result
of framing remedial devices as a rights violation is that those empow-
ered “will be believed to have a superior higher-priority, rights-based
claim to social resources than they ought to have” as opposed to hav-
ing to compete with all claimants on state resources.358  He is, however,
mistaken in resisting the equivalence of accommodations to race- or
sex-based remedies under Title VII.359  Conversely, in contesting Kel-
man’s conception of antidiscrimination theory,360 Samuel Bagenstos is
correct in articulating an antisubordination theory for the ADA that
parallels that of other group antisubordination theory.361  He points
out that those scholars who have articulated group-based antisubordi-
nation theory generally agree that antidiscrimination law ought to be
understood as eviscerating practices of systemic subordination,362 and
that eliminating those barriers to equality may provide those group
members with remedies that mainstream society may not access.363  In
making that argument, Bagenstos asserts that “antidiscrimination law
aims at a wholesale, not a retail, injustice.”364  As such, he maintains
that the goal of statutes like the ADA is to alter the employer behavior
that contributes to unacceptable systemic patterns of social and eco-
(1976) (noting the perpetual subordination of African Americans).
358
KELMAN, STRATEGY OR PRINCIPLE, supra note 24, at 114.
359
See Kelman, supra note 21, at 92-96.
360
See Bagenstos, supra note 16, at 832 (“Kelman’s argument does not withstand
close scrutiny when considered on its own terms, largely because any notion of what
constitutes rational discrimination must itself rest on a series of contentious normative
judgments.”).
361
See Bagenstos, supra note 21, at 452 (explaining that he is drawing “on the work
of scholars who have articulated an antisubordination theory as both a description and
defense of civil rights law”).
362
For two recent and thoughtful variations on this theme, see Jack M. Balkin &
Reva B. Siegel, The American Civil Rights Tradition:  Anticlassification or Antisubordination?
58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 9, 10 (2003) (averring that the normative goals of anticlassifica-
tion and antisubordination, usually considered in opposition to each other, “overlap
[in scope, and] that their application shifts over time in response to social contestation
and social struggle”) and  Robert Post, Prejudicial Appearances: The Logic of American An-
tidiscrimination Law, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1, 31 (2000) (asserting that antidiscrimination law
cannot eliminate stereotypes entirely but can alter and modify them).
363
Bagenstos, supra note 21, at 452-57; see also Colker, supra note 357, at 1015 (as-
serting that state actors ought to be allowed to “use facially differentiating policies to
redress subordination”); Fiss, supra note 357, at 136 (asserting that “preferential and
exclusionary policies should be viewed quite differently”); Kenneth L. Karst, Paths to
Belonging:  The Constitution and Cultural Identity, 64 N.C. L. REV. 303, 338 (1986) (“If the
subordination of a group is a constitutional wrong, there is nothing unorthodox in the
suggestion that group remedies may be appropriate.”).
364
Bagenstos, supra note 16, at 837.
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nomic subordination.365  This is premised on the notion that “employ-
ers who have a choice between participating in a subordinating system
and working (at reasonable cost) against such a system have a moral
obligation to respond in a way that reduces subordination.”366
Moreover, it is precisely because Title I accommodations affect the
workplace that they must be conceived of as an equalizing measure
rather than as charity, or as a variety of affirmative action.  The cen-
trality of work to people’s notion of self-respect and value would be
difficult to overstate.367  This is equally, if not more, true of disabled
people, whose historical experience in the labor market is one of ex-
clusion and segregation.368  Furthermore, according to the “contact
hypothesis,”369 an extension of one of the associational arguments
made in Brown v. Board of Education370 bias can be reduced by exposing
individuals from the mainstream to members of minority groups with
whom they are less familiar.371  Specifically, footnote eleven of the
365
Id. at 837-39.
366
Id. at 838.
367
Schultz notes that:
Our historical conception of citizenship, our sense of community, and our
sense that we are of value to the world all depend importantly on the work
that we do for a living and how it is organized and understood by the larger
society.  In everyday language, we are what we do for a living.
Schultz, supra note 99, at 1884.  See also JUDITH N. SHKLAR, AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP:
THE QUEST FOR INCLUSION 63-101 (1991) (arguing that there is a right to work and
earn, which is linked to one’s standing as a citizen); Cynthia L. Estlund, Working To-
gether:  The Workplace, Civil Society, and the Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 1, 3-5 (2000) (arguing that,
outside the family, the workplace is the single most important site of cooperative inter-
action and sociability among adult citizens).
368
Gregory S. Kavka, Disability and the Right to Work, 9 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 262-63
(1992); see also Elizabeth Clark Morin, Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990:  Social Inte-
gration Through Employment, 40 CATH. U. L. REV. 189, 192-95 (1990) (addressing the
historical treatment of people with disabilities and the importance of integrating them
into the workplace); Mark C. Weber, Beyond the Americans with Disabilities Act:  A Na-
tional Employment Policy for People with Disabilities, 46 BUFF. L. REV. 123, 124 (1998) (as-
serting that the federal government needs to implement a “national employment pol-
icy for persons with disabilities”).
369
The theory is said to originate with GORDON W. ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF
PREJUDICE 250-67 (1954).
370
347 U.S. 483, 493-95 (1954).  A great deal of scholarship has, unsurprisingly,
examined the decision and its implications.  For one recent example (because the fif-
tieth anniversary of the decision is certain to spur many), see ROBERT J. COTTROL ET
AL., BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION :  CASTE, CULTURE, AND THE CONSTITUTION (2003).
371
This is a standard sociological argument.  For a classic expression of this theme
in the context of overcoming subordination, see ERVING GOFFMAN, STIGMA:  NOTES ON
THE MANAGEMENT OF SPOILED IDENTITY 5 (1963).  For a modern take, see CYNTHIA L.
ESTLUND, WORKING TOGETHER:  HOW WORKPLACE BONDS STRENGTHEN DEMOCRACY
(2003).  Ironically, Estlund does not include the disabled in her analysis.
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Brown opinion cites a psychological study examining children’s pref-
erences for white dolls372 that the Court found influential in determin-
ing (constitutionally-based) association rights.373  The same normative
dynamic applies to people with disabilities, since similar studies on
disability show that nondisabled children have an even stronger aver-
sion to drawings depicting individuals with obvious disabilities than to
drawings depicting racial-minority children.374  Thus, from a pruden-
tial perspective, it is crucial both to integrate workers with disabilities
into the workplace and to ensure that such incorporation is received
as a matter of right rather than as one of goodwill.375
To effectively influence society towards a social norm of inclusion,
disabled workplace participation must be grounded in equality theory
rather than being framed as a subsidy arising from humanitarian con-
cern.  This premise can be observed by applying arguments from the
emerging field of expressive law, which considers how law can influ-
ence individual behavior by altering broader social mores.376  Expres-
sive law, which is a further evolution of the field of law and social
norms377 and behavioral economic scholarship,378 explores the ques-
372
Kenneth B. Clark & Mamie P. Clark, Racial Identification and Preference in Negro
Children, in READINGS IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 551-60 (Guy E. Swanson et al. eds., 1952).
373
Brown, 347 U.S. at 494 n.11.  Naturally, not all commentators are enamored
with the theory.  See, e.g., Gary Blasi, Advocacy Against the Stereotype:  Lessons from Cognitive
Social Psychology, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1241, 1279 (2002) (reporting that the contact hy-
pothesis “has proven wildly overoptimistic”); Krieger, supra note 203, at 1331 (“We also
know that simple integration does little to reduce intergroup conflict.”).
374
See Norman Goodman et al., Variant Reactions to Physical Disabilities, 28 AM. SOC.
REV. 429, 434-35 (1963) (discussing test results for various groups’ reactions to differ-
ent disabilities); Stephen A. Richardson, Age and Sex Differences in Values Towards Physi-
cal Handicaps, 11 J. HEALTH & SOC. BEHAV. 207, 212-13 (1970) (observing shifts, based
on age and gender, in reactions to different handicaps); Stephen A. Richardson & Jac-
queline Royce, Race and Physical Handicap in Children’s Preference for Other Children, 39
CHILD DEV. 467, 469, 478 (1968) (“For all subjects, the non-handicapped drawing was
judged most liked regardless of color.”).
375
See generally SCOTCH, supra note 192, at 15-40.
376
See Michael Ashley Stein, Under the Empirical Radar:  An Initial Expressive Law
Analysis of the ADA, 90 VA. L. REV. 1151, 1184-89 (2004) (interpreting disability life sto-
ries from an expressive law perspective).  Earlier work by law and society scholar Lau-
ren Edelman argues much the same point, i.e., that law can create an environment
that institutionalizes compliance through gradual ritualization.  See Lauren B. Edel-
man, Legal Ambiguity and Symbolic Structure:  Organizational Mediation of Civil Rights Law,
97 AM. J. SOC. 1531, 1545 (1992) (“Legal change engenders a process of institutionali-
zation whereby new forms of compliance are diffused among organizations and gradu-
ally become ritualized elements of organizational governance.”).
377
Most commentators consider ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW:
HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES (1991), to be the determining work in this area.
See, e.g., Richard H. McAdams, Signaling Discount Rates:  Laws, Norms, and Economic
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tion of how law shapes individual preferences by changing one’s taste
for specific outcomes, beyond the traditional effect379 of sanctions,380
through altering behavior.381  This can be because the new law either
Methodology, 110 YALE L.J. 625, 626 (2001) (opining that “[t]he seminal work in the law-
and-economics camp is unquestionably Robert Ellickson’s”).  Several symposia have
been convened on the subject. E.g., Symposium, Law, Economics and Norms, 144 U. PA.
L. REV. 1643 (1996) (discussing the extralegal enforceability of norms); Symposium,
The Legal Construction of Norms, 86 VA. L. REV. 1577 (2000) (examining the law’s effect
on social norms); Symposium, Social Norms, Social Meaning, and the Economic Analysis of
Law, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 537 (1998) (addressing the emerging body of scholarship in-
corporating “social meaning and social norms into the study of legal rules”).
378
See generally Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50
STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1471 (1998) (“[L]aw and economics analysis may be improved by
increased attention to insights about actual human behavior.”); Symposium, The Legal
Implications of Psychology:  Human Behavior, Behavioral Economics, and the Law, 51 VAND.
L. REV. 1495 (1998) (analyzing the impact on contract negotiations of negotiator bi-
ases for the status quo and inaction, as well as expressive law and economics, which ex-
amines how legal norms can alter social norms).
379
Lawrence Lessig, The New Chicago School, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 661, 673-80 (1998),
describes this schism as one between the “Old Chicago School” whose adherents be-
lieve that norms act independently of law, and the “New Chicago School” who consider
what impact laws have upon norms.  For stalwarts of the Old Chicago School, for ex-
ample Richard Posner, law and social norms scholarship enriches traditional law and
economic work, but does not supercede it.  Posner believes that social meaning is
“something that society invests a sound or gesture with rather than something that
comes ready-made in the sound or gesture or practice.”  Richard A. Posner, Social
Norms, Social Meaning, and Economic Analysis of Law:  A Comment, 27  J. LEGAL STUD. 553,
563 (1998).
380
See, e.g., Eric A. Posner, Law and Social Norms:  The Case of Tax Compliance, 86 VA.
L. REV. 1781, 1806 (2000) (tax); Melvin A. Eisenberg, Corporate Law and Social Norms,
99 COLUM. L. REV. 1253, 1253 (1999) (corporate law); Steven Hetcher, Creating Safe
Social Norms in a Dangerous World, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 3 (1999) (torts); Elizabeth S.
Scott & Robert E. Scott, A Contract Theory of Marriage, in THE FALL AND RISE OF
FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 201, 201 (F. H. Buckley ed., 1999) (marriage); Eric A. Posner,
Family Law and Social Norms, in THE FALL AND RISE OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT, supra at
256, 258-68 (family law); Michelle J. White, Why It Pays to File for Bankruptcy:  A Critical
Look at the Incentives Under U.S. Personal Bankruptcy Law and a Proposal for Change, 65 U.
CHI. L. REV. 685, 686-87 (1998) (bankruptcy); Robert D. Cooter, Punitive Damages, So-
cial Norms, and Economic Analysis, 60 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer & Autumn
1997, at 73, 73 (punitive damages); Eric A. Posner, The Legal Regulation of Religious
Groups, 2 LEGAL THEORY 33, 33-35 (1996) (religion); Richard H. McAdams, Group
Norms, Gossip, and Blackmail, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2237, 2240 (1996) (blackmail); Dan M.
Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 591, 593 (1996) (crimi-
nal punishment); McAdams, supra note 335, at 1008 (antidiscrimination law); Robert
D. Cooter, Structural Adjudication and the New Law Merchant:  A Model of Decentralized
Law, 14 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 215, 215-16 (1994) (commercial law); Lisa Bernstein,
Opting out of the Legal System:  Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J.
LEGAL STUD. 115, 115 (1992) (Jewish diamond merchants).
381
See, e.g., Robert Cooter, Expressive Law and Economics, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 585, 586
(1998) (describing the role of law in the development of social norms, and socioeco-
nomic law and economics, which seeks to inject psychological and social factors related
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carries a symbolic social meaning, or because it affects the way indi-
viduals mediate that symbolic social meaning.382  What is crucial to this
analysis is the nexus between law, norms, and social meaning.383  When
designed appropriately, law can cause individuals to alter their own
behavior because either the law induces them to change their tastes
(internalization), creates a fear of bearing social sanctions (second
order sanctions), or because of pressure brought to bear upon them
through societal sanction (third order sanctions).384
to wealth and race into otherwise “neutral” economic analyses); Lawrence Lessig, The
Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943, 1019 (1995) (discussing regulation
of social meaning as a way to regulate social conduct); Richard H. McAdams, A Focal
Point Theory of Expressive Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1649, 1650-53 (2000) [hereinafter McAd-
ams, Focal Point Theory] (suggesting that law may be alternatively conceptualized for its
expressive as well as its traditionally acknowledged enforcement functions); Richard H.
McAdams, An Attitudinal Theory of Expressive Law, 79 OR. L. REV. 339, 340 (2000) [here-
inafter McAdams, An Attitudinal Theory] (highlighting the power of the approval or
disapproval of law in shaping behavior); Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of
Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021, 2025 (1996) (arguing that “the expressive function of law
makes most sense in connection with efforts to change norms and that if legal state-
ments produce bad consequences, they should not be enacted even if they seem rea-
sonable or noble”).
382
Lessig, supra note 379.
383
This account is, naturally enough for an emerging field, a synthesis of several
views, rather than a univocal proposition.  For example, Robert Cooter describes law as
having two very different functions:  enacting new obligations from the top down (as in
the case of regulatory law) and growing from the bottom up (through social norm en-
forcement).  Robert Cooter, Normative Failure Theory of Law, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 947,
949 (1997).
384
An example commonly used in the literature to illustrate the effect of norm
changes on behavior, is regulations prohibiting public smoking.  See, e.g., RICHARD H.
MCADAMS & JANICE NADLER, A THIRD MODEL OF LEGAL COMPLIANCE:  TESTING FOR
EXPRESSIVE EFFECTS IN A HAWK/DOVE GAME 30 (IACM 17th Annual Conference Paper
No. P-107, July 15, 2004) (“By publically announcing a state of affairs (e.g., ‘No smok-
ing here’) law can make one of the multiple equilibria salient.”), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=573582; McAdams, Focal Point Theory, supra note 381, at
1718-21 (discussing the labeling of public spaces as “smoking” and “non-smoking”);
Sunstein, supra note 381, at 2032-34 (“In the relevant communities, the social meaning
of smoking is not attractiveness and rebelliousness, but dirtiness and willingness to be
duped.”).  Suppose a society exists in which most people smoke regularly, either be-
cause they consider it pleasurable, or because it is otherwise in keeping with regular
social mores.  Having now learned that smoking engenders costs in terms of both
health care (cancer and emphysema, to name two examples) and environmental costs
(e.g., poor air quality), the legislature passes a law that prohibits public smoking and
fines violators.  See, e.g., Dhammika Dharmapala & Richard H. McAdams, The Condorcet
Jury Theorem and the Expressive Function of Law:  A Theory of Informative Law, 5 AM. L. &
ECON. REV. 1 (2003) (using the example of a ban on public smoking); MCADAMS &
NADLER, supra at 30 (same).  The effect of this Act on Marlboro Man, an exuberant
smoker, can be three-fold.  Passage of the anti-smoking ordinance can (1) educate
Marlboro Man that smoking really is a bad activity in which to engage, not only on his
own behalf, but also for fellow citizens within reach of second-hand smoke and for
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Advancing this field, Alex Geisinger has proffered a “belief
change” theory of expressive law that seeks to model and predict be-
havior in the context of social norm change.385  According to
Geisinger, law impacts an individual’s certainty regarding the conse-
quences of her actions either by providing additional information
about that action, or through its influence on an individual’s “inferen-
tial reasoning process.”386  This may occur either because the passage
of a law has caused those who were ambivalent about particular con-
duct, “fence sitters,” to lean toward an equilibrium, or because indi-
viduals with little information regarding an activity have now updated
their knowledge and beliefs subsequent to the law’s passage.387  In ad-
dition, as Richard McAdams and Robert Scott have each pointed out,
the fact that a legislature has passed an ordinance signals to individu-
als that a majority of the franchise believes the rule is just.388  Thus, a
belief change theory rests on the mechanisms by which a law’s passage
can influence an individual’s behavior beyond the traditional notion
of sanction.389
An expressive law analysis of the ADA indicates that the statute has
the potential to legislate a belief change regarding individuals with
disabilities in three ways:  by informing the public about people with
disabilities, by creating tri-order sanctions which alter the main-
animals who may choke on cigarette butts, and so change his desire to smoke; or (2)
have no effect at all on Marlboro Man’s personal desire to smoke, but make him fear
the social condemnation of others who witness his public smoking, thus causing him to
either curb his addiction or to practice it in private; and/or in combination with either
or both of the previous two possibilities, (3) cause other members of Marlboro Man’s
society to bear social pressure and condemnation upon him until he abstains from
public smoking.  Stein, supra note 376, at 1173-74.  For examples in the literature, see
Dan M. Kahan & Eric A. Posner, Shaming White Collar Criminals:  A Proposal for Reform of
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 42 J.L. & ECON. 365, 368 (1999) (criminal shaming);
Lessig, supra note 381, at 968-72 (dueling in the American South).
385
Alex Geisinger, A Belief Change Theory of Expressive Law, 88 IOWA L. REV. 35, 38
(2002).
386
Id. at 63-65.
387
Id. at 68-69.  Drawing on studies by social psychologists, Geisinger points out
that two factors serve as the main influences upon individual decisions as to whether to
engage in particular behavior.  They are that individual’s personal attitude toward the
behavior, and that individual’s belief about how society at large regards the behavior.
Combined, these two factors help determine how an individual will act in a given cir-
cumstance; in other words, a person’s attitude (or belief certainty) about the conse-
quences of satisfying a particular preference will govern whether she will satiate that
preference. Id. at 55-56, 62-63.
388
McAdams, An Attitudinal Theory, supra note 381, at 374; Robert E. Scott, The
Limits of Behavioral Theories of Law and Social Norms, 86 VA. L. REV. 1603, 1615 (2000).
389
Geisinger, supra note 385, at 65.
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stream’s behavior when interacting with the disabled, and by finan-
cially sanctioning discriminatory behavior.
The ADA educates mainstream individuals about people with dis-
abilities who, unlike other minority groups, were empowered by civil
rights legislation prior to a general elevation of social consciousness
about their circumstances and capabilities.390  The statute does so by
providing information through its legislative findings regarding the
relative position of people with disabilities in society.391  This is espe-
cially true in the statute’s statements about artificial exclusion as the
cause of social exclusion, as opposed to inherent necessity.392  Addi-
tionally, by requiring that places of public accommodation be made
readily accessible, ADA Title III393 affords people with disabilities a
greater opportunity to participate in social function.  Together, these
features lessen the identity of the disabled as “other,” and increase
nondisableds’ general familiarity with people with disabilities.  Hence,
following the ADA’s promulgation, an employer who reads the statute
(or consults with a lawyer as to its effects) is presented with a different
vision of disability identity than that previously held.  If she had lacked
information regarding the role of disabled workers in society, the
ADA has now updated her knowledge and beliefs.  If she had been
ambivalent about excluding disabled workers, the ADA’s passage has
now tipped her from being a fence-sitter toward accepting an inclusive
equilibrium.  Further, when an employer encounters people with dis-
abilities in other areas of social activity, say, at a baseball game or
when riding on public transportation, she becomes acclimated to the
presence of persons from whom she was previously sheltered.  This ef-
fect, in combination with the educational information contained in
the ADA, will influence an employer to embrace the notion that peo-
ple with disabilities belong in the mainstream, including the work-
place.  This is particularly true because the general impetus to exclude
disabled people arises from benign neglect rather than from ani-
mus.394
390
See supra Part II.C.2 (illustrating the “unique civil rights chronology” of disabled
Americans).
391
See supra Part III.A.1 (discussing evidence about the treatment of people with
disabilities that was presented during congressional hearings for the ADA).
392
Id.
393
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12,181-12,189 (2000) (specifying how places of public accom-
modation must make their facilities accessible to disabled persons).
394
At the same time, it bears noting that expressive law scholarship, including the
above account, may not adequately account for exogenous factors (for example, public
transportation and health care) that have a powerful effect on the efficacy of antidis-
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Moreover, recall that Congress framed the ADA as a civil rights
remedy rather than as a subsidy program.395  In doing so, the legisla-
ture articulated a group-based antisubordination theory that was to
eviscerate practices of systemic subordination.396  As such, the ADA’s
goal is to alter employer behavior that contributes to unacceptable sys-
temic patterns of social and economic subordination.397  This is prem-
ised on the notion that “employers who have a choice between par-
ticipating in a subordinating system and working (at reasonable cost)
against such a system have a moral obligation to respond in a way that
reduces subordination.”398
Framed as an antidiscrimination device, the ADA contains three
levels of sanctions that can change social norms towards people with
disabilities.  As a first order sanction, the fact that Congress promul-
gated the ADA in this manner signals to individuals that the majority
of the franchise believes that discriminating against the disabled is
morally wrong.  According to the belief change theory, and also ex-
trapolating the points that Robert Cooter has made in a more general
context,399 disability law can influence this process in two ways.  First,
in formulating a law regarding the disabled, and thereby creating a
legal duty on behalf of employers, Congress can increase an individual
employer’s willingness to embrace that duty as part of her larger du-
ties of citizenship.  Second, individuals who believe they are required
to obey the ADA’s precepts will alter their preferences in order to be-
have in a manner conducive with that mandate.  These two processes
tip an individual’s behavior toward a new equilibrium of behavior.
However, even if the ADA does not change the thinking of indi-
vidual employers who would prefer to continue to exclude disabled
workers,400 the framing of disability-based exclusion as a moral wrong
can convince those employers not to exercise that preference in fear
crimination norms.  For a discussion of the effect of some of these factors, see Stein,
supra note 68.
395
See supra Parts III.A.1, III.C.1 (outlining the evidence on which Congress based
its decision to enact the ADA and which motivated Congress to frame the ADA as an
“antidiscrimination device” as opposed to a subsidy program).
396
See supra Part III.C; note 362 and accompanying text.
397
Bagenstos, supra note 16, at 837-38.
398
Id. at 838.
399
See Robert Cooter, Do Good Laws Make Good Citizens?  An Economic Analysis of In-
ternalized Norms, 86 VA. L. REV. 1577, 1579 (2000) (discussing how the internalization
of social norms affects civic acts).
400
This argument works regardless of whether the employer is motivated by overt
prejudice, benign paternalism, or ignorance of true cost.
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of social condemnation.  This is true whether the censure would arise
through formal or informal channels.  Moreover, in combination with
either or both of the previous two orders of sanction, the ADA can
cause other members of an employer’s society to bring social pressure
and condemnation to bear upon her until she abstains from exclud-
ing disabled workers.  Again, this is especially true when the exclusion
of employees with disabilities arises from nonanimistic motivation.
Finally, the ADA has an effect for the traditional (“Old Chi-
cago”)401 reason that it creates monetary sanctions for discriminating
against individuals with disabilities in their employment relation-
ship.402  Modeled after Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,403 the
ADA consciously tracks many of its provisions and offers several means
for prosecuting claims.404  As described above, these means include the
requirement that employers engage in an “interactive process” with
disabled workers requesting workplace alterations, the formal filing of
a disability discrimination complaint with a local EEOC office, media-
tion requests, and lawsuits brought against those employers either by
aggrieved individuals or by the EEOC or the Department of Justice su-
ing on their behalf.405  Each of these measures in turn carries increas-
ingly heavy transaction costs for employers.  Thus, regardless of
whether employers continue to ultimately prove victorious in defend-
ing federal court suits, the ADA has added a transaction cost that re-
duces the overall utility to individual employers of exercising a prefer-
ence for excluding disabled workers.  Accordingly, by providing
sanctions, the ADA motivates individual employers to reconsider act-
ing on preferences that exclude disabled individuals from employ-
ment.
401
See supra note 379 (discussing the differences between “Old Chicago” and “New
Chicago” schools of thought on how norms interact with the law).
402
42 U.S.C. § 12,112 (2000).
403
Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2000) (prohibiting em-
ployment practices that result in disparate treatment as well as those causing disparate
impact).
404
See Scotch, supra note 73, at 276 (“Using the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as a legisla-
tive template, the ADA seeks to eliminate the marginalization of people with disabili-
ties through established civil rights remedies to discrimination.”); see also S. REP. NO.
101-116, at 43 (1989) (outlining which remedies and procedures under the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 are also available pursuant to the ADA); H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt.
2, at 82-83 (1990) (same); Burgdorf, supra note 4, at 463-64 (same).
405
See supra text accompanying notes 341-351(discussing the three avenues that
the ADA provides through which employers can correct informational asymmetries).
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CONCLUSION
Accepting ADA accommodations as an antidiscrimination remedy
equivalent to those contained in its predecessors—especially the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 on which the ADA was modeled—also requires ac-
cepting the equality of workers with disabilities.  The canonical para-
digm posits that economic reality and conceptual theory brightly and
inexorably divide Title I from Title VII.  Underlying this assertion is
the precept that the disabled are fundamentally different from, and
less capable than, other workers with atypical biology.  The near-
consensus of legal scholars and Supreme Court Justices who adhere to
the canonical paradigm acknowledges (to greater or lesser degree,
depending upon their jurisprudential vision) the equality of women
and African Americans and their wrongful historical exclusion from
workplace opportunity.  Yet these same scholars and judges rigidly
adhere to an interpretation of law maintaining that people with dis-
abilities are less able and more costly due to their inherently fixed im-
pairments.  Altering this canonical stance on disability equality re-
quires a sea change in social attitude.
Perhaps the most expedient way to transform social norms is
through increasing society’s familiarity with a previously unknown
group that it perceives, in sociological terms, as “other.”406  Remember
that a great deal of, if not the essential, support for the ADA’s passage
came from the “hidden army” of legislators with either personal (be-
cause they themselves had disabilities) or instinctive (because indi-
viduals they cared about were disabled) understanding of disability-
related stigma.407  As people age and are either themselves subject to a
disabling condition, or come into contact with others who have dis-
abilities, they become more sensitive to what it means to be cata-
406
The qualification in text reflects a view that the most expedient way to trans-
form legal norms is through widespread enforcement of those laws.  That, at least, is
the conclusion reached by Nobel Prize-winning economist James J. Heckman and
three of his colleagues in the context of measuring Title VII’s efficacy.  See Donohue &
Heckman, supra note 333, at 1637-40 (explaining the apparent “enigma” during the
1960s and 1970s in which African American advancements in employment and wages
occurred at times when federal enforcement of civil rights legislation was weak); James
J. Heckman & Brook S. Payner, Determining the Impact of Federal Antidiscrimination Policy
on the Economic Status of Blacks:  A Study of South Carolina, 79 AM. ECON. REV. 138, 167-73
(1989) (examining data which illustrates the contribution that federal civil rights activ-
ity made to the improvement of African American economic status during the mid-
1960s).
407
See supra Part II.C.2 (discussing the “hidden army” of legislators who supported
the bill).
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logued as “disabled.”408  Indeed, the transmogrification of previously
able-bodied individuals into people with disabilities is, among minor-
ity groups, an almost unique phenomenon that contributes to reduc-
ing the sense of “otherness.” 409  It is for this reason that I have op-
posed proposals to narrow Title I’s definition of disability to the
“seriously” disabled, even though to date the largest category of peo-
ple asserting Title I claims are able-bodied individuals who develop
back-related maladies.410  Although largely grounded in anecdote,
there is reason to believe that when a known and valued able-bodied
employee becomes, through illness or injury, a known and valued
employee with a disability, the disabled community as a whole bene-
fits.411  In addition, because ADA Title III requires that places of public
accommodation be made readily accessible,412 many employment-
related accommodation costs should be subsumed by employers in
408
Disabilities can manifest for a number of reasons.  See, e.g., Chung-Yi Li et al.,
Longest Held Occupation in a Lifetime and Risk of Disability in Activities of Daily Living, 57
OCCUPATIONAL & ENVTL. MED. 550, 550 (2000) (examining “the association between
the longest held occupation in a lifetime and risk of disability in activities of daily liv-
ing . . . among elderly people . . . in Taiwan”); Catherine A. Sarkisian et al., Correlates of
Attributing New Disability to Old Age, 49 J. AM. GERIATRICS SOC’Y 134, 134 (2001) (docu-
menting the attribution of disability among women to old age); Judith A. Turner et al.,
Predictors of Chronic Disability in Injured Workers:  A Systematic Literature Synthesis, 38 AM. J.
INDUS. MED. 707, 708-09 (2000) (analyzing a variety of factors associated with chronic
lower-back injuries).  As reported by the Survey of Income and Program Participation,
collected during 1991 and 1992, the average rates of disability by age among adults are:
13.6% for age 18–44 years; 29.2% for age 45–64 years; 44.6% for age 65–74 years;
63.7% for age 75–84 years; and 84.2% for age 85 years and over.  John McNeil, Disabil-
ity, in POPULATION PROFILE OF THE UNITED STATES 32, 32 (Bureau of the Census, Spe-
cial Studies Series No. P23-189, 1995), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/1/pop
/profile/95/14_ps.pdf.  Additional census data having to do with disabilities is avail-
able at http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/disability.html (last revised July 8, 2004); see
also Stein, supra note 202, at 64.
409
Exceptions to this rule include those people of color who had previously
“passed” as white or did not know their identities, as described, for example, by Jones,
supra note 134, at 1517 n.137, and those few individuals who change their sex.  See, e.g.,
Julie A. Greenberg, An Interdisciplinary and Cross-Cultural Analysis of Binary Sex Categories,
in TRANSGENDER RIGHTS: HISTORY, POLITICS, AND LAW 212 (Paisley Currah & Shannon
Minter eds., 2003).
410
This point was noted by economists Marjorie L. Baldwin and William G. John-
son in Dispelling the Myths About Work Disability, in NEW APPROACHES TO DISABILITY IN
THE WORKPLACE 39, 44 & fig.2 (Terry Thomason et al. eds., 1998).
411
Stein, supra note 202, at 55; see also Morley Gunderson & Douglas Hyatt, Do In-
jured Workers Pay for Reasonable Accommodation?, 50 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 92, 101
(1996) (finding that newly disabled workers at large firms received accommodations
under Canada’s similar law); Nancy R. Mudrick, Employment Discrimination Laws for Dis-
ability:  Utilization and Outcome, 549 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 53, 68 (1997)
(finding the same for American workers under the ADA).
412
42 U.S.C. §§ 12,181-12,189 (2000).
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their guise as owners or operators of those venues.  Moreover, when
states and local governments comply with Title III access requirements
in the areas of public transportation and public accommodation as
well as in the general construction of the physical environment,413
people with disabilities will have greater opportunity not only to
physically participate in social function, but also to socially interact
with mainstream society.
The ADA was enacted to achieve social and economic equality for
people with disabilities, mainly through the provision of reasonable
workplace accommodations.  Yet legal scholars and Supreme Court
Justices alike assert that the ADA’s employment mandates distinguish
the statute from traditional antidiscrimination measures, such as Title
VII, because providing accommodations results in something more
than equality for the disabled.  Challenging this canonical belief, this
Article argued that ADA-mandated accommodations are consistent
with other antidiscrimination measures because each remedies artifi-
cial exclusion from employment opportunity by questioning the ne-
cessity of established workplace norms.  It also placed the ADA within
its historical context by illustrating how now-outdated social conven-
tions about other workers with atypical biological identities, particu-
larly women and African Americans, continue to keep workers with
disabilities from equal labor market participation.  Finally, this Article
demonstrated how ADA accommodation expenses are an appropriate
and reasonable remedy and provided economic and prudential rea-
sons for why disability-related accommodations must be conceived of
as antidiscrimination provisions (rather than as tax-and-spend subsi-
dies) so as to alter social attitudes toward the disabled.
413
Id.
